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Abstract
The object of this study is to provide an empirical account of the nature and scope 
of home invasion robbery, an emerging form of serious and organised crime in 
Canada. This is situated within the ongoing definitional debate of what constitutes 
organised crime. It is also contextualised with anomie theory to elaborate the 
impact of American Empire upon Canada through the intertwined vehicles of law 
and political economy. A case study of home invasion robbery is provided that 
illustrates the spectrum of criminal enterprise this phenomenon is linked to or 
represents. I also provide an analysis of the rise in the use of financial intelligence 
in Canada’s fight against serious and organised crime, and the links this may 
entail with respect to home invasion robbery.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
Introduction
This study aims to provide an empirical account of the nature and scope of home 
invasion robbery, an emerging form of serious and organised crime in Canada. It 
situates these activities within the prevention and control apparatus with a 
particular focus on financial intelligence. The principal data source is case law as 
well as participant observation in selected areas of the Canadian law enforcement 
and intelligence community. Direct use of the latter experiences is constrained by 
secrecy and legal issues. Therefore, they were used to inform my use of a range 
of secondary research materials.
The impetus for this study derived from two factors. First, the development of a 
paper (Hicks 1998) which articulated the need for a programme of organised 
crime prevention. This combined a concern with the limitations of standard 
organised crime control strategies and some of the under-appreciated linkages 
between crime and organised crimes. It also included discussion of the potential 
of preventive approaches to diversify from the field of crime, in a complementary 
fashion, into more comprehensive efforts to tackle organised crime. I used this 
paper as an opportunity to survey the research literature, to identify prospective 
thesis supervisors and to market, later, my doctoral research interests toward
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particular academics. Serendipitously, the article was published in a volume of a 
journal in which my future thesis supervisor had contributed an article.
Second, in the employ of the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime 
(ICPC) located in Montreal, I was charged with the role of principal investigator for 
a research report. The report was to examine residential break and enter 
(burglary) and, the emergence of a terrifying criminal phenomenon that had been 
receiving much media attention, home invasion robbery. Commissioned in 1999 
by the National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) of the Government of Canada, a 
draft was completed for departmental use with a short-turnaround time and a 
revised version subsequently published by the ICPC (Hicks and Sansfacon 2001). 
Among other items, the research requested was to draw upon international 
experience on trends and consequences of these phenomena, various strategies 
and responses and the identification of effective preventive approaches.
The depth and breadth of available information on home invasion robbery was 
decidedly sparse, this notwithstanding a determined international trawl for 
information under the usual constraints imposed by short-term projects. The 
taskmasters were pleased with the product, but I was not satisfied with the extent 
of knowledge I was able to glean. During my time in Montreal, I had the good 
fortune of being introduced to senior officials in Criminal Intelligence Service 
Canada (CISC), a network of police/criminal intelligence across Canada. Through 
this forum, I began to understand that there were additional under-explored
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dimensions to home invasion robbery. The novelty and opaque nature of the topic 
captured my interest as a potentially suitable topic for scholarly study.
The research for this thesis has been undertaken during a period of substantial 
change in my professional circumstances; a diversity of experience that has 
contributed substantially to my knowledge base in the study of organised crime 
and the specific phenomenon of study. I left behind my employment with ICPC in 
the fall of 1999, but continued to contribute on a consultancy basis to various 
projects. From 2000 through to the summer of 2003 I lectured in criminology at the 
University of Ottawa, this in addition to various consultancies on crime prevention 
and organised crime issues as well as maintaining professional association with 
CISC. From the summer of 2003 to late 2005 I was employed with the Financial 
Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), a unique 
opportunity to view organised crime activities through the lens of a national 
financial intelligence unit.
Chapter Contents
In chapter two, I provide a review of the literature on serious and organised crime 
alongside efforts to define this phenomenon. It begins by exploring the distinction 
between two models, disorganised crime versus the mafia-octopus 
(disaggregated crime versus the Godfather), which underlie many interpretations 
of this topic area. I then provide a selective overview of official definitions from the 
United States, Canada, the European Union and the United Nations. My attention
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then turns to assessing the importance of social context in understanding 
organised crime as a participant in illegal and legal activities. Issues of social 
context are used to highlight the underlying dimensions of the linear (mafia- 
octopus) and non-linear (disorganised crime and network) arguments.
I argue that the literature tends toward disorganised crime and inter-related 
markets as indicative of the bulk of ‘organised crime activity’. Official definitions of 
the phenomenon have a long history of linear arguments of a presumed 
concentration toward populist images of a mafia-octopus. Nevertheless, official 
definitions have more recently (post-United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organised Crime 2000) given way to recognising the non-linear 
arguments of disorganised crime and network structures. Unfortunately, whilst the 
definitions have expanded to include a broad range of serious crimes, the 
Godfather imagery has lost little of its cachet or power as a (misleading) social 
metaphor. A situation of denotative expansion and connotative intransigence 
continues to impede clearer understanding of what organised crime is and how it 
fits into contemporary society.
In chapter three, I address critical issues on the evidence base for the study of 
organised crime as well as articulating an appropriate methodology for a case 
study on the social organisation of a serious crime, home invasion robbery (HIR), 
presented further below.
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It is not at all clear that standard scientific positivist methods are appropriate in the 
field of organised crime study or the construction of a helpful evidence base in this 
area. It is difficult to answer basic questions about the state of the evaluation 
literature, or to assess the size and scope of this problem or the assessed level of 
threat. Few programme evaluations are conducted, and those that exist tend to be 
basic pre-post designs using privileged operational data, often from enforcement 
agencies. Efforts to estimate the size of organised crime profits and the extent of 
money laundering typically involve little in the way of rigorous methodology and a 
distinct inflationary tendency.
The problems of studying organised crime are compounded by several key 
factors. Certain observers may exercise considerable influence over knowledge 
about the phenomenon and who is permitted to gain access to study the subject 
matter. The mass media provide the most accessible form of knowledge on this 
topic, though their coverage often tends to portray an explicit or implicit mafia- 
octopus. The executive branch of government, and law enforcement in particular, 
may limit funding, access and/or attempt to obscure evidence for certain topical 
areas of study.
Notwithstanding the acute and chronic difficulties of studying organised crime, 
academic researchers have employed a range of techniques to study various 
forms. These methods have included participant observation, observation, 
interviews with victims/offenders/enforcement/government, examination of police 
and court files, and other methods such as economic analysis based on the prices
of illicit commodities. Many of these efforts have required that the methods are 
tailored to the phenomenon of study. In developing my thesis, I employed a range 
of methods.
This included participant observation in the fields of criminal and financial 
intelligence that, although I could not use these directly for legal and ethical 
reasons, helped to inform my use of other sources of information. These included 
case law, the published and grey market literature, media reports and scholarly 
literature.
In chapter four, I assess the challenge of social regulation in general and with 
particular attention to organised crime. I discuss selected insights from anomie 
theory. These include Durkheim’s insight that anomie results from the absence of 
society in the failure to achieve social regulation. It also includes Merton’s insight 
that anomie results from the presence of society in the failure to achieve a 
balance between goal achievement and the suitability (morality) of the available 
means, then turn to the claim that Durkheim and Merton may be control theorists, 
and I highlight that in control theory individuals are freed to engage in deviance 
whereas in Durkheim and Merton individuals are pressured toward deviance.
I then shift from issues of causation to responses with respect to particular 
approaches to social regulation. These approaches illustrate the limitations of 
applying standard control orientations in general and especially with respect to 
those involved in organised crime. The analysis addresses general deterrence
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(the wider population), specific deterrence (at-risk individuals), incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation. In the case of the first three responses, we find questionable 
capacity to reduce or prevent organised crime. Such groups have available 
numerous techniques and tactics to circumvent or displace risks. Further, 
rehabilitation has not been properly tried.
The chapter also includes discussion of Durkheim’s legal evolution thesis. 
Therein, he argues that as society becomes more complex, moving from 
mechanical to organic solidarity, repressive (punitive) law is progressively 
replaced with restitutive (restorative) law. Although there are a number of critics of 
the legal evolution thesis, Durkheim posed a key problem of whether modern law 
can retain its own moral force and be something more than mere politics: a point 
taken up by post-modern refinements of the ‘moral panic’ thesis. The control of 
organised crime is an area that illustrates the continuing drift toward the narrow 
concerns of positive law.
In chapter five, I examine the sociological foundations of institutional anomie 
theory (IAT). These foundations involve the rise of the doux-commerce and self- 
destruction theses (Hirschman 1982) of market society. Respectively, the 
eighteenth century Enlightenment view that markets help to perfect human society 
and the nineteenth century Industrial revolution view that markets have a 
corrosive effect on human society. Building upon these ideas, IAT offers a macro- 
criminological model to examine structural causation. It posits that a market- 
oriented imbalance in social institutions may cause criminogenic tendencies in
various parts of society and simultaneously undermine institutional and individual 
observance of social rules.
I then examine key issues relating to the ideas of globalisation and empire. In 
particular, the post-World War II view of globalisation as a system of economic 
means to improve the condition of humanity and social organisation. This was 
followed by the late-1980s shift toward a view of globalisation as a system of 
economic means apparently operating for its own abstract purposes. These 
issues are then linked to the concept of empire (over imperialism) in the 
contemporary period of United States dominance.
My analysis then turns to how Canada experiences several anomic trends. 
Canadian sovereignty is not assaulted directly by an imperial aggressor but rather 
national participation in contemporary Empire compels a market-oriented focus in 
social institutions. This produces considerable inter-related problems and limits 
the ability of social institutions to regulate individuals and society. Despite the 
successes of the market-oriented society, those individuals and groups who find 
themselves marginalised represent a substantial problem to Canadian society.
In chapter six, I provide a case study of home invasion robbery as an example of 
serious and organised crime. I am not arguing that all HIR cases are organised 
crime, either in the sense that they meet stereotypical notions or that they 
necessarily fit neatly into official definitions. This is central to debates and issues 
raised in the thesis about the evolving definitions of ‘organised crime’ (See
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Chapter Two). Not the least of these issues is that the term itself and official 
definitions are problematic, and they are often unhelpful when examining the 
variable organisation of serious crimes. My aim is to examine how HIR exhibits, 
and may be linked to, a spectrum of criminal enterprise.
I begin with a range of definitional issues relevant to the discussion of HIR. This 
includes discussion of the two most proximate categories for HIR, residential 
break and enter (RB&E) and robbery, as defined by the Criminal Code of Canada. 
I then turn to the definition of HIR, which is not a distinct crime category but rather 
a subdivision of the categories of RB&E and robbery. The narrow definition 
focuses on robbery that occurs in a private dwelling. The broad definition focuses 
on a robbery, or any RB&E involving a violent offence, that occurs within a private 
dwelling. Given the potential overlap in the broad definition, a given incident 
should only be counted once and as the more serious offence. I also provide a 
brief discussion of definitional issues relating to serious and organised crime, and 
I discuss how HIR exhibits, and is linked to, a spectrum of criminal enterprise
I then turn to attempt to quantify the magnitude of the HIR problem. This is no 
straightforward task given that HIR does not exist as a distinct official crime 
category. For this reason, Uniform Crime Reports (UCR 1) that contain a 
nationally representative picture of police-recorded crime cannot be used to 
identify HIR incidence. It is possible to gain some idea of incidence using the more 
detailed UCR 2 survey of police-recorded crime. However, UCR 2 represented 
less than 50% of the national volume of police-recorded crime and, therefore, it
does not provide a representative picture of Canada as a whole or any of its 
regions. The General Social Survey (GSS), which includes a criminal 
victimisation component, provides some insights. However, the GSS does not 
have sufficient sensitivity to provide reliable statistics at a national, or census 
metropolitan area, level. The International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) is a 
comparative instrument and its typically small sample sizes (around 2,000) for 
each country produce sampling errors that make precise domestic estimates of 
existing crime categories problematic. Thus, the ICVS does not have sufficient 
sensitivity to be able to provide a reliable or precise estimate of the sub-category 
of home invasion robbery.
Then I provide an overview of 25 examples of HIR, 16 drawn from case law and 9 
from newspapers. These are assessed using the 5ls analytical framework 
(Ekblom 2003) and its eleven generic causes of crime to assess the social 
organisation of this phenomenon. My particular aim in using the framework is to 
examine how HIR exhibits, and may be linked to, a spectrum of criminal 
enterprise. I then turn to the Canadian policy response specific to the problem of 
home invasion robbery.
I try to highlight explicitly the profitability inherent in each of the examples (where 
the information is available), and there are a number of quite profitable examples 
that could be flagged by money laundering controls. The pertinent AML legislation 
in Canada and elsewhere by no means limits itself to ‘organised crime’ as that is 
commonly understood. Anti-money laundering controls can identify and be used to
target a broad spectrum of serious crimes. This may result objectively from sums 
over $10,000 (objective reporting) and/or from sums that are incompatible with the 
individual’s income and profile with a financial institution (subjective suspicious 
transaction reports that can potentially be triggered at any monetary amount). 
There are limits to what money laundering controls can achieve, and I am 
critiquing the idea of what such controls can achieve when they are ostensibly 
directed at ‘organised crime’. When in reality, these controls are directed at the 
finances generated by (potentially) any serious predicate crime (i.e., monies or 
convertible assets).
In chapter seven, I discuss the rise of anti-money laundering (AML) controls and a 
national financial intelligence unit (F ill) in Canada. Although many persons may 
think that AML relates primarily to organised crime, as it is commonly understood, 
and drug trafficking, these controls cover a broad range of serious and organised 
crimes. This diversity may include virtually any proceeds of crime as well as so- 
called ‘hot money’. This occurs where otherwise legitimate actors attempt to 
evade taxes and engage in deposits or wire transfers to convert or conceal such 
monies. To follow-up on the case study in chapter six, I will also discuss how AML 
controls may potentially detect or affect the phenomenon of home invasion 
robbery.
Financial intelligence may be considered the vanguard of efforts to tackle serious 
and organised crime. Its purported centrality in the anti-crime arsenal should
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therefore, also provide useful insights into more general aspects of the prevention 
and control of serious and organised crime.
The chapter begins with a brief discussion of getting inside a F ill, in particular the 
author’s involvement with the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre 
of Canada (FINTRAC). It discusses the difficulties of obtaining and using 
information about this very secretive area of public policy and operations. I then 
provide an overview of the policy and operational structure in Canada such as the 
jurisdictional division of governmental and investigative responsibilities.
Attention is then focused on issues surrounding the creation of FINTRAC in 2000. 
These include the domestic and international pressures for its creation, the 
substantive components of the reporting regime, and key components of 
FINTRAC’s design. The discussion also looks at the operational potential of 
FINTRAC. This includes its tactical mandate via the disclosure process, levels of 
analysis that are possible in context and the potential utility of external 
enforcement/intelligence and open source databases.
I also examine FINTRAC as representing an example of policy transfer from the 
United States but with a Canadian twist. Its design features are specific to the 
legal and cultural rules in Canada. These design features, in turn, have an effect 
on the potential impact of FINTRAC. This has resulted in a variety of public 
criticisms of the institution. I provide a brief discussion on Phase II of FINTRAC’s
12
legislative mandate, which is a response to various criticisms and a general 
deepening of the AML controls in Canada.
Finally, I explore how AML controls may potentially detect or affect the 
phenomenon of home invasion robbery. This includes discussion of how HIR, as a 
serious and/or organised crime, can generate sufficient proceeds to trigger 
investigative interest and/or AML detection. This is especially the case with 
respect to the more organised examples discussed above, and, in particular, with 
respect to the multi-billion dollar marijuana grow operation (MGO) industry.
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CHAPTER TWO: 
DEFINITIONS OF SERIOUS AND ORGANISED CRIME
A Calabrian chicken decided to become a member of the mafia. He 
went to a mafia Minister to get a letter of recommendation, but was told 
that the mafia did not exist. He went to a mafia judge, but he also told 
him that the mafia did not exist. Finally he went to a mafia mayor, and 
he too told him the mafia did not exist. So the chicken went back to the 
henhouse, and when the other chickens asked he answered that the 
mafia did not exist. Then all the chickens thought he had become a 
member of the mafia and became afraid of him.
— Luigi Malerba (Hess 1970: 190-191)
Introduction
The present chapter provides a review of the literature on serious and organised 
crime alongside efforts to define this phenomenon. It begins by exploring the 
distinction between two models, disorganised crime versus the mafia-octopus 
(disaggregated crime versus the Godfather), which underlie many interpretations 
of this topic area. I then provide a selective overview of official definitions from the 
United States, Canada, the European Union and the United Nations. My attention 
then turns to assessing the importance of social context in understanding 
organised crime as a participant in illegal and legal activities. Issues of social
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context are used to highlight the underlying dimensions of the linear (mafia- 
octopus) and non-linear (disorganised crime and network) arguments.
In this chapter, I argue that the literature tends toward disorganised crime and 
interrelated markets as indicative of the bulk of organised crime activity. Official 
definitions of the phenomenon have a long history of linear arguments of a 
presumed concentration toward populist images of a mafia-octopus. 
Nevertheless, official definitions have more recently (post-United Nations 
Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime 2000) given way to 
recognising the non-linear arguments of disorganised crime and network 
structures. The new Europol mandate appears to abolish the term organised 
crime and substitutes this with ‘serious crime’. Unfortunately, whilst the definitions 
have expanded to include a broad range of serious crimes, the Godfather imagery 
has lost little of its cachet. A situation of denotative expansion and connotative 
intransigence continues to impede clearer understanding of what organised crime 
is and how it fits into contemporary society.
Disorganised Crime vs. the Mafia-Octopus
Many accounts of organised crime may be divided between two competing views: 
(a) the “disorganised crime” model of flexible associations that service demand for 
outlawed goods and services; and (b) the “mafia-octopus” model of hierarchical 
associations that service the outlawed desires, strive for monopoly (or oligopoly) 
control, and corrupt ‘legitimate’ social structures. Proponents of the disorganised
15
crime model typically fuse theory and detailed empirical analyses of specific 
criminal activities or sectors to illustrate characteristic fluidity in disaggregated 
criminal markets. Journalists (Lippmann 1931a,b) sometimes portray the 
disorganised crime model. But this model is most commonly associated with the 
empirically derived preference of academics (Albini 1971; Hess 1970; lanni 1974; 
Levi 1981 1987; Levi, Bissell and Richardson 1991; Levi and Handley 1998; 
Mativat and Tremblay 1997; Morselli 2006; Naylor 2002; Potter 1994; Reuter 1983 
1995; Smith 1971 1976 1980; Thoumi 1995; Tremblay, Cusson and Morselli 
1998).
Proponents of the mafia-octopus model usually (avoid theory and) focus on 
empirical analyses, often of highly selective or confidential data, to show the 
machinations of (potentially) centralised criminal conspiracies. Journalists 
(Charbonneau 1976; Handelman 1993 1995; Kaplan and Dubro 2003; Lavigne 
1987; Robinson 1999; Sterling 1990 1994; Stock 2001) often portray the mafia- 
octopus model. It is the typical confidential-data-derived preference of politicians, 
government commissions and law enforcement agencies (in the case of North 
America, Criminal Intelligence Service Canada 2002; Kennedy 1960; Kerry 1997; 
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice 
1967; Quebec Police Commission 1977a,b). Academics and journalists (Anderson 
1965; Cressey 1967 1969; Lindesmith 1941a; Maas 1968 1997) who theoretically 
bypass, or gain access behind, the veil of legal and bureaucratic secrecy also 
tend toward the mafia-octopus model.
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The competition between the disorganised crime and mafia-octopus perspectives 
continues to assume a central place in much of the debate about organised crime.
Separating between the denotative and connotative aspects of definition 
(Sheptycki 2003), the former has progressively expanded to an ever larger range 
of activities and offenders (disorganised crime), and the latter steadfastly retains 
the popularised notions of elaborate criminal conspiracies (mafia-octopus). In 
simple terms, serious crime and organised crime are being fused together in an 
unwieldy composite. This is one way of sidestepping unease about definitions, as 
is the formation of superagencies or mega-departments, such as (in the richer 
Common Law countries) the Australian Crime Commission, the Serious and 
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) in the United Kingdom, the Department of 
Homeland Security in the United States and the Ministry of Public Safety in 
Canada. The denotative-connotative pattern above has had an unfortunate effect 
on definitions and understanding of what constitutes organised crime. Specifically, 
it leads many to the conclusion that the tentacles of an octopus are at work 
despite wide variations in the degree of activity and association patterns amongst 
offenders. Its consequent and unfortunate policy effect is that it oftentimes 
facilitates an undifferentiated official response to markedly different forms of 
criminal organisation (Beare 2003).
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Official Definitions — A Selective Overview 
United States
The lack of uniformity in applicable definitions between agencies, departments, 
and countries has long been a key barrier to the coordination of effort within and 
between nations. The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice (1967: 437) offered the following definition:
Organised crime is a society that seeks to operate outside the control 
of the American people and their governments. It involves thousands 
of criminals, working within structures as complex as those of any large 
corporation, subject to laws more rigidly enforced than those of 
legitimate governments. Its actions are not impulsive but rather the 
result of intricate conspiracies, carried on over many years and aimed 
at gaining control over whole fields of activity in order to amass huge 
profits.
An agreement amongst major U.S. enforcement agencies in 1979 arrived at the 
following two complementary definitions:
(1) Organised crime refers to those self-perpetuating, structured, and 
disciplined associations of individuals or groups, combined together for 
the purpose of obtaining monetary or commercial gains or profits, 
wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities 
through a pattern of graft and corruption.
(2) Organised crime groups possess certain characteristics which 
include but are not limited to the following:
A) Their illegal activities are conspiratorial;
B) In at least part of their activities, they commit or threaten to commit 
acts of violence or other acts which are likely to intimidate;
C) They conduct their activities in a methodical, systematic, or highly 
disciplined and secret fashion;
D) They insulate their leadership from direct involvement in illegal 
activities by their intricate organisational structure;
E) They attempt to gain influence in Government, politics, and 
commerce through corruption, graft, and legitimate means;
F) They have economic gain as their primary goal, not only from 
patently illegal enterprises such as drugs, gambling and loan-sharking, 
but also from such activities as laundering illegal money through and 
investment in legitimate business. (General Accounting Office 1981: 
10- 11)
Organised crime is portrayed above as a mafia-octopus. This official/populist 
paradigm has long-standing currency in the United States and it holds a powerful 
influence over public opinion, official definitions, and policy in many jurisdictions 
(Woodiwiss 2001 2003). An early example in the late-nineteenth century related
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to the killing of eleven imprisoned Italians in New Orleans. The Congressional 
Representative for Massachusetts argued that the lawless acts of the lynch mob, 
led by men of good standing, was in part prompted by their belief that those killed 
were,
...members of the Mafia, a secret society bound by the most rigid oaths 
and using murder as a means of maintaining its discipline and carrying 
out its decrees. Of the existence of such a society no reasonable man 
can, I think, have any doubt.... There was a further popular belief that 
this society was not only responsible for the murder of the chief of 
police, but that it was extending its operations and that it was 
controlling juries by terror, and that it would gradually bring the 
government of the city and the State under its control. This belief, no 
doubt, was exaggerated, but it was certainly not without foundation. 
(Lodge 1891: 603-604)
At this historical juncture, we see the emergence of the persistent alien mafia 
conspiracy thesis (Hawkins 1969; Smith 1976 1980). Nonetheless, lawlessness in 
late nineteenth and twentieth century did not primarily reflect the wholesale 
importation of the Italian (Sicilian) mafia. In late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century Chicago, for instance, localised gang activity gave way to gangsterism in 
parallel with a shift from frontier ethics to a more rigid ‘legitimate’ opportunity 
structure. With money as the common bond, crime assumed its role as 
handmaiden to local machine politics in advancing the interests of specific social
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groups and profiteers (Nelli 1969: 376, 389). The introduction of national alcohol 
prohibition in 1920 further helped, but did not determine, the development of 
American gangsterism.
By the 1970s observers were pointing to the emergence of a new mafia in 
America comprised of Blacks and Hispanics with more fluid organisational 
structures and methods to respond to the dynamics of illicit markets (lanni 1974). 
Less able to systematically corrupt officials but significantly more violent than the 
preceding Godfather paradigm, the new competitive market criminal organisations 
presented less potential for galvanising public and official opinion as well as new 
challenges for investigators (Reuter 1995). However, the mafia-octopus view of 
criminal organisation was renewed, possibly for an indeterminate term, with the 
post-Soviet rise of the so-called Red Mafia or Russian Mafiya (Anderson 1995; 
Rawlinson 1998a,b). The imagery of an actively or passively corrupt (ex- 
communist) state, supporting an imperialistic drive for criminal market dominance, 
underpinned constructions of the new evil empire (Handelman 1993 1995; Sterling
1994).
The flexibility of the Octopus construct is demonstrated by the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organisations (RICO) Statute (1970): Title 18 of the 
United States Code, Section 1961(4) defines (criminal) enterprise as “any 
individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any 
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity”. In 
enforcing this federal statute, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines
“organised crime as any group having some manner of a formalised structure and 
whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities. Such groups 
maintain their position through the use of actual or threatened violence, corrupt 
public officials, graft, or extortion, and generally have a significant impact on the 
people in their locales, region, or the country as a whole”. (FBI 2006)
Canada
Prior to 1997, the Criminal Code of Canada (CCC) did not per se define organised 
crime. The 1989 Proceeds of Crime legislation referred to enterprise crime offence 
(s. 462.3 CCC) as inclusive of a range of offences relating to corruption, 
prostitution, gambling, extortion, fraud, serious violence, designated drug 
offences, laundering the proceeds of crime, and other offence categories. The 
characteristics of organised crime could be deduced with reference to the specific 
offences alone, and/or the cross-referencing of offences (s. 462.3 CCC), in 
relation to acts, omissions, conspiracies, attempts, accessories, and/or the 
associated disposal of any property, benefits or advantages whether directly or 
indirectly obtained. Nevertheless, in serving the convenience of identification, the 
descriptive cross-references for the concept of enterprise crime offence were not 
to be used to interpret the meaning of the section (Greenspan 1994: 619). The 
concept of enterprise crime offence thus provided, at least implicitly, the notion of 
the pursuit of profit and/or power being the central motivation as well as the 
involvement of such actors in serious criminal offences. However, it said little
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about the social organisation of crime behind the descriptive cross-references of 
enterprise crime.
Following the enactment of Bill C-95 (1997), the Criminal Code of Canada defined 
organised crime (S. 467.1) as a specific type of criminal organisation. It referred 
to any group, association or other body consisting of five or more persons, 
whether formally or informally organised:
(a) having as one of its primary activities the commission of an 
indictable offence under this or any other Act of Parliament for which 
the maximum punishment is imprisonment for five years or more, and
(b) any or all of the members of which engage in or have, within the 
preceding five years, engaged in the commission of a series of such 
offences.
Bill C-95 was designed to target Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMGs). The 
legislation was prompted by the violence of biker wars (Hells Angels versus the 
Rock Machine) in the province of Quebec and the city of Montreal, and the 
resultant pressure these regions exercised upon the federal government. The 
prevailing popular account of OMGs is that of a mafia-octopus (though derived 
from an historic outlaw group of disorganised criminals), a national and 
international criminal confederation that controls drug distribution, prostitution, and 
other illicit markets (Lavigne 1987; Quinn 2001). If criminal organisations 
conformed to stereotypical public understandings, the C-95 definition would be
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adequately inclusive of OMGs as well as other generic profit-motivated examples 
(who are involved in much of their own dirty work) such as East-European-based 
groups like the Russian Mafiya, and Traditional/Italian- based groups like the 
Cosa Nostra.
The reality is that the C-95 definition did not capture the essence of contemporary 
organised crime. This law was criticised by enforcement officials, academics and 
others for being too rigid in terms of classification and for being too difficult to 
operationalise and apply against target groups. Indeed, C-95 was used to modest 
success against OMGs, and as a questionable sledgehammer against the 
reduced insulation of street gangs involving mostly young persons (Federation of 
Canadian Municipalities 2000). The core failure of the C-95 definitional strategy 
was its very high entry-barrier which tended to exclude the fluid nature of criminal 
organisations. In contrast to the popular imagery of OMGs as a mafia-octopus, the 
organisational structure is actually quite fluid and cellular, combining core 
membership with networked projects and use of arm’s length sub-contractors.
European Union
Authorities in Europe identify eleven characteristics of criminal organisation that 
provide substantive evidence for the label of organised crime. The European 
Union definition (Adamoli et al. 1998:8-9; Europol and the European Commission 
2001: 42) requires that a minimum of six characteristics be present. The first four 
are mandatory criteria: (1) Collaboration among more than two people; (2)
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Extending over a prolonged or indefinite period (referring to stability and 
(potential) durability); (3) Suspected of committing serious criminal offences, 
punishable by imprisonment for at least four years or a more serious penalty; and 
(4) Central goal of profit and/or power. A minimum of two further characteristics 
must be present from the remaining seven criteria: (5) Specialised division of 
labour among participants; (6) Exercising measures of discipline and control; (7) 
Employing violence or other means of intimidation; (8) Employing commercial or 
business-like structures; (9) Participating in money-laundering; (10) Operational 
across national borders; and (11) Exerting influence over legitimate social 
institutions (polity, government, justice, economy).
Europol (2007) recognises the multi-dimensional aspects of organised crime 
involvement in activities that are (wholly or partially) illegal. It is anticipated that 
from 2008 onwards the scope of work in Europol will shift from ‘organised crime’, 
which attributes qualities to criminality to ‘serious crime’ with its impact, and harm 
falling upon individuals and collective victims.
United Nations
While containing subtle (and not so subtle) differences, the European and 
Canadian definitions are quite complementary and consistent with respect to core 
characteristics. The points of convergence include the motivation for profit or 
power, which is deemed to be the core raison d’etre. It includes the involvement 
of two or more actors in a structured/disciplined association (formal or informal)
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that continues for some time. It also includes the engagement of actors in serious 
criminal offences as well as other linked activities that are wholly or partially 
illegal. To many observers two or more people do not appear to do justice to the 
populist mafia imagery and it is difficult to think of what this definition would 
exclude. Thus, some jurisdictions operationalise more formalised notions of the 
social organisation of enterprise crime such as those that flow from continued 
enforcement of the RICO Statute (1970) in the United States.
Despite core similarities, the above definitions could hardly respond to demands 
for a unified definition to address the phenomenon of cross-border crime 
(Dobov§ek 1996). The concept of transnational crime, coined by the United 
Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch in 1974, implicitly adds 
several sets of ideas to the concept of organised crime (Bossard 1990: 5; Mueller 
1998). First, the crossing of a border by people, things, or even criminal will. 
Certain criminals, fugitives, terrorists, and others may attempt to cross a border 
(which may be a crime in itself) during which they commit a crime or are on their 
way to commit a crime. The crime may be attached to specific illegal activities 
(e.g., white-collar crime, money laundering, corruption, terrorism or significant 
forms of violence), or to certain illegal objects (drugs, illegal aliens, firearms, 
artwork, intellectual property, etc.). The crime may also involve no physical 
passage across borders but refer instead to the exercise of criminal will, typically 
effected by electronic and communications technology (e.g., computer crime, 
corruption, money laundering and infiltration of legitimate business).
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Second, transnational crime adds the idea of international recognition of a crime 
by at least two involved states, or by one state wherein the crime has been 
committed. Without recognition in law by the state in which such a crime was 
committed or, in the case of remotely-effected crimes, without one state 
recognising the laws of another or possessing similar laws, a crime has not (from 
a legal standpoint) been committed. Whereas the concept of organised crime 
explicitly (in most definitions) includes more than one actor, serious transnational 
crimes typically involve organised criminal activity but may be conducted by an 
independent actor (Mueller 1998: 2: Reuter and Petrie 1999: 8). Despite more 
than a quarter century of currency, the widespread official popularity of 
transnational crime is quite recent. The vogue of transnational crime accompanied 
the flurry, beginning in the 1990s, of government concern about (international) 
organised crime and the need for standardised definitions and multi-lateral 
cooperation (Edwards and Gill 2002; Harfield, 2008; Passas 1999a; Ruggiero 
2000b; Savona 1995).
The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (2000) 
was introduced in a high-level signing conference convened in Palermo, Italy, 
December 12-15. The central purpose of the Convention was “to promote 
cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organised crime more 
effectively”. The scope of application was the subject of extensive negotiations as 
elaborated in Article 3. The convention applies to four offences (participation in a 
criminal organisation, laundering the proceeds of crime, corruption, and
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obstruction of justice as per articles 5, 6, 8, 23, respectively). In addition to the 
four specific offences, the convention also applies to any “serious crime” as 
articulated by Article 2, paragraph (1)(b) if, in either case, the offence is 
“transnational in nature” and if it “involves an organised criminal group”. Article 
two, paragraph (2), addresses the question of whether an offence is “transnational 
in nature”. It includes offences committed in more than one state and offences 
committed in only one state if they are prepared, planned, directed, controlled or 
have substantial effects in other states, or if they are committed by an organised 
criminal group which is active in more than one state. This provision generally 
determines whether the Convention will apply to the “prevention, investigation and 
prosecution” of offences covered by the Convention, but this is subject to more 
specific rules set out in some of the Articles of the Convention and Protocols. For 
example, Article 18, paragraph (1), which deals with mutual legal assistance, 
refers to requests for assistance when the requesting State Party “...has 
reasonable grounds to suspect...” that the offence is transnational in nature, which 
makes it possible to use such a request in an attempt to find out whether this is 
the case.
For the purposes of the Convention, article 2 defines an “organised criminal 
group” as a structured group. A non-random organisation, a structured group 
exhibits formal or informal association and/or roles for its members, but does not 
require continuity of membership. It involves at least 3 members, exists for a 
period of time, and involves participants acting in concert for the purpose of
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committing crimes specified in the Convention or serious crimes (e.g., punishable 
by four years imprisonment or a more serious penalty) in order to obtain financial 
or material benefit. The convention also compels parties, under the provisions of 
article 5, to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, 
participation in a criminal organisation.
In April 2001, the Government of Canada proposed Bill C-24. It was passed by 
the House of Commons in June 2001 and came into force in January 2002. In 
compliance with the Palermo Convention, C-24 provides the following definition 
under the Criminal Code of Canada:
467.1(1) Criminal organisation means a group, however organised, that
(a) is composed of three or more persons in or outside Canada; and
(b) has as one of its main purposes or main activities the facilitation or 
commission of one or more serious offences [an indictable offence 
punishable by five years imprisonment or more, or another offence 
prescribed by regulation] that, if committed, would likely result in the 
direct or indirect receipt of a material benefit, including a financial 
benefit, by the group or by any of the persons who constitute the group.
It does not include a group of persons that forms randomly for the 
immediate commission of a single offence.
29
The above simplifies the (previous C-95) Canadian definition of criminal 
organisation in several ways. It reduces the minimum number of persons from five 
to three. It no longer requires evidence of a series of crimes occurring over a 
given period (only offences relevant to the case). It also covers all serious crimes 
inclusive of those prescribed by regulation. This legislation allows for enforcement 
and prosecution of individuals who: participate in or facilitate the activities of 
criminal organisations (467.11); commit indictable offences for the benefit of or in 
association with a criminal organisation (467.12); and direct or indirectly instruct 
others to commit offences for the benefit of or in association with a criminal 
organisation (467.13).
The maximum penalties include imprisonment for five years, fourteen years, and 
life, respectively. Sentences relevant to criminal organisation offences are to be 
served consecutively to any other offence sentence, regardless of whether the 
given offence is connected or unconnected to a series associated with the 
particular event and organisation (467.14).
The core elements of the Palermo-inspired definition are the: (a) non-random 
association of three or more persons; (b) commission of serious offences and/or 
offences prescribed in domestic criminal law and/or the UN Convention; and (c) 
pursuit of material benefit including financial benefit. This newly minted model of 
definitional harmonisation offers a truly breathtaking conflation of serious crime, 
organised crime, and transnational organised crime. It also adds further confusion 
to efforts at unpacking the disorganised crime and mafia-octopus debate. While
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the official definitions focus on the question of what the phenomenon is from the 
narrow standpoint of legal targeting of individuals and aggregations thereof, such 
definitions conveniently sidestep the more pressing questions of why criminal 
organisations exist and how they fit within the social context. Context is critical to 
this understanding.
Criminal Organisation and Social Context 
The Linear Argument
The nature of a given criminal organisation can be discerned with reference to the 
patterns and processes of social interaction, the analytically separable, yet 
interdependent, “structures of activity” and “structures of association”, geared 
toward the achievement of criminal objectives (Cohen 1977: 97-100). The 
concept of activity structures refers to the chain of techniques used to conduct a 
crime(s). The concept of association structures refers to the techniques 
associated with creating and maintaining the social bond. McIntosh (1971 1973 
1975 1976) lists four types of criminal organisation that accompany, and 
predominate within, the opportunity structures associated with the progressive 
political and economic centralisation of modern Western civilisation:
Picaresque: the hierarchical and military-style organisation
characteristic of the violent robbery activities and nomadic lifestyle of 
pirates and bandits (in the rural pre-industrial context);
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Craft: the egalitarian and flat organisation characteristic of the non­
violent activity of largely sedentary pickpockets and burglars (in the 
urban pre-industrial context);
Project: the combination of a flat organisation of core members and 
hierarchical organisation of peripheral members characteristic of the 
advanced planning involving robbery of large-scale commercial targets 
(in the emerging urban industrial context);
Business: the variable forms of vertically-integrated and networked 
organisational structures characteristic of involvement in racketeering 
activities, that is, extortion/protection and the distribution of illicit goods 
and services (in the urban industrial context).
Implicitly or explicitly, many observers may view macro-evolutionary change 
through a linear lens, a Darwinian focus on competitive selection, incremental, 
adaptive, and hierarchical change. The typology that McIntosh constructed, rather 
impressively given limited data then existing, identifies a general trend of 
symptomatic expressions of criminal organisation. It further intimates the evolving 
professionalisation of the underworld accompanying the development of Western 
countries. The linear argument may be appealing for its simplicity. However, it 
fails to take into account that societies in any given historical period create a 
range of opportunities for illegal enterprise. In simple terms, many of the forms of 
crime identified by McIntosh may appear in a given society and there is no reason
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to expect a linear progression or concentration toward more ‘advanced’ forms (cf. 
Bauman 1998: 59; Gould 1980). Indeed, McIntosh herself opposed the view that 
there was a linear progression to business forms of organisation.
Clearly, there is a need to go beyond the linear argument and to identify and 
employ a more instructive and analytical method to understand illegal enterprise. 
Naylor (2003) helps to clarify the economic logic behind profit-driven crimes with a 
tri-partite model: predatory, market-based and commercial. Predatory crimes are 
“purely transferral” given the involuntary nature of bilateral property extraction 
from victims, whereas market-based crimes are “partly functional” given the 
(more-or-less) voluntarily nature of multilateral exchange for illicit goods or 
services (United Nations International Drug Control Programme 1997: 150). 
Commercial crimes are apparently voluntary given the multilateral trade in legal 
goods and services, but also involuntary given the illegal (fraudulent) methods of 
manipulating market values to the disadvantage of victims. The business model is 
the referent for the partly functional transaction and common (i.e., popular and 
pre-Palermo Convention) notions of what constitutes organised crime. The 
picaresque, craft, and project models are primarily examples of the purely 
transferral transaction, and these may, under certain circumstances, be labelled 
as organised crime. Ideal types of criminal organisation may not correspond with 
all, or even many of the characteristics of real organisational forms, including 
patterns of centralisation, within a given context. Clearly, we should not be
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seduced by the periodisation of the McIntosh typology (Levi 1998c: 340) nor by 
the overly mechanical centralisation implicit in the linear argument.
For instance, many observers will tend to equate racketeering, as the 
quintessential form of modern organised crime, with the twentieth century, and 
piracy and banditry with the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. 
Nevertheless, this ignores various examples of the presence of unexpected types 
of criminal organisation and the culture-specific overlapping of such forms. 
Throughout antiquity and across the geographic diversity of Greece, Italy, Egypt 
and other countries, one finds concurrent and/or separate examples of extortion 
and racketeering, advanced financial fraud, craft crime, and banditry and piracy 
(Hopwood 1999; van Wees 1999). An organised system of racketeering in 
eighteenth-century France was conducted by gangsters known as “chevaliers 
d’industrie” (Saintonge and Saintonge 1938). In eighteenth-century Holland, there 
existed apparent linkages between marginal populations, craft criminals, roving 
foreign bandits, and largely sedentary urban bandits who engaged in crime as a 
part-time supplement to their legitimate transportation occupations (Spierenburg 
1998). The persecution suffered by John Hancock -  the first signer of the 
Declaration of Independence -  did not result from his putative status a 
(suspected) smuggler. Rather, his persecution in the pre-Independence period 
reflected his determination to pursue his legal rights when confronted by the 
personal, political, and economic motivations of British revenue racketeers 
(Dickerson 1946).
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Patterns of Centralisation
Equally puzzling are patterns of centralisation. Sometimes ‘less mature’ forms of 
criminal organisation are able to establish business-like racketeering, and other 
times the pattern will be reversed. For example, banditry may develop into a 
permanent racketeering organisation, typically where it achieves control over an 
unpoliced territory or accommodation with the local elite. Such accommodation 
may include a fix against enforcement pressure or a contract for the bandits to 
provide policing services.
Similar to an autocratic monarch, the “stationary bandit” presented with stable 
opportunities for racketeering activities may be guided by an “invisible hand” to 
limit the rate of theft (taxation) and provide public goods such as peace and order 
(Hobsbawm 1969a: 55-56, 87; McGuire and Olson 1996; Olson 1993). While 
social justice sensibilities may be at play, the economic imperative is to provide 
adequate encouragement for citizens (victims) to produce more output, or 
additional resources that may be available for extraction. The band it-racketeer 
often suffers for the crudity of his/her technique as well as market conditions. This 
form of organisational centralisation is therefore quite vulnerable to shifting 
political currents and enforcement pressure, a lesson experienced by the Kray 
and the Richardson brothers in 1960s London (Levi 1981: 65, 75).
Craft crime may move toward, or be subsumed by, business organisation where 
entrepreneurs are able to exert control over the activities of the autonomous craft
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organisation. This may occur in two cases. First, a substantial quantitative 
increase in the pool of people who require the training and coordination services 
of an entrepreneur (fence) occurs because law enforcement has significantly 
increased the risk in marketing (as opposed to stealing) stolen goods (e.g., the 
Fagin phenomenon). Second, an entrepreneur (fence) has managed to secure 
protection from law enforcement for a group of craftsmen, and the former is thus 
able to secure control under the threat of withdrawing protection (McIntosh 1973: 
47).
Where an entrepreneur (fence) is able to offer either improved training and 
coordination, or protection from law enforcement, this can enable sustained 
qualitative change and larger-scale activities than regular craft crime. 
Nevertheless, the basic craft technique remains vulnerable to external pressures. 
It is not clear that this underlying vulnerability is mitigated by over-reliance upon 
the capacity of an entrepreneur (fence) to bribe, charm and control his patrons 
(law enforcement) and clients or subordinates (thieves). While its core of 
professional criminals provides some insulation, project crime may also be subject 
to centralisation processes where an entrepreneur and/or mafia groups are in a 
position to offer substantial capitalisation needed for specific projects. This in 
addition to protection from rivals and law enforcement and/or the threat of betrayal 
to the latter if the criminals do not come onside.
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Networks and the Non-Linear Argument
The stark contrast of disorganised crime and the mafia-octopus may not be helpful 
in analysing actual forms of serious and organised crime. The nature of organised 
crime makes it a “permanently transitional sector” exhibiting hybrid forms of 
activity and association to exploit available opportunities (Arlacchi 1979: 66-72). 
The middle-range of networks offers variable levels of fluidity and coordination 
that are useful to maximise returns and reduce risks in the uncertain environment 
of informational capitalism (Castells 1998; Thorelli 1986). Cellular structures are 
today ubiquitous in both legitimate and illicit enterprises as evidenced by 
widespread patterns of contract and ad hoc employment of internal and external 
human resources, overlapping patterns of governance and core groups of 
“protection entrepreneurs” (Gambetta 1993). The rise of networks in contemporary 
capitalism further problematises the identification of the essential characteristics of 
serious and organised crime. On the one hand, we do not know the relative 
predominance of disorganised crime versus mafia-octopus organisation (Naylor 
2002) and there is no reason why this should be consistent in different societies 
either over time or contemporaneously. On the other hand, the nodal distribution 
of power through local, regional and transnational networks adds to the analytical 
challenges of determining whether one has uncovered tentacles, a part of the 
octopus itself, or a small school of (independent) squid.
Some argue that, for the purposes of definition and understanding, it is important 
to separate markets from criminal organisations. Whereas the supply of illicit
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goods and services is typically disorganised with no inherent tendency toward 
centralisation, criminal organisations persist with a developmental path that may 
not be predicated upon involvement in, or the dynamics of, illegal markets (Paoli 
2002). Indeed, a number of the major organised crime groups (e.g., camorra, 
’ndrangheta, Sicilian mafia, etc.) pre-date many of the current illegal markets. 
Many of the illicit markets may be immune to monopoly or oligopoly control, but 
the profitability of these same markets may also provide “the central core of 
underworld business”, the protection market which initiates and sustains large- 
scale organised crime (Schelling 1967: 78; 1971: 79).
The market to produce and sell trust in the form of protection guarantees over 
economic transactions may also be disorganised. Nonetheless, specific aspects 
of protection as a commodity, such as the need to establish enforceable property 
rights (Jennings 1984: 321), are likely to “foster the growth of...a succession of 
territorial monopolies...in the protection market” (Gambetta 1988: 134).
Participation in illegal activities is often accompanied by a lack of trust which can 
induce a norm-less state of social relations. Actors involved in illicit activities may 
be experiencing pervasive anomie (given the absence of trust) as a function of the 
illegality of their work, but this also adds value to those extra-market forces which 
are perceived to be capable of fostering goal achievement and contractual 
compliance (cf. Levi 1981: 82, 119).
Neither economic efficiency associated with illicit markets, nor monopoly control, 
offers an adequate explanation for the organisational logic of organised crime.
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The polyvalence of such groups implies a multi-faceted logic as the basis for 
organisational culture, goals and structure (Paoli 2002: 63-64, 73). Organisational 
logic will also be driven by the particulars of a given context. Indeed, large-scale 
and hierarchical racketeering organisations as portrayed in the Godfather films do 
not fit in every time and space given the variability of infrastructure, tastes, 
competitive and law enforcement pressures and other variables.
For instance, British organised crime is dominated, not by the vivid colour of 
mafia-octopus conspiracies as preferred in the United States, but rather the 
modest-scale and shabby grey of middle-aged, white, and home-grown career 
criminals of the variety portrayed in the Minder television series (The Economist
2001). These Minder-type syndicates run streamlined but diversified networks, 
offering a very efficient, or competition resistant mechanism for engaging in drug 
distribution, armed robbery, fraud, and trade in illegal cigarettes. While such 
networks may possess a comparative advantage domestically, these may also 
impair the capacity to control domestic markets and attract foreign investors who 
are seeking reliable outlets for diversification and economies of scale. Though 
British crime, as is the case for British industry, is simply too profitable for many 
investors to resist (Levi 1976). Other countries, such as Canada, are more open to 
cultivating home-grown talent as well as effective or de facto franchises of foreign 
industry (Cressey 1969: 155-157; Cressey 1972: 2-3; Mann and Hanley 1968: 
152-153).
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Chief Superintendent Ben Soave, a leading (former) RCMP gang-buster, argues 
that a consolidated Organised Crime Inc. is apparent in the joint enterprise 
linkages, cooperation, and coordination between multinational gangs (Stock
2001). A specialised division of labour is deemed to exist, with some parties 
concentrating on leadership and policy coordination (Italian-based or traditional), 
technology and computer expertise (Asian-based), money laundering and 
extortion (East European-based), and distribution and enforcement (Outlaw 
Motorcycle Gangs or OMGs). Others dismiss the multi-ethnic complex that is 
deemed to constitute organised crime (Criminal Intelligence Service Canada
2002) as merely a pluralist revision of the much-derided alien mafia conspiracy 
thesis (Hawkins 1969; Potter 1994; Smith 1976 1980). The global pluralist theory 
of serious and organised crime promulgated by the Palermo Convention serves to 
further obfuscate the disorganised crime and mafia-octopus debate. Also lost in 
this debate is the possibility that we do not face a zero-sum game as more and 
less organised crime may co-exist without necessary tension within and between 
nation-state boundaries. Whilst it generates a spectacularly inclusive model of 
what constitutes organised crime, the Palermo Convention also conveniently 
sidesteps issues of context and linkage between the upperworld and the 
underworld (Woodiwiss 2003: 22-24). What is more, greater or lesser amounts of 
organised crime may be capable of coexistence (symbiotic or otherwise) within 
and between nation state boundaries. A zero-sum game is not, necessarily, what 
we confront at the domestic and international level.
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Government Protection (State Racketeering)
At root, official definitions represent the choices made by the police and other 
state agencies of social groups and activities that are considered dangerous 
threats to the integrity of the state and its agencies (Levi 1998c: 335; Reuter and 
Petrie 1999: 12; Ruggiero 2000b). The Palermo Convention offers wonderfully 
elastic definitional boundaries. It constitutes an unequivocal and ongoing act of 
gerrymandering the definitional boundaries (Woolgar and Pawluch 1985). For 
notwithstanding the selective enforcement imperative given inevitable resource 
constraints, the new definitional harmonisation provides the maximum possible 
discretion to state and enforcement officials as to the expansive range of deviant 
acts and actors who may be viewed and treated as (transnational) organised 
crime. Whereas the denotative definition of organised crime has been expanded 
to the wide domain of all designated and “serious crime”, the connotative 
dimension of (domestic and transnational) mafia-octopus criminal conspiracies 
retains its popularity and status (Sheptycki 2003).
It is important to question the underlying assumptions of the new definition and its 
policy implications. The official (Palermo-style) definitions of organised crime are 
inherently problematic because they merge an expansive range of activity and 
association structures into an unwieldy composite, ostensibly to be addressed by 
the enforcement architecture and officialdom. They further avoid substantive 
issues of how criminal organisations work in practice and how these phenomena 
fit into the policy environment of contemporary social structure.
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The conspiratorial imagery of the mafia-octopus offers a saccharine model for 
public consumption. Nevertheless, the “artificial unity” ascribed to the category of 
serious crimes is misleading (Naylor 2003: 83) as is the neat dichotomy between 
the pathological and the normal:
...the pathological forms of a phenomenon are no different in nature 
from the normal ones, and consequently it is necessary to observe 
both kinds in order to determine what that nature is. Sickness is not 
opposed to health; they are two varieties of the same species and each 
throws light on the other (Durkheim 1895: 79).
The law enforcement concerns with detecting whom and what tend to unduly 
narrow understanding to issues such as the means, goals, individuals, activities, 
behaviour, or money. Improved understanding could be achieved with a process- 
oriented focus focussing on how forms of crime develop and co-exist, how they 
capitalise upon opportunities and neutralise social control efforts in a given 
context (Adamoli et al. 1998: 4, 9; Cohen 1977: 100; McIntosh 1975; Woodiwiss 
2001).
Well repressed in the thinking behind official definitions, the alleged growth and 
pervasiveness of organised crime is primarily linked to the structural problems 
wrought by the “criminogenic asymmetries” of anomic market-oriented policy 
(Passas 1999a). The use of globalisation as a synonym for civility and progress 
on the one hand, or disorder and chaos on the other, contributes little to
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intellectual clarity (Bauman 1998: 57-59; Hirschman 1982). However, the 
profusion of the market-oriented society underscores the desire for freedom to 
participate in, and to obtain protection from, the forces of glocalisation (Robertson
1995) or the reciprocal currents of local and transnational forces. The role of 
government and public policy is critical in this regard, for as the American political 
historian Charles Tilly puts it:
[If we] consider the definition of a racketeer as someone who creates a 
threat and then charges for its reduction. Governments’ provision of 
protection, by this standard, often qualifies as racketeering. To the 
extent that the threats against which a given government protects its 
citizens are imaginary or are consequences of its own activities, the
government has organised a protection racket. Since governments
themselves commonly simulate, stimulate, or even fabricate threats of 
external war and since the repressive and extractive activities of 
governments often constitute the largest current threats to the 
livelihoods of their own citizens, many governments operate in 
essentially the same ways as racketeers. There is, of course, a 
difference: Racketeers, by conventional definition, operate without the 
sanctity of governments (Tilly 1985: 169, 171).
Organised crime is not a mere blight upon the social landscape as it serves a 
number of social purposes, both in the illicit and licit economy. Indeed, it has
become in some societies a significant force in the legitimate economy as a
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provider of trust for transactions, an entrepreneurial entity, and even a provider 
(and allocator!) of social service such as low cost housing. This is more often 
recognised in selected countries such as Colombia, Italy and Russia (Anderson 
1995; Clawson and Lee 1996; Gambetta 1993; Hess 1970; Handelman 1995; 
Rawlinson 1998a,b; Sterling 1990 1994). Nevertheless, this can also be a fact in 
many countries, including wealthy industrialised nations.
Conclusion
The present chapter provided a review of the literature on serious and organised 
crime alongside efforts to define this phenomenon. It began by exploring the 
distinction between two models, disorganised crime versus the mafia-octopus 
(disaggregated crime versus the Godfather), which underlie many interpretations 
of this topic area. I then provided a selective overview of official definitions from 
the United States, Canada, the European Union and the United Nations. My 
attention then turned to assessing the importance of social context in 
understanding organised crime as a participant in illegal and legal activities. 
Issues of social context were used to highlight the underlying dimensions of the 
linear (mafia-octopus) and nonlinear (disorganised crime and network) arguments.
In this chapter, I argued that the literature tends toward disorganised crime and 
interrelated markets as indicative of the bulk of organised crime activity. Official 
definitions of the phenomenon have a long history of linear arguments of a 
presumed concentration toward populist images of a mafia-octopus.
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Nevertheless, official definitions have more recently (post-United Nations 
Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime 2000) given way to 
recognising the non-linear arguments of disorganised crime and network 
structures. Unfortunately, whilst the definitions have expanded to include a broad 
range of serious crimes, the Godfather imagery has lost little of its cachet. A 
situation of denotative expansion and connotative intransigence continues to 
impede clearer understanding of what organised crime is and how it fits into 
contemporary society.
The following chapter delves into the evidence-based with respect to the study of 
organised crime and discusses the theoretical and methodological orientation for 
the study of home invasion robbery.
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CHAPTER THREE: 
METHODOLOGY
We must study what is significant, not what best fits conventional 
methodologies.
— Maria Los and Andrzej Zybertowicz (2000)
Introduction
The present chapter addresses critical issues on the evidence base for the study 
of organised crime as well as articulating an appropriate methodology for a case 
study on the social organisation of a serious crime, home invasion robbery (HIR), 
presented further below.
It is not at all clear that standard scientific positivist methods are appropriate in the 
field of organised crime study or the construction of a helpful evidence base in this 
area. It is difficult to answer basic questions about the state of the evaluation 
literature, or to assess the size and scope of this problem or the assessed level of 
threat. Few programme evaluations are conducted, and those that exist tend to be 
basic pre-post designs using privileged operational data, often from enforcement 
agencies. Efforts to estimate the size of organised crime profits and the extent of 
money laundering typically involve little in the way of rigorous methodology and a 
distinct inflationary tendency.
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The problems of studying organised crime are compounded by several key 
factors. Certain observers may exercise considerable influence over knowledge 
about the phenomenon and over who can gain access to study the subject matter. 
The mass media provides the most accessible form of knowledge on this topic, 
though their coverage often tends to portray an explicit or implicit mafia-octopus. 
The executive branch of government, and law enforcement in particular, may limit 
funding, access and/or attempt to obscure evidence for certain topical areas or 
study.
Notwithstanding the acute and chronic difficulties of studying organised crime (and 
a relatively low prestige - especially in North America - for non-quantitative 
research), academic researchers have employed a range of techniques to study 
various forms. These methods have included participant observation, observation, 
interviews with victims/offenders/enforcement/government, examination of police 
and court files, and other methods. Many of these efforts have required that the 
methods are tailored to the phenomenon of study. In developing my thesis, I 
employed a range of methods. This included participant observation in the fields 
of criminal and financial intelligence that, although I could not use directly for legal 
and ethical reasons, helped to inform my use of other sources of information. 
These included case law, the published and grey market literature, media reports 
and scholarly literature.
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The Evidence Base for the Study of Organised Crime
Beginning with the study of medicine and progressively expanding to encompass 
many other disciplines, the concept of evidence-based research and policy1 has 
earned a wide following amongst politicians, policy-makers and academics 
(Council of Europe 2001; Petrosino et al. 2001). Although the concept enjoys 
remarkable currency, a consensus as to what it actually means has not yet 
emerged in the field of criminology. The debate may be divided amongst the 
quantitative and qualitative camps. First, there are those who advocate a (largely) 
quantitative programme of scientific positivism (Farrington 1997 1998 2002; 
Farrington and Petrosino 2001; Petrosino et al. 2001; Sherman et al. 1997 2002; 
Welsh and Farrington 2002a). Second, there are those who advocate for realism 
(Pawson 2002a,b; Pawson and Tilley 1997 1998a,b). This includes a focus on the 
importance of context and theory building about factors that enable or inhibit 
change (Annie E. Casey Foundation 1998; Connell et al. 1995; Fulbright- 
Anderson et al. 1998; Kubisch et al. 1997 2002). Indeed, the successes and 
failures of many programmes, such as the United Kingdom crime reduction 
programme, cannot be properly understood through the lens of scientific 
positivism alone (Hough 2004).
Operating in relative degrees of accordance with the tenets of the Campbell 
Collaboration (http://www.campbellcollaboration.org), the positivists are engaged
1 The following three paragraphs on evidence-based research and policy are adapted 
from Hicks (2004: 3-4).
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in the centralised accumulation and dissemination of systematic reviews on 
scientific evaluations. Scientific evaluation refers specifically to “what works” as 
measured by rigorous attention to the internal validity between a given 
programme(s) and its effect(s). Greater credence is afforded to individual and 
cumulative studies that utilise the gold standard of scientific research, a fully 
experimental design including random assignment to experimental and control 
conditions. The greater the deviation from this standard -  for instance, pre-post 
measures with multiple matched groups, pre-post without controls and one-shot 
correlative studies -  the lesser the value of the individual study and the lesser its 
cumulative relevance for the base of evidence (what works, what does not, and 
what’s promising).
By contrast, change theorists and realists are less interested in isolating the 
question of what works to the internal validity of a given programme and its 
effect(s). The gold standard of random assignment may be appropriate in the 
context of testing the effectiveness of therapeutic medicines in a clinical or quasi- 
clinical setting (for a dissenting opinion see lllich 1976/1995). However, such 
standards may constitute a decidedly alien method when applied in a non-clinical 
community context that involves complex chains of actors, relationships and social 
structures (cf. Farrington 1997 1998; Pawson and Tilley 1998a,b).
The persistence of the disorganised crime and mafia-octopus debate is connected 
to the definitional issues discussed in the previous chapter as well as to the issues 
discussed below on how we know about organised crime. The latter may be
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revealed through the consideration of selected research questions about our 
knowledge of organised crime, key groups of observers who influence our 
understanding and the links between methodology and the portrayal of this 
phenomenon.
Selected Research Questions
A number of core research questions spring from the discussion above. What is 
the state of the evaluation literature in this area? What is the size and scope of 
this problem or the assessed level of threat?
Evaluations of prevention and control initiatives directed at organised crime 
appear to be a rare occurrence. This is substantiated by the paucity of evaluations 
published in the official or grey literature and, where available, that may be subject 
to further empirical scrutiny. Some substantive international reviews of efforts at 
evaluation initiatives (Levi and Maguire 2004: 407; Schneider et al. 2000: 7) reveal 
that where relevant data were made available to the reviewers, such studies 
typically involve no more than a decidedly rudimentary pre-post assessment 
(excluding matched or randomised controls) using the privileged operational data 
of the agency (typically law enforcement) concerned. There appears to be an 
absence of a common frame of reference for both the target phenomenon as well 
as standards for evaluation. It may not be practical to think that evaluations of 
organised crime control initiatives could achieve the positivist gold standard. The 
ethics of random assignment may be decidedly problematic with respect to the
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serious harms involved in organised crime. Moreover, differential access to data 
can make it difficult or impossible for future researchers to reproduce or replicate 
studies.
Further challenges to an evidence-based approach are highlighted by efforts to 
assess the level of threat or the size and scope of organised crime. Throughout 
the 1990s it has been popular to ascribe the threat level in the context of 
estimates of money laundering. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) began 
the charge with its 1990 estimate of $300 billion in global illicit drug proceeds, the 
bulk of which was deemed to be available for laundering (van Duyne 2002: 62). 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) followed with the estimate that two to five 
per cent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) represents laundered funds 
involving some $500 billion in the study year (Quirk 1996). The UN topped the 
debate with an estimate that organised crime syndicates worldwide gross $1.5 
trillion per year with, presumably, a substantial portion of this available for 
laundering (United Nations Development Programme 1999: 42; United Nations 
International Drug Control Programme or UNDCP 1997: 123-124). Unfortunately, 
each of these efforts provided little in terms of coherent and systematic 
methodology that may guide further research.
Building on these foundations, a government-sponsored study in Canada 
attempted to “assemble and aggregate the best information available... original 
research, interviews, and classified and unclassified materials... on the [domestic] 
impact of selected organised crime activities” (Porteous 1998: 1). The study
attempted to assess economic impact on the basis of significant activities which 
involve revenue for organised crime and (direct and indirect) costs and/or losses 
for society and the commercial sector. The study attempts to shift the focus of the 
organised crime debate “from questions of form to issues of substance” (Porteous 
1998: 2). For ease of presentation, I have subdivided the data below according to 
cost (social and government costs) and benefits (illicit revenue and/or profits):
Social and Government Costs:
• $1.4 billion in conservatively estimated drug-related social and 
commercial costs (limited to factors such as health care, reduced 
productivity, and direct enforcement);
• Billions of dollars of hazardous waste dumping (aggregate costs not 
quantifiable given present intelligence infrastructure foci), with one 
tonne of such waste costing $9,000 (estimated health care and loss of 
life costs, but excluding clean up costs);
• $1.5 billion in losses due to alcohol, tobacco, and jewellery smuggling 
(government tax losses, excludes losses to legitimate retailers 
operating outside the illicit market);
• $5 billion minimum in economic crimes such as securities, 
telemarketing, and insurance fraud (losses to industry and citizens);
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• $1 billion in losses due to counterfeit goods including clothing,
computer software, and pharmaceuticals (lost revenues to legitimate 
producers);
• $600 million in motor vehicle theft costs (insurance industry costs);
and
• $120 - $400 million in costs due to illegal immigration, involving an
estimated 8,000 to 16,000 migrants (government costs for refugee 
processing and care)
Illicit Revenue and/or Profits:
• $7 - $10 billion illicit drug market (revenues based on seizure and
interdiction data); and
• $5 - $17 billion in laundered money (50-70% of which is estimated to
derive from illicit drug revenues, and the maximum range being derived 
from the International Monetary Fund estimate that 2% of global GDP 
is laundered money).
This study is decidedly problematic. It provides only passing indirect references to 
supporting documentation with no appended bibliography, no clear identification 
of the methods for data collection, lack of systematic presentation of data (see 
original which tends to confuse profits and revenues, and costs or losses), and 
often vague allusions as to how estimations were arrived at. Though admittedly
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an initial attempt and “far from the last word” on the subject area (Porteous 1998: 
1), this study offers little questioning of form and context which serves to 
obfuscate the substance of its own inquiries as well as impeding replication or 
further research.
Each of the above estimates is derived from a decidedly imperfect base of 
knowledge. This particular field of study suffers from a variety of problems, 
including non-existent or questionable methodologies, indirect indicators of supply 
and demand with large margins of error, and mathematical incoherence combined 
with the generation of “facts by repetition” (van Duyne 2002; Passas 1999b). 
Putative claims about the size of organised crime revenues, profits, laundering 
and suggested prolific growth of the same may be reduced to the following: 
“...adding up all the guesswork proves nothing except that [enhanced] arithmetic 
[and better models] can produce larger figures” (Hobsbawm 1969b: 686). We 
might also postulate that much of the suggested growth in organised crime 
revenue can be attributed to the expansion of definitional boundaries, the growth 
in the number of predicate offences from drugs and other designated offences to 
the wide domain of all serious crime. Moreover, the understanding of what 
constitutes money laundering activity has itself been subject to flexible expansion, 
to include virtually any disposition of the proceeds of crime (van Duyne 2003).
A broad review of much of the available international literature on the extent of 
money laundering summed up the evidence as follows: “the macroeconomic 
estimates are methodologically flawed, while the available microeconomic
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estimates lack credible empirical foundations” (Reuter and Truman 2004: 10). 
This area continues to leave unaddressed or under-addressed a number of 
important empirically issues in need of further research at the micro- and macro­
level of analysis. This includes studying the differential distribution of the tangible 
and intangible costs and benefits (inclusive of realisable revenue following 
depreciation etc.) across various types of serious crime, whether predatory, 
market-based, commercial or hybrid forms (Levi and Osofsky 1995; Naylor 2003). 
This would also include further research as to the extent of illicit profits, whether 
initially generated without or within the system, manifest in international flows of 
trade and finance (de Boyrie et al. 2005; Pak et al. 2003; Walker 1995). Efforts to 
more systematically address these issues could help to avoid the (separate and 
cumulative) error of directly equating gross financial wherewithal with the capacity 
to mobilise and achieve goals, a financial mafia-octopus. Crystallised power is 
tied to a diversity of social and economic relationships that can dwarf the nominal 
value of financial reserves under the control of any particular entity (Ferguson 
2001: 161).
A continuing lack of systematic and comparative data sets on serious and 
organised crime led the United Nations, in the late 1990s, to conduct a pilot 
survey to develop benchmark data. The pilot survey was distributed to a number 
of countries for testing. In Canada, the survey was tested with the following two 
objectives (Sauve 1999). First, the research aimed to gather quantitative data via 
the distribution of the survey to a non-representative sample of 16 police agencies
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(e.g., Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Ontario Provincial Police, la Surete du 
Quebec, and selected urban-regional services) who deal with organised crime. 
Second, the project aimed to analyse the produced data to describe the 
characteristics of organised crime in Canada. All 16 agencies representing 69% of 
publicly-recorded crime (and probably the greater part of most recorded and un­
recorded serious crime) participated, with a total of 72 respondents (N=72). 
Readers should be cautioned that due to the sampling procedures and the 
absence of inter-regional comparisons (to protect the confidentiality of 
respondents) that the data provide a non-representative picture of organised 
crime in Canada. Given the uncertainties it is not clear how one could be assured 
that one in fact had a representative sample.
The survey revealed (figure in parentheses represents percentage of organised 
crime groups cited as possessing or exhibiting, according to survey respondents, 
the specified characteristic):
• Common core characteristics: motivation for profit and/or power 
(96%), use of violence (93%), longevity of activities (92%), and 
engaged in serious criminal offences (92%);
• Common peripheral characteristics: discipline over its members 
(88%); operating at the national level (83%), money laundering (80%), 
international activities (74%), use of legitimate businesses (71%), 
specialised tasks (68%), and exercising influence or corruption (50%);
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• Membership: male-dominated (90% in three-quarters of groups, 
100% in over four-tenths of groups), 15 or more principal members 
(56%) and associate members (71%), and groups having less than 5 
principal members (11%) and associate members (8%);
• Crimes frequently committed: drug trafficking (88%), extortion (71%), 
illegal firearms traffic (71%), prostitution (63%), vehicle theft (60%), 
counterfeit goods/fraud (56%), and gambling or illegal schemes (50%);
• Crimes least frequently committed: illicit traffic in endangered species 
(8%), illicit disposal of waste (7%), and child pornography (3%);
• Networked operations: links with other criminal groups (93%) and of 
these at the national level (85%) and at the international level (81%), to 
promote cooperation and goods and services exchange (88%), 
expertise and skills (58%), personnel (51%), and facilities (43%), and 
cooperative international orientation across North and South America 
(51%) and Europe (26%).
Criminal organisations in Canada are often the subject of police investigations and 
criminal charges. For the year 1997, charges were laid against most of the known 
organisations (54%), with many charges relating to drugs (44%), homicide (23%), 
and assaults (18%). Of the major organised crime groups considered as national 
law enforcement priorities (Criminal Intelligence Service Canada 1998) at the time 
of the survey, the most prevalent were (of organisational members with
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percentages rounded): Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (38%), Asian-based (20%), 
Italian-based (16%), Aboriginal-based (14%), and Eastern European-based 
(13%). (Though what proportion of criminal activities these groups represent is 
unknown and undiscussed.)
The five major groups exhibit considerable similarities in terms of common core 
and peripheral characteristics, moderate to high-levels of membership, 
involvement in characteristic and frequently committed crimes such as drug 
trafficking, and interests in diversification of the range and scope of their activities. 
There are also differences and specialisation, with OMGs tending to focus on 
trafficking in cocaine, firearms, and explosives, Asian groups focusing on 
trafficking in heroin and extortion schemes, Italian groups focussing on drug 
trafficking and illegal schemes relating to gambling and extortion, Eastern- 
European focusing on counterfeit and fraud, and Aboriginal groups focussing on 
firearms, alcohol and tobacco. In contrast to other organised crime groups, the 
five major groups are distinct in the size and scope of their activities and structure, 
but also in terms of their networked capacity at the national and (less so for 
Aboriginal groups) international level (Sauv6 1999).
Of course, the above data represent law enforcement understandings/perceptions 
of serious and organised crime and of who is a ‘member’ of particular groups. 
The data admittedly offers a non-representative sample but does coherently map 
out the methods used and provides helpful insights. This does not negate 
continuing problems with falsifiability, given that the data represent the privileged
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view of law enforcement. It does raise a number of important issues in need of 
further empirical research, not the least of which includes the variable linkages 
between serious and organised crime by type of criminal activity, groups involved 
and the extent of organisation. The concept of serious crime typically refers to 
terrorist and mafia-type activities, which might quantitatively comprise 3% to 
perhaps 20% of overall criminal activity (Vourc’h and Marcus 1996: 41, 50-52), but 
which exercises variable qualitative scope over the petty crime of un-organised 
individuals that is deemed to be of much greater concern to citizens (Cressey 
1972: 20).
This begs the question of how much crime rates, and the associated costs and 
benefits, might be reduced if the organised crime component (domestic and 
transnational) was effectively reduced. It is axiomatic that the volume of crime 
offers a vast complex of learning and performance structures (Cloward and Ohlin 
1960) within which to develop, recruit, and mobilise talent to achieve desired 
goals. In Canada, work was undertaken to develop and implement a system of 
coding police-recorded crime to include a variable on whether the crime was 
committed by or for the benefit of a criminal organisation and the type of 
organisation (Ogrodnik 2002). Although the list tends to follow the ethnic- or 
regionally-based categorisations used by law enforcement, the proposed variable 
offers the prospect of additional insight into the distribution of organised crime 
involvement in serious crime. This was intended to be pilot tested in 2006-07 and 
potentially rolled-out thereafter. This initiative bears similarities to the United
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Kingdom Organised Crime Notification Scheme (OCNS) and the associated 
challenges of generating reliable and valid data on a phenomenon that can be like 
shifting sand (Gregory 2003).
The state of the evaluation literature in this area along with efforts to assess the 
size and scope of organised crime tend to point to an underlying pattern. 
Sheptycki (2003) argues that the pattern is a continuing reliable consensus of 
experts as to the grave and mounting threats posed by a host of the usual 
suspects. An implicit mafia-octopus tends to be conjured in the process of 
gathering evidence through tautology, opaque or non-existent methodology, and 
the absence of empirical support that may be subjected to replication and assist 
further research. None of the criminologists involved in longitudinal studies have 
expressed any real interest in studying ‘organised crime’ as part of their research.
Key Observer Influences
The state monopoly on the use of coercive force and the challenge to it posed by 
the use of privatised violence presents further challenges. The development of a 
valid and reliable understanding of organised crime must acknowledge the 
implications of the threat or use of privatised violence against key observers who 
in turn influence the knowledge base.
Through television, print, and radio, the mass media provides the most widely 
accessible forms of knowledge about organised crime. With significant variability 
according to the particular jurisdiction the public consciousness may be filled with
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several recognisable forms, including: Italian, Colombian, Asian, Outlaw 
Motorcycle Gangs (OMGs), and the Russian Mafiya. Although often unrelated to 
the complex and fractured relationships for many criminal organisations 
sensationalised coverage persists with the caricature of integrated corporate 
hierarchies of acts and actors, the mafia-octopus (Charbonneau 1976; Handelman 
1993 1995; Kaplan and Dubro 2003; Lavigne 1987; Robinson 1999; Sterling 1990 
1994; Stock 2001). Even high quality and detailed reportage tend to project, and 
sharpen reader appetite for, portrayals of organisational hierarchies and powerful 
criminals engaged in blatant lawlessness. For instance, the noble pursuit of the 
truth is in far too many jurisdictions a sufficient warrant for intimidation and 
assault, kidnapping for ransom and terror, attempted murder and murder (Garcia 
Marquez 1997: 77; Rawlinson 2000: 357; Reporters Without Borders < 
www.rsf.org >; Solyom 2000; Stille 1995).
If the Mafia-octopus concept has eroded at all in media accounts, the image of 
hierarchical criminal organisation was renewed (possibly for an indeterminate 
term) with the 1990s rise of the Russian Mafiya (Rawlinson 1998a: 346, 353). 
The imagery of an actively or passively corrupt (ex-communist) state, supporting 
an imperialistic drive for criminal market dominance, underpinned constructions of 
the new evil empire (Handelman 1993 1995; Sterling 1994).
Mafia conspiracies offer a valuable and saleable consumer commodity (Los and 
Zybertowicz 2000: 204) as well as a superficial means to describe the object of 
study. Profit motives aside, the systemic threat to reliability and validity comes
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from uncritical reliance upon particular sources, sometimes offenders or victims, 
but more typically officialdom and law enforcement. Personal and bureaucratic 
interests may encourage deliberate or inadvertent misrepresentation and critical 
truth seeking, which will vary according to the absence and/or presence of 
negative and positive sanctions within a specific organisational culture. Thus, 
despite the comfortable symbiosis of objectives between the enforcement 
community and the mass media (Naylor 2002: 30) the latter may offer a useful 
outlet to make public information that would otherwise tend to be minimised or 
suppressed. Media with an inside track and/or a critical eye can produce 
information that offers fragments of insight that, when subject to careful analysis 
and especially when combined with other information sources, provides helpful 
evidence on the phenomenon of organised crime. Given the access problems for 
outsiders, in practice it may prove difficult to distinguish what careful analysis 
would look like, as opposed to a priori acceptance or cynicism.
Executive Branch and Law Enforcement
Official information about organised crime suffers from the unhealthy compression 
and distance between government and quasi-government agencies and other 
influences. Strategic planning depends on operational knowledge (with open 
source information as a supporting cast); operational practice relies upon strategic 
planning; and insiders and outsiders study the phenomenon based on security 
clearances and the training that accompanies privileged access. Indeed, 
oligarchic networks of high-level public and private officials may elaborate
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definitions and policy in a near vacuum from other direct influences (Lowi 1964: 
679-680). Highly compartmentalised information ensures that neither internal nor 
external factions are likely to possess (or be able to acquire) the requisite 
authority to integrate systematically information across various domains. 
Institutions that are positioned to integrate information often find themselves 
subject to levels of secrecy that rise beyond the standard controls extant in the 
various sensitive strategic and operational areas that feed into the collector 
agency. Compartmentalisation may be disrupted by external events which 
allegedly highlight failures (e.g., the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and 
purported intelligence breakdowns), but the new opportunities presented for 
internal and external factions may further inhibit outside scrutiny even where there 
exists a diversity of pressure from high-level political capital (General Accounting 
Office 1997a).
The academic community offers perhaps the most dispassionate voice. 
Organised crime threats and intimidation are an omnipresent problem and 
concern for researchers, even though academics are rarely targeted (Rawlinson 
2000: 353). The dispassionate nature of the inquiries may explain this in part, in 
addition to the penchant of academe for making offers no one can understand. 
The latter is probably best characterised by the variety of dialects associated with 
the academic division of labour between law, criminology, sociology, economics, 
political science, and other disciplines. Distinctive interests and theoretical 
preferences have tended to impede the integration of knowledge about organised
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crime (Cohen 1977: 103). Diversity of academic and quasi-academic literature is 
not an inherently negative feature, quite the contrary many would argue. 
Nevertheless, the construction of a synthetic evidence-base is problematic where 
the underlying phenomenon is highly variable by type and context, and the 
diversity of experts appear content to continue to watch a thousand flowers bloom 
(Reuter and Petrie 1999).
The prospects for interdisciplinary study are certainly limited by the sheer volume 
of research literature as well as other barriers to integrated knowledge 
development. In civil society there is no simple equation between the truth and 
success given that certain tangible entities appoint ambassadors or professors or 
give state salaries (Rousseau 1762: 65). Students of organised crime confront a 
variety of interrelated problems relating to relative autonomy for investigation, 
available funds for research, and the career prospects of studying crime versus 
serious crime, the latter almost invariably a part-time specialisation. Furthermore, 
the vast majority of part- and full-time professional opportunities to study 
organised crime are located, paraphrasing the evocative words of Hobbs (2000: 
167, 174), in or closely related to the “gulags” mandated to generate official 
knowledge. The student of organised crime will often find that her ability to 
conduct studies free from violence or interference flows from implicit or explicit 
permission, typically granted by agencies of the executive branch of the state 
and/or pertinent criminal organisations. Researchers may also face the stark 
conflict between the standards and ethics of their discipline and those in the
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operational field. For instance, the implicit or explicit premium placed on loyalty 
over honesty and truth amongst those admitted into the rarefied population of 
secret societies and secret services (Greene 1980: 77).
Beyond the Difficulties -  Selected Research Studies
Knowledge about organised crime is generated through an interactive and 
dynamic process. At root, this is grounded in the competitive balance between 
criminal technology and control/observer technology. That is, information that 
criminals (and where there are identifiable and forthcoming victims) voluntarily or 
involuntarily reveal and the methods used to control or observe groups or 
activities (Gambetta 1988; McIntosh 1975). Our current mode of knowledge in this 
area is decidedly problematic. In large measure, this is because the labyrinth of 
power currents tends toward containment within the framework of “policy-based 
evidence” rather than “evidence-based policy” (Christie 1986; Glees 2005; Pal 
1987: 110, 119).
The development of an evidence-based approach to the study of organised crime 
is bedevilled by myriad factors. Perhaps more than many other areas of social 
scientific inquiry the evidence base on the “permanently transitional sector” 
(Arlacchi 1979: 66-72) tends to be more opaque, inaccessible and resistant to 
standard research methodologies. The evidence base may often involve the 
explicit or tacit use of obscure or privileged data which entails a fundamental 
challenge to social scientific standards that studies and their conclusions may be
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falsified or verified. The validity and reliability of the separate and cumulative 
evidence must therefore be treated with a healthy dose of scepticism. Scholars in 
this area face an ongoing set of interrelated issues on how we build knowledge in 
this area. These include the establishment of standards for data quality, means to 
assess the validity (or falsifiability) and reliability of evidence across multiple 
information sources (whose evidence and can we trust it), and the pervasiveness 
of the influence of state-sponsored priorities (Adamoli et al. 1998: 4, 9; Hobbs 
2000; Levi 1998c: 337; Levi and Maguire 2004; Maguire 2000: 128). Resolving 
the evidence-based debate is beyond the author’s scope, but it represents an 
ongoing challenge for the community of scholars working in this genre. The acute 
and chronic problems discussed above should not dissuade, but rather draw 
attention to a particular balancing act. That is, studying what is significant and 
employing theory and methods tailored to develop systematic knowledge on the 
subject matter. The student of organised crime is confronted with a set of 
choices. These choices express the underlying message: who the researcher is, 
the goals and means of the research, the nature of the subject matter, and 
articulation of what our discipline is and what it should be (Haines and Sutton, 
2000; Kuhn, 1983; Slaughter and Ratner, 1999).
Academic researchers have identified and exploited a number of pathways into 
obtaining and exploiting relevant data on organised crime.
Cressey (1967 1969) was able to gain privileged access to law enforcement data, 
including reports, police observers, informants and wiretap information.
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Hess (1970) was able to acquire access to police archives and court records in 
Sicily.
Smith (1971 1980) developed a theory of a spectrum of illegal enterprise.
Albini (1973) focused on American social structure, and issues of consumer 
demand.
lanni and Reuss-lanni (1972) engaged in participant observation to study a 
particular mafia family in New York, including its social organisation and activities, 
lanni (1974) also drew upon the insights of black and Puerto Rican ex-convicts 
formerly engaged in organised crime.
Reuter (1983) examined the illegal bookmaking, numbers and loan sharking 
markets in New York City from an economic perspective. He drew his evidence 
from interviews with police, prosecutors, criminal informants and official files.
Levi (1981 1987) drew upon the insights of victims, offenders and case 
information to study frauds. Drawing upon police, banking and government 
informants as well as case information and documentation, Levi (1991) and co­
authors (Levi and van Duyne 2005; Levi and Gilmore 2002; Levi and Reuter 2006) 
have addressed the anti-money laundering regime.
Gambetta (1993) used transcripts of offender confessions, historical and judicial 
records and observation of wholesale markets.
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Potter (1994) used observation, official and historical records to explore the nature 
of organised crime in an Eastern U.S. industrial city in decline.
Morselli (2006) used the memoirs of ex-members of organised crime and drug 
traffickers.
Previous authors have identified a number of helpful pathways to study serious 
and organised crime. However, the particular methods typically have to be 
adapted to the phenomenon of study.
Methods Used for the Present Study
In determining the methods I would employ for this study, I had considered the 
use of interviews with HIR offenders to assist in determining the social 
organisation of this criminal activity. This option was discounted due to the nature 
of home invasion robbery and how it is treated by the criminal justice system. 
First, it is a statistically tiny phenomenon. It occurs in communities across 
Canada, in urban, suburban and rural areas that are wealthy as well as poor and 
a number of reasons may lead to one home being the target over another. My 
intention was to discuss this as an issue across Canada. The lack of funding for 
this research would have constrained any offender interviews to my home city or 
those nearby. I anticipated that those incarcerated for HIR would tend to be 
lower-level cases and that access to higher-level cases in a limited market would 
be opportunistic at best. I could reasonably expect that higher-level cases would 
tend to be weeded out because of charges not being laid, plea bargains, and the
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near inviolability of informer privilege in Canada. In terms of possibilities for 
ethnographic research, the explicitly violent and transitory nature of the 
phenomenon, and its distribution across the second-largest country in the world 
by geographic land mass, does not make it amenable to direct observation.
My vantage point for research was also linked to my association with agencies 
concerned with criminal intelligence and financial intelligence. My time behind the 
veil of legal and bureaucratic secrecy has shaped my understanding of organised 
crime and the context that surrounds it. By the time I had joined FINTRAC in 2003 
it was becoming increasingly difficult to speak to any outsiders (see chapter 
seven). The agencies I associated with are exceptionally secretive and rigorously 
controlled. All who gain access to this circle are subject to vetting inclusive of 
intensive scrutiny of their background and associations and/or required to obtain 
high-level security clearance.
Thus constrained by practical considerations, I chose to use unobtrusive methods 
in order to study my subject matter. This involved literature reviews for the chapter 
on definitions of serious and organised crime and the elaboration of anomie 
theory. For the case study of home invasion robbery and my analysis of 
FINTRAC in the context of Canada’s prevention and control systems, I employed 
mixed methods.
The home invasion robbery case study chapter addresses definitional and 
statistical issues about the size and scope of the problem. I also review a
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selection of case law (ISM 5) drawn from the LexisNexis/Quicklaw database for all 
Canadian criminal cases during the period 1998 through 2002. Home invasion is 
not a specific offence under the Criminal Code of Canada, and it may be charged 
and prosecuted under a variety of separate or cumulative charges that could 
range in relative seriousness from theft to murder. My search thus used the broad 
concept of home invasion resulting in three hundred and ninety-five examples that 
were then manually parsed to ninety-six cases that met the parameters for 
inclusion. Factors for inclusion generally refer to the characteristics of home 
invasion identified in the landmark decision in the case of R. v. Matwiy, judges 
referring to the offence as a home invasion, and the narrow and broad definition 
used by Statistics Canada. The cases used for analysis were drawn from seven 
of the ten Canadian provinces, and assessed using the 5ls analytical framework 
(Ekblom 2003). These findings are then discussed in terms of the risk and 
responses that have been invoked to address HIR.
Case law is a reliable source given the adversarial nature of court proceedings 
and the validation provided by judges. While this data source has strong internal 
validity, its external validity in representing HIR may be questioned. This may be 
related to several factors, including under-reporting by victims concerned about 
reprisals or drawing enforcement attention to illicit activities in which they may be 
involved. It may also be related to general and specific detection problems and 
attrition in criminal justice procedure. The identification of incidents may prove to 
be more difficult where there are threats as opposed to violence producing
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substantive injury, and it may be difficult to isolate offenders where they employ 
techniques to obscure their identity. Cases that are detected and offenders 
identified may also evade court processes through plea-bargaining or cases not 
prosecuted where the offenders are providing service to enforcement agencies as 
criminal informants or other such contributions.
The FINTRAC chapter examines the rise of this institution in the context of 
prevention and control mechanisms in Canada. Through participant observation 
over two-and-a-half years beginning in 2003, I was able to glean considerable 
information about the structure and function of this organisation, both internally 
and in respect of its relationships with outside bodies. Members of this agency 
are precluded from divulging certain types of information by law and ethical 
obligations. Legal self-protection and ethical accountability infer that I cannot use 
my experience directly, but there is no restriction against the use of my experience 
to interpret and assess in the light of open source information. I piece together a 
serpentine road map of data to show the rise of this institution, key aspects of its 
mandate, it operational potential, and an assessment of its potential impact in 
preventing and reducing serious and organised crime.
This study will also draw upon a broad range of secondary data. This includes 
published and grey market literature, media reports as well as scholarly research.
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Conclusion
The present chapter addressed critical issues on the evidence base for the study 
of organised crime as well as articulating an appropriate methodology for a case 
study on the social organisation of a serious crime, home invasion robbery (HIR) 
discussed in chapter six.
It is not at all clear that standard scientific positivist methods are appropriate in the 
field of organised crime study or the construction of a helpful evidence base in this 
area. It is difficult to answer basic questions about the state of the evaluation 
literature, or to assess the size and scope of this problem or the assessed level of 
threat. Few programme evaluations are conducted, and those that exist tend to be 
basic pre-post designs using privileged operational data, often from enforcement 
agencies. Efforts to estimate the size of organised crime profits and the extent of 
money laundering typically involve little in the way of rigorous methodology and a 
distinct inflationary tendency.
The problems of studying organised crime are compounded by several key 
factors. Certain observers may exercise considerable influence over knowledge 
about the phenomenon and who can gain access to study the subject matter. The 
mass media provides the most accessible form of knowledge on this topic, though 
their coverage often tends to portray an explicit or implicit mafia-octopus. The 
executive branch of government, and law enforcement in particular, may limit
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funding, access and/or attempt to obscure evidence for certain topical areas or 
study.
Notwithstanding the acute and chronic difficulties of studying organised crime, 
academic researchers have employed a range of techniques to study various 
forms. These methods have included participant observation, observation, 
interviews with victims/offenders/enforcement/government, examination of police 
and court files, and other methods. Many of these efforts have required that the 
methods are tailored to the phenomenon of study. In developing my thesis, I 
employed a range of methods. This included participant observation in the fields 
of criminal and financial intelligence that, although I could not use directly for legal 
and ethical reasons, helped to inform my use of other sources of information. 
These included case law, the published and grey market literature, media reports 
and scholarly literature.
The following chapter addresses issues pertaining to law and anomie theory.
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
LAW AND ANOMIE
When law is detached from justice, it becomes a compass without a 
needle. — Jacques Ellul (1964: 299)
Introduction
This chapter assesses the challenge of social regulation in general and with 
particular attention to organised crime. It discusses selected insights from anomie 
theory. These include Durkheim’s insight that anomie results from the absence of 
society in the failure to achieve social regulation. It also includes Merton’s insight 
that anomie results from the presence of society in the failure to achieve a 
balance between goal achievement and the suitability (morality) of the available 
means, then turn to the claim that Durkheim and Merton may be control theorists, 
and I highlight that in control theory individuals are freed to engage in deviance 
whereas in Durkheim and Merton individuals are pressured toward deviance.
I then shift from issues of causation to responses with respect to particular 
approaches to social regulation. These approaches illustrate the limitations of 
applying standard control orientations in general and especially with respect to 
those involved in organised crime. The analysis addresses general deterrence 
(the wider population), specific deterrence (at-risk individuals), incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation. In the case of the first three responses, we find questionable 
capacity to reduce or prevent organised crime. Such groups have available
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numerous techniques and tactics to circumvent or displace risks. Further, 
rehabilitation has not been properly tried.
The chapter also includes discussion of Durkheim’s legal evolution thesis. 
Therein, he argues that as society becomes more complex, moving from 
mechanical to organic solidarity, repressive (punitive) law is progressively 
replaced with restitutive (restorative) law. Although there are a number of critics of 
the legal evolution thesis, Durkheim posed a key problem of whether modern law 
can retain its own moral force and be something more than mere politics. The 
control of organised crime is an area that illustrates the continuing drift toward the 
narrow concerns of positive law.
Anomie and Control Theory 
Emile Durkheim
Conducting reviews of literature for the Revue Philosophiaue. Durkheim was 
exposed to Ferdinand Tonnies classic paper on Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 
[Community and Society] published in 1887 (Aldous, Durkheim, and Tonnies 
1972). Borrowing from Tonnies, Durkheim described in The Division of Labour in 
Society (1893) the modernisation process as the transition from mechanical to 
organic solidarity. Under mechanical solidarity, social units are small and self- 
contained, sharing very similar circumstances, work, and values and little contact 
with other social groups. Within this pre-industrial model there is only very general 
division of labour, and solidarity is grounded in the uniformity or resemblance of its
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members who are isolated from the outside world (Aron 1967: 12). In the organic 
society, social units are combined into a larger and highly-organised political 
structure of interdependent, but nevertheless autonomous and specialised groups. 
The transition to this form of solidarity is fostered by individuation that, in turn, has 
been prompted by the division of labour (Merton 1934: 320). Deviant behaviour 
and crime may be induced by the pathological state of anomie that can 
accompany societal transition toward the organic form.
For Durkheim (1897: 252-256), anomie occurs when society is, temporarily, 
disrupted by severe crises or sudden desired transformations, unable to exercise 
control and set limits on individuals and their goals. Anomie occurs as an acute 
state during periods of rapid social change associated with socio-economic crisis 
or expansion, and as a chronic state in the sphere of industry and trade. 
Durkheim argues that,
...as the conditions of life are changed, the standard according to which 
needs were regulated can no longer remain the same....The scale is 
upset.... Time is required for the public conscience to reclassify men 
and things. So long as the social forces thus freed have not regained 
equilibrium, their respective values are unknown and so all regulation is 
lacking for a time. (Durkheim 1897: 253-254)
Sudden social change induces the “anomie of scarcity” and/or the “anomie of 
affluence”. This serves to foster differential pressures that reduce social regulation
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and increase the probability of deviant behaviour. Individuals cast into a lower 
status as the result of economic crisis may find that society is ill-positioned to offer 
help, and that limiting potential recourse to deviance requires a quick lowering of 
individual desires to match the new standard of living. Individuals cast into a 
higher social status as the result of an economic boom may find that, as previous 
standards have become obsolete, they experience pressure toward un-restrained 
aspirations. In the sphere of industry and trade, the dictates of progress provide 
that such activities should be freed of “all regulation” or any “limiting authority”, 
and that any initiative toward “restraint seems like a sort of sacrilege” (Durkheim 
1897: 255). Anomie is a chronic state in this domain, as is the potential for 
deviance, due to the boundless greed aroused.
The absence of society, or more precisely the failure to achieve social regulation, 
is what Durkheim views as the abnormal or pathological phenomenon of anomie 
to be fought against (Agnew 1997: 31; Passas 1995: 93-94). Individuals are not 
freed by the absence of society to satisfy their desires in the most expedient 
manner. The insatiable and unrealistic human aspirations for unlimited or 
unattainable goals, often deemed to derive from the individual, are instead created 
by the induced state of anomie (Adler 1995: 275; Agnew 1997: 31; Passas 1995: 
93). It is thus important to emphasise the social (rather than individual) origins of 
anomie. This is evident in Durkheim’s distinction between physical and social 
needs. Whereas physical needs are often regulated by an individual’s organic 
structure such as the cues provided by a satiated stomach, social needs such as
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desires for status and power are “an insatiable and bottomless abyss” (Durkheim 
1897: 247). The state of anomie associated with the proliferation of social needs 
is then further exacerbated by the strain of failing to achieve goals combined with 
a lack of discipline over the human “passions”. The “inextinguishable thirst” of 
desires beyond the command of individual means is a “constantly renewed 
torture” which “throws open the door to disillusionment”, and the desires become 
more undisciplined under the very conditions which require greater discipline 
(Durkheim 1897: 247, 253, 285). The absence of society is important, then, not 
because it increases freedom but because it increases the frustration/anger (or 
strain) that drives individuals to deviance (Agnew 1997: 31).
Robert K. Merton
Building upon an initial interest in the work of Durkheim, Merton (1934) 
subsequently proceeded to develop a conception of anomie specific to America in 
the mid-twentieth century. With the classic essay “Social Structure and Anomie” 
(1938), and other works (Merton 1957 1964 1968), Merton developed the concept 
of anomie into a general theory of deviant behaviour in which unfulfilled 
aspirations were a central concern and normlessness was not. For Merton, 
anomie (or deviance) was the by-product of the socially structured disjunction 
between the cultural (and individual) goal of pursuing achievable wealth (the 
American Dream) and the limited access to legitimate means (opportunity 
structure) for achieving such normative-induced measures of success (Pfohl 1985: 
211). The essential problem for Merton is the disjunction or lack of fit between
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culture and the opportunity structure. This anomic condition tends to dissipate the 
regulatory force of social and legal norms particularly within certain sub-cultural 
groups (Messner & Rosenfeld 1994: 12).
Merton views anomie as resulting from the presence of society, and that 
associated deviance is a function of the lack of equilibrium between fundamental 
elements of social structure (Adler 1995: 276; Agnew 1997: 37- 38; Passas 1995: 
93-94). Anomic breakdown could be attributable to a disproportionate focus on 
specific goals or ends, especially when combined with only “slight concern” with 
the means for attaining such goals (Merton 1938: 673). This cultural imbalance 
was deemed to present a ‘universal’ problem for all citizens. However, Merton did 
not assume that human nature entailed limitless passions or that turning to 
deviance is an automatic adaptation to strain (Merton 1938: 677; Merton 1968: 
207). Rather, he noted that distorted aspirations are generated amongst certain 
individuals or groups. Pressures toward the more visible forms of deviation may 
be experienced most strongly amongst those of the “lower strata” (Merton 1968: 
198), but the “strain toward innovational practices” (Merton 1938: 678) offers no 
immunity to the upper-classes (Passas 1995: 99).
The anomie of affluence may lead to “Faustian aspirations”. That is, the stress of 
ever escalating and insatiable demands for achievement (Merton 1964: 221). 
Actual achievement of goals may become unrewarding rather than ever- 
escalating. Goals may become “trivialised” by the respective individual and the 
social order where access is easy and abundant (Simon and Gagnon 1976: 361),
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and where the experience of achievement is much less than portrayed in the 
individual or collective imagination (Bauman 1998: 85; Merton 1964: 221). Many 
individuals are likely to hold more limited goals as their realistic objective, but the 
lower classes may tend to vocalise unattainable goals whereas the higher classes 
may tend to vocalise unlimited goals. Further, the selection of higher or broader 
strata as comparative reference groups for individual achievement levels may fuel 
deviance as an adaptation to relative deprivation (Agnew 1997: 38-44).
Unlimited and Unattainable Aspirations
Hirschi (1969: 3) asserts that “one of the purest examples of control theory” is 
offered by Durkheim, particularly given his view that deviant behaviour is an 
“automatic consequence” of deregulation or a lack of controls. Suppression (or 
fear of suppression) of the egoistic and unlimited desires of humans produces 
conformity in control theory, and thus all that needs to be explained are the 
weakness of controls (Bernard 1995: 82-83). This theory does not equate with the 
work of Durkheim or (guilty by association) the work of Merton. Such ideas 
severely distort and negate the important differences between anomie and control 
theory as well as obscuring the complementary theorising (despite differences in 
fundamental points of emphasis) of Durkheim and Merton (Agnew 1997: 27-29, 
45; Bernard 1995: 81). Though there are a number of differences between anomie 
and control theory, much of this stems from the question of human nature and its 
relationship to social structure. Contrary to the control theory view of humans as
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purely Hobbesian self-interest, Durkheim and Merton explicitly put forth a dualistic 
view of human nature.
Durkheim’s rejection of “individualistic-utilitarian positivism” (Merton 1934: 320) 
continued in Merton’s recognition that neither “imperious biological drives” nor the 
calculations of homo economicus offer the “sole regulating agencies”, but that the 
appearance of such a situation may instead be induced by an exaggerated 
cultural emphasis upon “pecuniary success and ambitiousness” (Merton 1938: 
672, 680682). The dualism of self-interest and social motivations toward cultural 
values requires the invocation of reciprocal forms of regulation and social 
solutions. Increased controls on individuals may offer solutions for linear 
problems, but enhanced controls often miss the mark when it comes to dynamic 
problems (Bernard 1995: 89).
Both Durkheim and Merton describe anomie as an induced social state wherein 
individuals are pressured (rather than freed as in control theory) into deviance, 
and that unlimited individual goals are more often a reflection of social strain as 
opposed to human avarice (Agnew 1997: 31-35). The physical and social interests 
of individuals should largely be achievable through conformity. In an anomic 
state, however, the devaluation of self-interest as an embedded feature of the 
‘legitimate’ division of labour pressures individuals to pursue goals using the most 
effective and efficient means with little regard to issues of legitimacy. Deviance is 
a result of the absence of society for Durkheim and the presence of society for 
Merton. Unlimited goals, reflected in the thirst for “novelties, unfamiliar pleasures,
[and] nameless sensations” (Durkheim 1897: 256-257), may indicate that 
individuals or groups have failed to set limits, that society has failed to help them 
do so, or that some reject the societal limits imposed (this may be a fortiori in the 
contemporary period of mass advertising and consumerism). This expresses the 
idea that deviance is fostered where anomie flourishes (not an automatic result of 
loosened controls), where the structure of self-interest is deregulated and some 
actors find that it is in their interests to commit crime (Bernard 1995: 85-89). 
Unlimited goals, reflected in the American dream of “monetary success [which] is 
conveniently indefinite and relative” (Merton 1968: 190, 193), impose a chronic 
disjunction between ‘legitimate’ institutional means and cultural goals or values 
and a “definite pressure” toward deviation (Merton 1938: 672). This expresses the 
view that the social values of American culture are weak or anomic and that 
individuals are readily (though by no means automatically) overwhelmed by the 
goals-means disjunction and the Hobbesian desire for economic success 
(Bernard 1995: 82-83).
Those who are most likely to reject societal limits, to a significant degree, for both 
Durkheim and Merton, are those at the extreme edges of the social continuum. 
This includes the marginal populations suffering the anomie of scarcity 
(unattainable goals) who have little to lose by not adhering to the prevailing 
norms, and the “sovereign individuals” of the anomie of affluence (unlimited goals) 
whose wealth deceives them into believing they depend on no one else (Davidson 
and Rees-Mogg 1997; Durkheim 1897: 254; Simon and Gagnon 1976).
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Alongside the proliferation of such concentrations that accompany industrial 
progress, anomie can become an endemic pattern within the social structure. 
Rather than a means to an end, industry has instead become “the supreme end of 
individuals and societies alike”, with economic values sanctified as the 
“apotheosis of well being” and placed as transcendent “above all human law” 
(Durkheim 1897: 255). The anomie-inducing effects of utilitarian motives in 
economic life became an omnipresent feature of the utilitarian and entrepreneurial 
culture of advanced American industrial society (Passas 1995: 96). A society 
over-run by such utilitarian guiding principles fosters “strain toward dissolution” or 
the dissociation of social structure and individuals, and pushed to the extreme, 
“predictability virtually disappears and what may be properly termed cultural chaos 
or anomie intervenes” (Merton 1938: 681-682).
Strain associated with the pursuit of unlimited or unattainable goals are largely 
ignored topics in research (Agnew 1997: 32). However, such topics offer 
considerable potential for studying the causes and consequences of 
contemporary anomie, to elaborate the progressive intensification of the 
processes described by Durkheim and Merton. If we accept the assertion that 
“probably relatively few people are afflicted with insatiable aspirations” (Cloward 
and Ohlin 1960: 83), then it follows that greater analytical focus should be placed 
on the more generalised pattern involving the pursuit of limited goals via limited 
means. Nevertheless, if our interest is crime and deviance, it is important to focus 
upon the increased probabilities associated with unlimited or unattainable goals.
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Such goals are most likely to arise “when society or its organs fail to set 
reasonable limits on individual goals or society specifically encourages the pursuit 
of unlimited [or unattainable] goals, and when individuals are not attached or 
committed to society or its organs, such as family, peers, school, mass media, 
and work” (Agnew 1997: 35). In the contemporary period of globalisation there 
are few limits placed on the push toward unlimited and unattainable goals, and 
commitments and attachments (whether increasing or decreasing) to social 
institutions are generating perverse effects.
As we emerge from the “Age of Extremes” (Hobsbawm 1994), perhaps only to see 
it intensify further, anomie appears to be built-in to much of the international social 
landscape. This serves to generate and reinforce the anomic constituencies in 
which deviant and aberrant behaviour flourish. Enhancing prospects for social 
regulation, and the prevention of organised crime, requires an improved 
understanding of the role of unlimited and unattainable goals within the anomic 
constituency. The Western-led programme of globalisation has encouraged the 
pursuit of unregulated self-interest that is not in the common good of the global 
social order. At the same time, the West decries the exaggerated self-interest that 
is defined as ‘criminal’ and tries half-heartedly to control the behaviours induced 
by the very conditions that have been created.
I will now move from issues of causation into the area of responses and particular 
approaches to social regulation. These approaches illustrate the limitations of 
applying standard control orientations to anomic individuals and groups, and
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organised crime especially. Moreover, I argue that the regulatory potential of the 
law is being eroded by the neo-liberal control policy agenda.
Deterring Organised Crime
Theories of social regulation typically divide into two historical traditions, the 
utilitarian and the retributive. Utilitarians are concerned with the social utility of 
punishment, wherein the purpose is to deter crime by promoting pro-social 
individual choices and to thereby optimise societal resource allocations (Becker 
1968; Ehrlich 1973). Retributivists, on the other hand, are concerned with meting 
out punishments which are proportionate (or scaled) to crime seriousness, 
including the degree of harm created by the conduct and the extent of the actor’s 
culpability (von Hirsch 1992: 81). The utilitarian-preventive approach primarily 
attempts to curtail additional or further offending behaviour, whereas the 
retributive-restorative approach attempts to re-establish a balance that has been 
disrupted. In the modernist representation of the utilitarian-retributive dichotomy 
the overall goal is the achievement of procedural and substantive ‘justice’, through 
fairness demonstrated in due process and equitable sentencing reflected in a 
balance between community protection and proportionality in punishment. 
Contemporary penal policy tends to over-emphasise utilitarian considerations, due 
in part to the ‘primitive’ philosophy of lex talionis associated with pre-modern 
retributive penal policy. Given the competing values and interests in a society, 
crime policy may be (arguably) balanced to the extent that such policy is afforded 
generalised legitimacy by the public. Faith in market society and the rule of law
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may be derived from false consciousness or social consensus, but more 
importantly, such beliefs are functional and necessary elements of the liberal and 
neo-liberal enterprise (Cotterrell 1999: 98-99; Levi 1981: 266; Pratt 1999).
Jeremy Bentham and other proponents of utilitarianism suggest that punishment 
deters the probability of offending behaviour through several mechanisms. These 
mechanisms include the following (Abel and Marsh 1984: 70; Becker 1968; 
Ehrlich 1973 1981 1996; Meier and Johnson 1977; Polinsky and Shavell 1998; 
Salop 1979; Sherman 1990 1993; Tauchen et al. 1994):
• General Deterrence: establishing standards of morality through public 
education on acceptable forms of behaviour;
• Specific Deterrence: increasing the fear or prudence of individuals who 
are engaged in (or might consider engaging in) offences;
• Incapacitation: making it difficult or impossible for an offender to break 
the law through surveillance and/or imprisonment;
• Rehabilitation: opening prospects for reforming deviants.
Does punishment deter the commission of offences? Do organised crime control 
efforts serve to reduce, displace, stimulate, or produce a combination of effects, 
and on what factors do these impacts depend? In relation to the broad concept of 
organised crime it is difficult to adequately analyse these issues. It is helpful to 
focus upon particular forms of criminal organisation and the associated
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implications of deterrence-control mechanisms. The reader may recall the chapter 
two discussion of McIntosh (1971 1973 1975 1976) who lists four types of criminal 
organisation that accompanied the emergence and advance of modern Western 
civilisation: picaresque, craft, project, and business.
The example of Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMGs) illustrates the asymmetrical 
state of current forms of criminal organisation. The characteristics of OMGs are, 
at the superficial level, outwardly picaresque - as exemplified in their historic 
outlaw status and associated violence; but they are also business-like in their 
national and international criminal confederation and associated control over drug 
distribution, prostitution, and other illicit markets (Lavigne 1987; Quinn 2001). If 
OMGs represent picaresque organisation, they could not persist for long once 
confronted by sustained enforcement pressure. If OMGs represent business 
organisation, they could persist to the extent that the surrounding social 
organisation (including crime control) has been sufficiently co-opted or corrupted. 
OMGs are the most heavily targeted criminal organisation in Canada given their 
over-representation as organised crime members in correctional institutions. Yet 
this group persists. Is this due to inadequate enforcement pressure or has social 
organisation been sufficiently corrupted?
While there may be some useful and valid insights in answering both the above 
questions, I argue that the key reason for OMG persistence is a misunderstanding 
of both its internal organisation and its relationship to wider social organisation. 
The OMG model is business-project crime articulated in the form of a cellular
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network. The organisation is not primarily driven by wolf-pack (picaresque) 
behaviour or by a centralised and hierarchical control structure (business). Rather, 
units undertake a diversity of projects, some ad hoc and others planned, and 
collaboration with internal and external partners occurs according to instrumental 
needs and tactical or strategic alliances and relationships such as family and 
friends. Though there will be further operational divisions, the two main groups 
are those who predominantly represent unattainable goals or the anomie of 
scarcity and those who represent unlimited goals or the anomie of affluence. The 
first group is dominated (though not exclusively) by generalists, impulsive 
situational offenders who seize upon opportunities to commit crime. The second 
group is dominated (almost exclusively) by specialists, compulsive offenders who 
create or stimulate (and/or seize upon) opportunities to commit crime. Specialists 
are the core group of organised crime actors, but generalists do most of the “dirty 
work” as arm’s length participants in a dispersed network, specifically as aspiring 
(or partial) members and as contractors for specific tasks.
If we were to set about “gearing up” (Ekblom 1997) for crime prevention, the 
present control-deterrence focus is rather lacking because the criminal justice 
panopticon (at least in the context of Canada) focuses upon generalist offenders 
and appears to suffer from myopia in the case of organised crime and its core 
group of specialists. Further, the control-deterrence orientation serves to mask the 
elusive and protracted causal chain that manifests (or is made to appear) as 
organised crime. This process is helped by erosion of the legal order evident in
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the over-emphasis upon the technical concerns of deterrence. The assumptions 
and practice of deterrence are symptomatic of an architecture which provides an 
appearance of ‘toughness’ which is, in practice, difficult to deliver against 
organised crime. This can be observed in the contradictions of organised crime 
control in relation to general and specific deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation.
General Deterrence
The law serves an educative and moralising function as it illustrates to citizens, 
which acts are subject to penalties, with variable sanctions indicating the level of 
social opprobrium. While the predominant focus in relation to organised crime is 
on utilitarian concerns, cursory attention is paid to retributive concerns so as to 
reflect the moral reflex of the public toward punishing such deviants. Allusions to 
serious harm and elevated offender culpability are captured in the retributive 
imputation of organised crime dangerousness, a key warrant to justify enhanced 
punishment for such actors. Nevertheless, it is the supposed preventive utility of 
the deterrent effects of punishment, which form the bedrock of organised crime 
control policy.
It is perhaps plausible that the threat of punishment deters the average person 
from engaging in criminal activities. It would be difficult, however, to prove this in 
relation to those who indirectly support organised crime by purchasing illicit drugs 
for instance, and for the recidivist offenders who more directly support, or are
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actively involved with, organised crime. For a variety of reasons that have nothing 
to do with punishment, people will engage in a range of separate or overlapping 
behaviour including conformity, relatively minor offending such as drugs 
possession, to active participation in criminal organisations. General deterrent 
effects will be quite differential depending upon individual predispositions, 
opportunity structures, and the presence of formal and informal controls.
How does one establish organised crime general deterrence as compared with 
ordinary general deterrence? An a priori assertion of deterrence is clearly 
insufficient (Lebow and Stein 1989). This applies to ordinary individuals, but is 
considerably amplified in the case of organised crime participants given the low 
visibility and secrecy which attend their activities. Although research tends to point 
toward stronger support for the effects of general rather than specific deterrence, 
the most salient factors in both cases relate to the certainty, celerity, and severity 
of punishment (Clark 1988; Cook 1980; Employment and Immigration Canada 
1993; Erickson and Murray 1989; Fattah 1983; Sherman 1990; Wilson 1983; 
Zagare 2004). We should expect that certainty and celerity of punishment relating 
to organised crime are rather weak. Confidential data from North America and 
Europe reinforces the funnel-like effect that common-sense would intimate. Few 
cases are identified, fewer still are investigated, and only a small fraction will 
reach the stage of successful prosecution. The prohibitive costs and time- 
consuming nature of such investigations serve to limit the certainty of being 
formally noticed, let alone prosecuted or punished. Both white-collar crime and
90
organised crime illustrate these difficulties although in many industrialised 
countries a predominantly regulatory approach is used for the former but not the 
latter.
Legal penalties are merely a cost of doing business for criminals. The critical 
difference in respect of criminal organisations is the distribution of risk for the 
imposition of legal penalties. Patterns of association and activity are likely to be 
altered so as to minimise detection, but legal pressures are unlikely to 
substantively curtail the problem of organised crime. For instance, OMG use of 
business-project-style corporate networks is no accidental organisational 
formation. The instinct for continued profitability fosters organisational flux which 
diffuses detection risk to the periphery, often through the use of buffers or “cut 
outs” who are typically non-criminals and/or criminal generalists, while retaining 
the benefits of capitalisation amongst the core of criminal specialists (Dorn et al. 
1998; McIntosh 1973: 44-45). It is not clear that deterrence theory can 
adequately address such patterns. It is more likely that deterrent effects may 
serve to promote further professionalisation of organised crime, a process that 
typically includes enhancing and expanding the organisational base of human and 
social capital. Deterrence must therefore transcend the status of symbolic 
reassurance for the “punters”, a perceptual barrier to be crossed amongst existing 
or prospective offenders who possess wide differentials in organisational 
allegiance, access, and range of planned or ad hoc network activities to which 
they are parties (Levi 1987: 256, 278; Pfohl 1985: 73-74).
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Further, the articulated cellular network of OMGs, and other organised crime 
groups, implies a degree of agency beyond that of individuals or of groups. It 
implies the agency of a corporate actor or a persona ficta, a fictitious person that 
has a certain legal standing like a natural person but has no physical corpus 
(Coleman 1993: 2). I am not arguing that this persona ficta does not exist, but 
rather that it is an elusive organisational construct despite the reality of its 
consequences. I am also arguing that the nature of OMGs and some other 
organised crime forms are corporate in character. The word corporation typically 
evokes images of large-scale bureaucracies, but the functional utility of such 
cumbersome (modernist) structures have progressively eroded. Network 
technologies offer potential efficiencies — which may be used to overcome the 
historical competitive advantage of vertically-integrated and centralised 
hierarchies — for organisational coordination alongside competitive and 
decentralised production (Castells 2001). This organisational formation offers a 
logical path to capitalise upon demands for lean production, disposable cells, and 
optimal profitability alongside marginal organisational risk. The core of the 
corporate actor is not merely the sum of its constituent parts, it is, sui generis, a 
living and breathing composite. It reflects the strengths of its individual 
components, and is designed to shed its frailties according to need and/or 
circumstance.
92
Specific Deterrence
The interests of organised crime are well served through a narrow upperworld 
focus on the assumption of free will and individual responsibility. These 
fundamental tenets of deterrence, and the consequent application in control 
strategies, are integral to existing and future innovations in criminal organisation. 
Marked increases to the certainty and celerity of punishment represent a limited 
option due to the prohibitive costs these impose upon the criminal justice system. 
These costs may be financial or procedural as demonstrated in efforts to 
transform systems to deal with organised crime and terrorism (Harfield 2006). An 
optimal response to this problem is possible. Mathematically, the same deterrent 
effect may be achieved by severely punishing a few offenders or by less harshly 
punishing a larger number of offenders, with the former option being preferred as 
it is more cost efficient (Becker 1968: 184). This mathematical approach may be 
a trite perspective on human beings who differ in their appetite for risk, and use 
cognitive approaches to assess risk rather than use of a cold calculus. Where 
organised crime participants are successfully detected, prosecuted and 
adjudicated, the penalties prescribed in law may be quite severe. This may 
include imprisonment for many years or life, asset forfeiture, or in some countries 
death.
Nevertheless, the control-deterrence paradigm is quite troublesome because it is 
primarily oriented to mopping up generalists, participants who may have, in 
relative terms, more to gain from criminal participation than they might lose if
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caught. The paradigm has much greater difficulty in dealing with specialists, who 
may have more to lose (as an individual and in organisational terms) and thus 
attempt to secure better insulation against law enforcement. This situation 
necessarily entails greater organisational use of criminal generalists, including 
more immature forms of criminal organisation such as picaresque gangs. The 
Third World and marginalised areas of the developed world may have held (and 
perhaps continue to hold) a comparative advantage in the supply of, and demand 
for, criminal labour (Arlacchi 1991: 15). Nonetheless, industrialised countries have 
substantially improved the prospects for illicit entrepreneurs, notably through 
expanded internal and external access to supplies of criminal labour generated via 
the institutionalised processes of globalisation and a wider range of 
activities/service ‘industries’ in which they can be employed.
Criminals who find that plying their trade has become risky, due to increases in 
enforcement technology, may respond in a number of ways. They might 
physically migrate toward relatively ‘unprotected’ locations (McIntosh 1975). 
Some may adopt a cross-border approach and earn arbitrage from (legitimate 
and/or illicit) exchanges and/or capitalise on the weakness of jurisdictional 
controls or coordination (Levi 1981; Porter 1996; Robb 1992; Tuteleers and 
Hebberecht 1998). Others may persist locally with upgraded skills, move on to 
different activities, or simply persist with ‘primitive’ methods in spite of increased 
enforcement risk and the availability of improved technologies to reduce such risk 
(Mativat and Tremblay 1997). They might also engage in some or many over-
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lapping local, regional, and transnational networks of crime (Castells 1998; Hobbs 
1997 1998). The contemporary context of globalisation-induced problems fosters, 
alongside the growth of unlimited or unattainable goals, a greater diversity of 
networked criminal opportunities. Whether organised criminals dispense violence, 
are involved in drugs distribution, or other money-making ventures will reflect 
individual characteristics (vision, temperament and skill sets) as well as their 
affiliations and roles in organised crime operations. Given means that are 
nominally important for issues of efficiency and effectiveness, prevention efforts 
aimed at limiting achievement of unlimited or unattainable goals may well be 
“doomed to failure” (Agnew 1997: 33). This argument is oriented to individuals, 
but it is especially important with respect to individuals operating under allegiance 
to corporate organisation.
Adequately confronting the challenges of organised crime control, and specific 
deterrence against individuals with unlimited or unattainable goals in particular, 
requires attention to a number of troubling issues. All persons who may benefit 
from, or be harmed by, a given policy could be treated equally. Nevertheless, 
weighting persons equally denies the significant differentials in the quantity and 
quality of resources available to various individuals. It is especially troublesome 
with respect to the differentials between generalists and specialists involved in 
networked criminal organisations. There is an ongoing need to confront the 
variable potential and pitfalls of organised crime control policies. This should 
include an honest account of differential degrees of suffering or pain amongst
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persons being punished, a key challenge for retributivists (Levi 1981: 116; Levi 
1987: 330), and the differential impact of punishing persons in a networked 
organisation, a key challenge for utilitarians.
Within the flexible domain of organised crime research and policy, a common 
metric to assess benefits and costs is needed to account for such differentials. 
Although benefit-cost analysis is not sufficiently developed for wholesale 
application to crime policy, it can provide useful support for marginal decision­
making and help to level the analytical field with respect to differences in actors’ 
resources and the variable impact of policy (Cohen 2001: 25, 45). Extending this 
logic to those whose freedom may be (or is) diminished by control efforts could 
provide a useful limit upon both utilitarian and retributive philosophies. Such a 
limit offers a potentially useful guide for dealing with the criminal sub-population as 
well as affected third parties. The manipulation of “old tools in new workshops” 
(Smith 1980: 362) may fuel the “alleged imperialism” of economic analysis 
(Fiorentini and Peltzman 1995b: 2), but caution is needed in extending the 
economic approach to organised crime policy. It is very difficult to attribute the 
distribution of costs and benefits with respect to criminal organisations and control 
policy, in part because control policy may become a perch that facilitates the “core 
technology” of organised crime (Beare 1996: 39; Smith 1971). For instance, the 
prohibition of illicit drugs creates a profitable market for criminal organisations.
Under conditions of allegiance to a persona ficta organisation, generalists and 
specialists alike may exhibit considerable hubris despite facing the potential of
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serious formal penalties. Under S. 467.1 of the Criminal Code of Canada those 
convicted of a criminal organisation offence may be sentenced to as much as 
fourteen years imprisonment, to be served consecutive to any punishments for 
offences linked to organisational criminality. The C-95 (1997) provisions of this 
section are limited to the five or more individuals who participate in, or 
substantially contribute to, criminal organisation activities. This combined with the 
knowledge that members are engaged in serial criminality for (certain) serious 
offences involving punishment for a maximum of five years or more, and that the 
particular individual is a party to (at least) one such serious offence. The C-24 
(2001) provisions of this section are lowered to include groups of three or more 
individuals, no longer requiring evidence of serial criminality, and expanding the 
range of included offences to all indictable and serious offences. The new 
provisions also differentiate degrees of maximum punishments based on levels of 
association and activity with a criminal organisation, including five years for 
participation, fourteen years for committing indictable offences, and life for leaders 
of such groups.
The C-95 provisions were intended to address the core group of organised crime 
actors, of OMGs in particular. However, the investigative and evidentiary barrier 
was quite high requiring substantive investigation on no less than five individuals. 
The Crown would have to prove that these individuals knowingly contributed to 
serial criminality for the benefit of a criminal organisation, and would further have 
to prove that each party was involved in at least one serious related offence. The
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C-95 tools were more useful to target lower level street gangs that emulate 
OMGs, and may be linked to the more mature biker-organisations. The C-24 
provisions lower the investigative and evidentiary barrier for targeting those 
associated with OMGs (and organised criminals in general). Contemporary 
penality often promotes the cost efficiency of heavier punishments for a smaller 
number of offenders over lighter punishments for a greater number (Becker 1968: 
184). In the present case, however, this policy preference appears to be giving 
way to another interest. This is expressed in raising the (general) probability of 
detection/conviction which may serve to reduce problems of over-deterrence and 
under-deterrence (Bebchuk and Kaplow 1992: 369). Nonetheless, this new 
optimal equilibrium to account for those who respectively, over-estimate and 
under-estimate the probability of detection/conviction, will continue to centre on 
criminal generalists (who are easier to detect and successfully prosecute), even 
though marginal increases may be achieved in the prosecution of criminal 
specialists.
I do not mean to imply that specialists are invulnerable to detection and 
prosecution, but rather to highlight the differential susceptibility of corporate actors 
to legal tactics against them. The corporate actor of organised crime not only 
possesses greater resilience against legal tactics, but also is better positioned to 
convert penalties into political capital such as building the mystique of individuals 
or criminal groups even where they are successfully targeted by the justice 
system. A deterrence orientation may be helpful at times in targeting specialists,
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including the leadership of cells or regional organisations. Take for instance, the 
case of Maurice “Mom” Boucher, the reputed leader of the “Nomads”, an elite 
branch of the Montreal Hells Angels Chapter (Humphreys 2000; Malarek 2002). 
Boucher was suspected of ordering the killing of two prison guards in 1997. He 
was acquitted by a jury in his first trial in 1998, but there were concerns that jurors 
had been intimidated by the stone-faced glares coming from Hells Angels sitting in 
the court gallery. In his second trial, with additional measures to protect the 
identity of jurors, Boucher was convicted. In early May 2002, Boucher was 
sentenced to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for twenty-five years. A 
further example is found in the case of Terry Adams, dubbed the “British 
Godfather”, one of the most notorious and long-standing underworld bosses in the 
United Kingdom. His conviction on one charge of money laundering required 
years of sustained enforcement pressure by various agencies including bugging 
conducted by MI5 (Bennetto 2007). He has an estimated fortune of £11 million 
without any work history and he was not paying taxes, and yet his sentence on the 
single charge was seven years and £750,000 confiscation for laundering £1.1 
million.
Some observers highlight the importance of damage to reputation upon charge or 
conviction, that is, the collateral penalties for which monetary costs imposed may 
exceed those of formal penalties (Karpoff and Lott 1995; Lott 1992). These 
penalties can include lost income during criminal justice processing and 
incarceration, reduced access to prospective employment opportunities and/or
99
reduced future income from legitimate sources, in addition to a range of possible 
formal and informal exclusions. Reputational penalties may be very relevant for 
the average offender and some corporate offenders, but one might be sceptical 
about the relative value of collateral penalties against those substantively involved 
with OMGs. Indeed, Boucher’s reputation was likely elevated amongst the biker 
sub-culture following the prison guard killings, and especially following the 
acquittal of the Nomads’ leader. This is another reason why speedy trials are a 
deterrent, but only if they lead to a conviction.
Members of OMGs may also be well-positioned to make their conviction difficult, 
by applying their individual and/or organisational resources. They might intimidate 
jurors, purchase high-quality legal representation or claim poverty and acquire 
legal aid. Some may question the value of the latter option, of legal representation 
retained for free (no cost to the defendant), but OMG members perhaps possess 
greater reputation and agency to promote counsel quality assurance in 
comparison to typical legal aid recipients. Having been subsequently convicted 
and sentenced for ordering the murders, Boucher’s life sentence may further his 
own reputation (at a significant opportunity cost to himself and, perhaps, the 
organisation) and that of the Hells Angels, insofar as this organisation is 
considered to represent a credible threat to state power. Further, the exercise of 
specific deterrence against Boucher, and his ‘incapacitation’ in prison, signifies the 
opportunities for others to strive for promotion in the OMG organisational matrix.
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Incapacitation
At face value one would suspect that offenders are deterred from, or incapable of, 
breaking the law when confronted by the possibility or reality of incarceration. 
However, capitalising upon the “inverted efficiency” (Foucault 1979: 271) of the 
criminal justice system is perhaps best demonstrated by the various specialised 
techniques and new networks cultivated during residence in prison, the so-called 
‘academies of crime’ (Findlay 1999: 144; Hobbs 1997: 59; Levi 1998b: 433, 435). 
In addition to the offer of training and recruitment facilities, prisons may also 
become battlegrounds. The Hells Angels and Rock Machine (the latter now 
absorbed into the Bandidos) biker war in Quebec also included a struggle for 
control of the Bordeaux jail in Montreal, a facility with a reputed $7 million annual 
trade in various illicit drugs (Sanger 1995). The possibility for organised crime, or 
‘incapacitated’ organised criminals, to continue to break the law is not per se 
achieved by incarceration. However, a case may certainly be made that 
punishment channels the actor and his/her behaviour, but it is unclear that this 
achieves greater control over organised crime. It may instead be a further 
component in the expanded regulatory potential of organised crime. That is, it 
expands markets and profits from selling drugs in jail and solidifies the position of 
gangs as providers of services and governance for prisoners.
Punishing the body of the persona ficta of organised crime has proved a difficult 
challenge, in terms of both efficiency and substantive utility. Nevertheless, this 
has not impeded the United States, the undisputed lead innovator in organised
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crime control policy. The U.S. enacted the Omnibus Crime Control Act (1968) and 
the Organised Crime Control Act (1970), the Currency and Foreign Transactions 
Reporting Act or Bank Secrecy Act (1970), and the Racketeer-Influenced and 
Corrupt Organisations or RICO (1970). The first components provided stronger 
enforcement tools such as wiretapping provisions, and coerced witness testimony 
before a grand jury, to target major drug traffickers and organised criminals. The 
second component required that imports and exports of financial instruments be 
reported, via a form commonly called CMIRs, for amounts over $5,000 (raised to 
$10,000 in 1980) and collected by U.S. Customs since 1977 (Feige 1997). The 
third component enabled civil and/or criminal prosecution by the state or private 
actors to strip organised criminals of business organisations they had nefariously 
infiltrated as well as other assets as damages. Although RICO was the centre­
piece from the 1970s to the early 1980s, by the mid-1980s and 1990s the Bank 
Secrecy Act was assuming centre stage. This policy shift marked a change from 
the focus on “targeting upwards” through street-level actors to kingpins, toward a 
top-down focus on proceeds of crime and international law enforcement to detect 
and prosecute the concentrated financial gain of upper echelon actors (Beare 
1996: 144-146; Naylor 2002: 17-18). It has not been shown whether these policies 
have served to reduce or prevent organised crime.
Some countries hold the reputation of offering a “welcome wagon” for organised 
crime (Humphreys and Eby 2000). Purportedly lax controls, such as those in 
Canada, are considered to offer an “extremely comfortable safe haven” for
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criminal enterprise (German 1995: 8). This reputation appears to reside internally 
amongst the law enforcement and intelligence community, and externally amongst 
U.S. and international enforcement and regulatory interests (Beare and Martens 
1998: 403). Canada implemented its Proceeds of Crime Act (1989) which allowed 
for asset forfeiture proceedings, and created a system of voluntary reporting by 
financial services of suspicious transactions. Under continuing pressure from the 
U.S. and international bodies such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 
Canada introduced Bill C-22 (Royal Assent 29 June 2000). In order to combat 
laundering of the proceeds of crime, inter alia this Bill created a system of 
mandatory reporting of financial transactions over $10,000 and of transactions 
deemed suspicious, and inaugurated the Financial Transactions and Reports 
Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC). The Act requires that those in financial 
institutions maintain records of client transactions, to report all prescribed 
transactions, and to report every transaction for which there are reasonable 
grounds to suspect money laundering. Failure to comply with reporting 
requirements may result in the following penalties: on summary conviction a 
maximum fine of $500,000 and/or six months imprisonment; and on indictment a 
maximum fine of $2,000,000 and/or five years imprisonment.
Policies targeting money laundering and the proceeds of crime have become 
popular and ubiquitous, particularly in the context of the post-September 11th 
drive to detect and seize the finances of suspected terrorists. Through Bill C-36 
(Royal Assent 18 December 2001), Canada’s anti-terrorist legislation, FINTRAC
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reporting requirements were extended to “hawala” and other informal money 
transfer businesses and charities effective 14 June 2002. Despite the wave of 
enthusiasm, some observers are sceptical of the methods and value of targeting 
money laundering and proceeds of crime. Research into underground banking 
systems or informal value transfer systems (IVTS) such as Hawala suggests that 
it is not a major vehicle for ‘dirty’ money. Primarily used by ethnic groups for 
legitimate purposes or for minor regulatory offences such as tax avoidance, IVTS 
is only occasionally used by criminal entrepreneurs because such informal 
networks have limited capacity for volume and because other alternative methods 
of transfer are widely available (Passas 1999b: 67). Other observers are 
iconoclasts. For instance, one commentator labels the prohibition on money 
laundering an “artificial and contrived offence”, and argues that asset forfeiture is 
a “washout” because it targets the firm rather than the industry and the conditions 
that sustain such enterprise (Naylor 2002: ix, 259). The assumption that asset 
forfeiture really damages organised crime should be treated with considerable 
scepticism. Despite the intrusions into the privacy of financial institutions and 
individuals, and the highly resource-intensive nature of conducting fiscal 
investigations, very little in the way of proof has been advanced to demonstrate 
the extent of the laundering problem or the effectiveness of these methods in 
countering organised crime.
The emerging international network of financial intelligence units (Fills) might 
signal a “key area of vulnerability for organised crime”, or, more plausibly, that
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control interests may only be keeping pace with the increasing sophistication of 
layered transactions prompted (at least in part) by increasing controls (Pinner 
1996: 18-21). That elusive persona ficta, invariably, will not sit still under the 
weight of control pressures to target organised crime assets. Such pressures can 
be circumvented in a number of ways. One of these ways is to neuter the asset, or 
for organised crime to reduce its fiscal liability in the asset (i.e., rent or lease) 
while still retaining it for day to day use. For instance, a home may be bought by 
an organised crime figure, often through a buffer(s), and mortgaged to the 
maximum limit with a ‘respectable’ bank. If the asset is subsequently seized, it is 
the property of the bank that has been confiscated (unless, depending on the form 
of legislation, it can be demonstrated to the court that the bank is knowingly 
facilitating a bona fide “purchaser” for value). Within this type of case, little real 
value has been lost by the organised crime figure, save the residual cost of rent or 
interest payments.
Moreover, a ‘respectable’ bank is unlikely to exhibit complacency while its assets 
are confiscated, and the enforcement community will face definite and substantial 
legal challenges should they fail to return bank property. Seized organised crime 
assets will often have a depreciated value on the market resulting from aesthetic 
concerns and safety. Who would want to own a house formerly in the possession 
of the Hells Angels — you never know who might show up for dinner or for a 
murder mystery evening? Additionally, organised crime groups may adopt the 
view that if they cannot possess the asset then no one will. In the province of
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Quebec, OMGs have adopted this approach, and have burned to the ground 
properties that have been seized from them. The insurance industry is highly 
unlikely on the basis of actuarial calculation alone to accept risk liability for OMG 
seized assets. Such properties are thus either uninsurable, with the new owner 
assuming full risk and the virtual impossibility of a mortgage, or requiring 
government-guarantees, with the taxpayer footing the bill for losses. This may not 
be a major issue in other countries or it may be a topic that is avoided or never 
even considered in published material.
The limitations of the contemporary money laundering/asset forfeiture method are 
perhaps best made with reference to Durkheim’s (1897: 327-329) description of 
suicide control methods in Christian societies since 452 AD. Often viewed as a 
crime in itself, suicide would result in denial of various rites such as a proper 
funeral and burial in the church graveyard. But this did not stop the problem. 
Material penalties were then added to religious penalties. The suicide victim could 
be tried before competent authorities and, if found guilty, the property of the 
suicide victim would be diverted from the heirs of the deviant to the baron or the 
local government. When asset forfeiture failed to solve the problem, new penalties 
were added. Various tortures were devised to put a stop to the deviant act of 
suicide and to deter citizens from committing this crime: dragging the corpse 
through the street, burning the corpse, throwing the corpse upon a garbage heap, 
piercing the corpse sideways with a stick, and burying the corpse on a highway 
without ceremony or under five feet of water in the sand. Despite the popularity of
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such tactics throughout Europe, surprisingly little effect was demonstrated in 
controlling the deviant phenomenon. As the prescribed reactive “penalty could in 
no way affect the guilty person”, its impact upon suicide victims or the suicide rate 
were non-existent (Durkheim 1897: 329).
As a means to prevent organised crime activity, asset forfeiture should prove of 
equal effectiveness, as this method demonstrated when inflicted upon suicide 
victims up to the 18th century in Europe. The commitment of the suicide victim 
and organised crime to their activities would appear to be rather resolute. The 
former clearly lacks the agency to resist, post facto, the prescribed penalty. The 
latter possesses the agency of a corporate actor, that elusive persona ficta. Some 
readers may feel that the comparison between suicide control and organised 
crime control is unreasonable. Certainly, the socio-historical context and the 
opportunity structures for both sets of phenomena are markedly different, as are 
the relative levels of agency that may be manifested by the actors. But the 
underlying point here is that, at its core, the tactic or the technique of asset 
forfeiture has not changed over the centuries. As a centre-piece, rather than being 
explicitly recognised as one tool in a (potentially) broad-based strategy, asset 
forfeiture offers a stale tactical agenda exhumed from dust-ridden law books and 
passed-off as state-of-the-art problem-solving. What is more, this fails to take into 
account historical considerations that led to the abolition of asset forfeiture. In late 
nineteenth century Canada, for instance, asset forfeiture was abolished, in part,
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due to the recognition that forfeiture may foster escalating criminality amongst 
those left destitute by the provisions (Beare 1996: 146).
I do not deny that asset forfeiture-focussed enforcement may be potentially useful 
in organised crime control. The popularity of this method is largely due to its 
widespread appeal to a variety of punitive sensibilities from general and specific 
deterrence, to retribution, and (assuming assets to be the life blood of organised 
crime) incapacitation (Levi 1987: 334). It may also prove useful in terms of 
developing intelligence, the annoyance and/or incapacitation factor against 
targeted organised crime cells, and in purifying the proceeds of crime through its 
use to fund certain enforcement and crime prevention activities. Perhaps the key 
element is that asset forfeiture offers a complementary plug toward credible 
deterrence, to bridge the gap between maximum legal punishments and fines 
(Bowles, Faure, and Garoupa 2000). The desire of society to purge itself of 
practices it abhors, through cathartic tactics such as asset forfeiture, has a 
seductive but nonetheless circular appeal. The focus on money laundering and 
asset forfeiture is an implicit (if not explicit) admission of policy failure. The fact 
that crime pays is made evident by the illicit generation of assets in spite of laws 
dealing with underpinning offences. The degree of escalation in penal 
technologies to target such assets thus offers a useful index by which to measure 
the extent of underlying as well as forthcoming policy failures. Although in 
fairness, this argument could be applied to any escalating measure, which may 
begin to show progressively diminishing returns.
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Rehabilitation
In dealing with organised crime, deterrence-control must only be one part of a 
more broadly-defined approach. Bentham’s elaboration of utilitarianism, set out 
as an ideal to aim for, has become in Foucault’s opinion “...a deep description of 
the actual nature of modern punishment” (Garland 1990: 163). In all fairness it 
should be pointed out that the limits to utilitarianism, as expressed by Bentham, 
have been largely ignored by proponents of control-deterrence approaches to 
crime. The idea that we shouldn’t punish where it is unprofitable, or where it is 
needless, has often been ignored (Primoratz 1989: 23). Punishment may be 
considered unprofitable and therefore unjustified if the evil it consists of is greater 
than the evil it prevents. In isolation from other strategic approaches, organised 
crime control is a contributing factor to that which it ostensibly seeks to prevent. It 
may also prove, when extended to extremes, to reduce the scope of democratic 
values and the associated individual freedoms. Punishment may also be 
considered needless where its aims can be achieved by other, non-punitive 
means, such as various measures of social policy and education. It is not clear 
whether such non-punitive measures have been considered as a means to 
prevent organised crime in Canada or other Western countries.
In summary, deterring organised crime is a considerable challenge. This 
phenomenon appears resilient to general and specific deterrence, incapacitation, 
and little has been done to determine possible avenues for rehabilitation. The 
internal problem is the over-emphasis on issues of supply rather than a balance of
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supply and demand issues (Naylor 2002: 10). The external problem is that 
organised crime continues to effectively and efficiently capitalise on the currents 
related to the spread of anomie or criminogenic asymmetries (Passas 1999a). 
That is, the expanding opportunity structure of supply and demand for illicit goods 
and services generated by the unfolding process of Western-led globalisation. 
Extending a partial approach will not magically result in success, no matter how 
vigorously it is pursued. Through a focus on the primacy of the individual, the law 
is largely incapable of dealing with the corporate behaviour of organised crime:
Our legal codes and courts are virtually irrelevant when it comes to 
organised crime. But they are equally irrelevant when it comes to 
regulating multinational corporations. The point is not that there is a 
moral equivalence between [organised crime] and multinationals, but 
that our laws are meaningless when it comes to international 
operations, whether criminal or corporate. (Saul 1992: 334)
Human beings, and corporate actors in particular, do not properly fit neatly- 
reasoned boxes of good and evil, the situations and the actors are far more 
complex (Turow 1993 1996). In spite of this complexity, the solutions remain 
surprisingly simplistic and, when failure is encountered, as it inevitably is, the 
response is usually more of the same.
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The Legal Evolution Thesis
Understanding the nature of law and its relationship to the evolution of social 
organisation provides key insights, both in relation to where the methods of control 
have broken down and where law becomes an agent of, rather than a bulwark 
against, moral decay. In the Division of Labour (1893), Durkheim suggested that 
as societies move from mechanical to organic solidarity, from simple to complex 
social organisation, there is a shift from the punitive sanctions of repressive law 
toward the civil (or restorative) sanctions of restitutive law. Legal evolution thus 
accompanies evolution in the division of labour, with the latter being the cause of 
the former, but with each reinforcing the other. In this macro-level model, 
repression of deviations from prevailing norms reflects a ‘primitive’ society of 
dependence, whereas the ongoing regulation of interactions and infractions 
through restitution between parties reflects a complex society of interdependence 
(Adler 1995: 272). This highlights a quantitative reduction in the intensity of 
controls and a corresponding qualitative increase in the refinement of dispersed 
controls. The quantitative-qualitative transition is intended to foster through subtle 
and positive means, rather than heavy-handed and negative means, that persons 
should find it in their interests to obey the law (Bernard 1995: 86).
A number of observers reject the legal evolution thesis. A synthesis of such 
critiques underscores that the developmental pattern of the legal evolution thesis 
offers too smooth and functional an evolution to fit with the asymmetries of penal 
history (Garland 1990: 48-49). Durkheim is rebuked for over-emphasising the
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transition from the repressive law of ‘primitive’ society toward the restitutive law of 
complex society, in spite of temporal and spatial evidence to the contrary. 
Further, the artificial dichotomy lacks reference to intermediate stages of legal 
development in addition to the continuing struggle between different methods in a 
given context. That Durkheim apparently “gets it wrong” (Garland 1990: 49) is 
more a reflection of misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the legal 
evolution thesis. The unit of analysis is not legal history or legal ideas, but rather 
the social conditions of mechanical and organic solidarity, and thus:
The legal evolution thesis is an initial presentation of a problem for 
legal theory to solve: what is the moral essence of complex societies 
that modern law expresses (and must express in order to retain its own 
moral force and be something more than ‘mere’ politics)? (Cotterrell 
1999: 91)
Following Hobbes too closely results in an ongoing failure to recognise and 
evaluate the shifting sands of both the means and objectives of the post-Fordist 
state. This shift is primarily about the supplanting of law by economics, and the 
transnational ideological sea change which underpins this transition (Lowi 1992). 
Law is continuing to drift toward a narrow focus on technical aspects of positive 
law. In the unfolding reductionism we find at the cutting-edge an obsessive focus 
on efficiency (optimal and actuarial calculation) as the emergent central criterion 
for technical law. The “new penology” (Feeley and Simon 1992) offers the utopian 
promise of clinical calculation and crime prevention in contemporary risk society.
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However, constellations of risk do not occur in “depoliticised social ether” and 
there is a troubling (friendly) relationship between actuarial justice and ‘primitive’ 
vengeance (Rigakos 1999: 145). Repressive applications of national or 
transnational law (criminal and/or civil) cannot and will not, post facto, resolve the 
sheer scale and complexity of crime problems being induced by the profusion of 
the market-oriented society.
Perhaps law and its enforcement (grounded in control formulations) will only 
produce nominal results at best and organised crime will flourish regardless (Kos 
1997). fear that the power of organised crime has increased even as the weight 
of enforcement pressure increases, but the existing state of knowledge precludes 
validation or falsification of this assertion. Some may view this charge of 
iatrogenesis as defeatism best expressed in the phrase “nothing works” 
(Martinson 1974) or justifying further and rapid escalation of control techniques. 
Instead, my aim is to highlight that the fight against organised crime should not 
continue to be dominated by tactical approaches at the expense of strategic 
approaches. Tactics are expedient procedures for promoting desired ends over 
the short-term. Strategies, on the other hand, consist of the science/art of planning 
and directing an evolving method for achieving specific goals over the short-, 
medium- and long-term.
The answer lies not in simply doing more of the same but rather in an evolved and 
evolving approach to social regulation.
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Many of the levers of social regulation that can reduce organised crime and 
related problems are clearly beyond the scope of utilitarian applications of law and 
criminal justice. As Jeremy Bentham explicitly recognised, only in a just society 
can utilitarian theory be both effective and just (Newman 1978: 206). Not a mere 
cognitive question, justice depends on a certain set of objective and subjective 
elements of social organisation. An endangered concept in the risk society, justice 
needs to be reformulated to limit the counterproductive exercise of state power 
and to foster non-repressive approaches (wherever possible) which reduce rather 
than exacerbate crime problems (Hudson 2002). We have not really progressed 
beyond Hobbes’ view of the state as a mechanism of social control (be it panoptic 
or otherwise), rather than it being an expression of the legitimacy conferred upon 
it by citizens (Saul 1995: 162-3). Within a democratic paradigm, effective social 
control must necessarily involve reciprocal rights and obligations between citizens, 
the state, and state agents of social control.
Greater effectiveness (as opposed to the efficiency of much existing control 
policy) requires a broader view of social regulation and what works in achieving 
this end. We need to embrace the richness, often misunderstood, of the 
Durkheimian conception of law and anomie. As a Jew and with the experience of 
rabbinical training, Durkheim used law in the dual sense of the word within the 
Torah which embodies: (1) “positive legal injunctions”; and (2) “the law in a larger, 
more living sense, the law as an intuitive, inward experience of how things should 
be” (Cayley 1997: 20-21). Effective social regulation requires that the individual
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both accept the authority of society or its organs, and recognise as just the limits 
that are set. This denotes that the power of social regulation must by “obeyed 
through respect, not fear”, force and physical restraint do not automatically 
restrain the human appetite or the heart (Durkheim 1897: 248-249, 252).
The failure to foster a culture of lawfulness (Godson 2000), or the spirit of law, 
underlies the embedded insecurity of our age. If we examine specific practices 
and transformations in the exercise of social power it appears that we are 
witnessing governance not of organised crime but rather governance through 
organised crime (Sheptycki 2003). Organised crime is used as a warrant to justify 
the assertion and expansion of state power in various domains, especially prior to 
2001. The putative rise of an un-governable tide of globalisation and serious 
crime throughout the 1990s (in spite of statistical evidence to the contrary for 
many indices, see next chapter) and into the new millennium has provided an 
excellent opportunity for the re-assertion and/or expansion of state power. The 
phenomenon of home invasion robbery (HIR) emerged during this period in 
Canada. HIR seems antiquated, nonadaptive and almost atavistic within the 
context of an advanced and wealthy society. The Canadian state should have little 
problem in preventing and suppressing such predatory (or picaresque) forms of 
serious crime and yet the phenomenon of HIR exists and persists.
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Conclusion
This chapter assessed the challenge of social regulation in general and with 
particular attention to organised crime. It discussed selected insights from anomie 
theory. These included Durkheim’s insight that anomie results from the absence of 
society in the failure to achieve social regulation. It also included Merton’s insight 
that anomie results from the presence of society in the failure to achieve a 
balance between goal achievement and the suitability (morality) of the available 
means, then turned to the claim that Durkheim and Merton may be control 
theorists, and I highlighted that in control theory individuals are freed to engage in 
deviance whereas in Durkheim and Merton individuals are pressured toward 
deviance.
I then shifted from issues of causation to responses with respect to particular 
approaches to social regulation. These approaches illustrate the limitations of 
applying standard control orientations in general and especially with respect to 
those involved in organised crime. The analysis addressed general deterrence 
(the wider population), specific deterrence (at-risk individuals), incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation. In the case of the first three responses, we find questionable 
capacity to reduce or prevent organised crime. Such groups have available 
numerous techniques and tactics to circumvent or displace risks. Further, 
rehabilitation has not been properly tried.
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The chapter also included discussion of Durkheim’s legal evolution thesis. 
Therein, he argued that as society becomes more complex, moving from 
mechanical to organic solidarity, repressive (punitive) law is progressively 
replaced with restitutive (restorative) law. Although there are a number of critics of 
the legal evolution thesis, Durkheim posed a key problem of whether modern law 
can retain its own moral force and be something more than mere politics. The 
control of organised crime is an area that illustrates the continuing drift toward the 
narrow concerns of positive law.
The following chapter turns to the impact of political economy in respect of issues 
relating to organised crime.
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND ANOMIE
[NJothing assures us that these conditions are normal. For we must 
not be dazzled by the brilliant development of sciences, the arts and 
industry of which we are the witnesses; this development is altogether 
certainly taking place in the midst of a morbid effervescence, ...in a 
pathological state just now accompanying the march of civilisation.
— Emile Durkheim (1897: 368)
Introduction
In this chapter, I examine the sociological foundations of institutional anomie 
theory (IAT). These foundations involve the rise of the doux-commerce and self- 
destruction theses (Hirschman 1982) of market society. Respectively, the 
eighteenth century Enlightenment view that markets help to perfect human society 
and the nineteenth century Industrial revolution view that markets have a 
corrosive effect on human society. Building upon these ideas, IAT offers a macro- 
criminological model to examine structural causation. It posits that a market- 
oriented imbalance in social institutions may cause criminogenic tendencies in 
various parts of society and simultaneously undermine institutional and individual 
observance of social rules.
I then examine key issues relating to the ideas of globalisation and empire. In 
particular, the post-World War II view of globalisation as a system of economic
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means to improve the condition of humanity and social organisation. This was 
followed by the late-1980s shift toward a view of globalisation as a system of 
economic means apparently operating for its own abstract purposes. These 
issues are then linked to the concept of empire (over imperialism) in the 
contemporary period of United States dominance.
My analysis then turns to how Canada experiences several anomic trends. 
Canadian sovereignty is not assaulted directly by an imperial aggressor but rather 
national participation in contemporary Empire compels a market-oriented focus in 
social institutions. This produces considerable inter-related problems and limits 
the ability of social institutions to regulate individuals and society. Despite the 
successes of the market-oriented society, those individuals and groups who find 
themselves marginalised represent a substantial problem to Canadian society.
The Sociological Foundations of Institutional Anomie Theory
In the contemporary period, and one would suspect in many others, crime is less 
opaque than political economy. The former attracts more attention because it is 
more easily understood and its effects seem more real and proximate. Crime 
touches “...our sense of how fragile social order is, how rare justice is, and how 
near we feel violence and disorder often are, both out in society and within 
ourselves” (Salutin 1997). The effects of crime seem all around us, reported in 
superficial and/or infinite detail in the media. The causes of crime and facilitating 
factors are well-ingrained in the public consciousness, including money, hate,
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love, drugs and weapons. The causes and facilitators of domestic and 
international political economy, on the other hand, are distant variables that are 
not easily understood by the vast majority of people. Of the social structures that 
“exert a definite pressure” toward certain behavioural patterns (Merton 1938: 672), 
those induced by the law are more directly observable and may (by-and-large) be 
discerned, whereas those induced by economic organisation are less directly 
observable and are quite difficult to discern (Durkheim 1895: 57).
Some commentators argue that market-oriented society is largely a positive force 
offering economic growth and rising living standards for the world and its people 
(Davidson and Rees-Mogg 1993 1997; Drucker 1993; Friedman 1982; World 
Bank 1995 2005). Other commentators argue that this it is largely negative, or that 
it contains a considerable number of negative aspects, including fostering 
increasing stratification between rich and poor. These observers (Barlow 2005; 
Buchanan 1998; Castells 1998; Clarke and Barlow 1997; Currie 1991; Greider 
1997; Kaplan 1998; Luttwak 2000; Mander and Goldsmith 1996; Monbiot 2000; 
Rifkin 1996; Taylor 1990 1999; United Nations Development Programme 2006) 
are concerned that market-oriented society will involve a dismal future for the 
world and its people whilst much of the benefits will go to multinational 
corporations. In spite of the opaque nature of the influence of contemporary 
economic organisation, the institutions and instruments of global political economy 
and market-oriented society have emerged as a major target of discontent at the 
close of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century. Significant
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demonstrations in various parts of the world have been held, and have to varying 
degrees disrupted, conferences and summits of the Group of 7 (G7), World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organisation (WTO) as well as 
meetings promoting regional trade via forums such as the Summit of the 
Americas.
At face value, we should expect to find some relationship between political 
economy and crime. Consequently, interest in this topic has been widespread in 
sociological, criminological and economic thought on whether market capitalism 
enhances or erodes the moral order of society (Rosenfeld and Messner 1997: 
222). Prior to the Enlightenment, human happiness and unhappiness was 
generally attributed to luck or chance and other unalterable causes such as the 
will of God. The rise of modernity and rationalism prompted cognisance of the 
growing influence of social and economic structure in generating differential life 
chances (Hirschman 1982: 1463; Merton 1968: 202-203; Merton 1995: 12). Since 
the end of the Second World War, however, especially but not at all exclusively in 
North America, the mainstream of sociology and criminology has been largely 
uninterested in the issue of political economy and crime. Indeed, studies on such 
issues have tended to be “identified as a quaint preoccupation of the academic 
specialist but of no immediate practical policy relevance” (Taylor 1998: xiii). The 
ongoing development of interdependent market-based societies compels 
reconsideration of this neglected topic at both the macro- and micro-level. These
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issues have been given serious consideration in several contributions (Cohen 
1988; Reiner 2007; Ruggiero 2000a, 2006).
The Doux-Commerce Thesis
The doux-commerce thesis is a product of the political, economic and moral 
philosophy of the Enlightenment. It combined the 18th century European ideas of 
secular human progress and the perfectibility of humanity (Hirschman 1982: 1463- 
1464; Zeitlin 1981: 12). Two objects, the free individual and the state, dominated 
social thinking during this period and social progress attached to solidifying the 
association between the two. Observers argued that the primary interest of 
absolute monarchs and the church was that “...the people should be weak and 
wretched, and that it should never be capable of resistance” to the Sovereign will 
(Rousseau, 1762: 105). Throughout 18th century Europe, however, it was being 
recognised that traditional society was impeding social advance and the diffusion 
of its benefits to the populace. Up-rooting the chains of feudal tyranny necessarily 
involved an effort to dissolve the relative power of absolute monarchy and the 
church as well as intermediate social groups including the patriarchal family, 
guilds, and universities (Nisbet 1943b: 157-158). There was, nonetheless, one 
particularly important nexus needed to connect the two supreme rational entities. 
Montesquieu (1749/1961. Vol.
2: 8, 81) argued that commerce and civility (or manners) are reciprocally related 
and that the causal relationship flows from commerce which “...polishes and
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softens [adoucit] barbaric ways as we can see every day” (Hirschman 1982: 
1464). Enhancing the circulation of wealth and money associated with markets 
would brush away the cobwebs of irrational behaviour associated with traditional 
society. Like the flow of purifying water through a system of conduits, it was 
believed that markets would mitigate the excesses of absolute monarchy and the 
church by improving the common weal in a new secular moral order (lllich 1986: 
42-43).
Under the doux-commerce thesis, the market would serve as a bulwark against 
deviant and/or aberrant behaviour. A benefactor was still required, for protection 
against political despotism and to enshrine a rational social structure that fostered 
capital accumulation and the diffusion of douceur. Later observers recognised 
that (the promise of) inalienable individual rights were required for the diffusion of 
commerce and its social benefits. Without such guarantees, the tyranny 
associated with “political despotism” and absolute monarchy might be supplanted 
by the “tyranny of the majority” under the auspices of the state, a situation no less 
threatening to the establishment of a “good condition of human affairs” (Mill 1859: 
63). Achieving the necessary balancing act between the individual and the state 
required a set of viable policy prescriptions. Montesquieu attributed the English 
with the greatest progress of peoples in commerce, freedom and civility (Weber 
1920: 45). Published on the eve of the American Revolution, The Wealth of 
Nations (1776) provides the quintessential reference point for the philosophy of 
laissez-faire. Adam Smith argued that an unregulated market of individuals
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pursuing their self-interest would foster, as though led by an invisible hand, the 
accumulation of financial, human and social capital. Within his “system of natural 
liberty”, the sovereign state (Leviathan-Shackled) would possess only three 
duties: (1) defence of the nation against foreign aggressors; (2) administration of 
justice to defend against internal injustice or oppression; and (3) establishing and 
maintaining certain public works and institutions, such as public education, where 
profit would be insufficient to attract individual investors but where it may 
significantly contribute to the “great society” (Smith, 1776: 745). As the logic of 
market capitalism and its accompanying social structure unfolded during the 
industrial revolution, idealistic notions about douceur would increasingly conflict 
with actual experience.
The Self-Destruction Thesis
The self-destruction thesis is a product of the political, economic and moral turmoil 
associated with the 19th century emergence of the Industrial revolution. This 
thesis put forth the critique that market capitalism “cuts from under its feet the very 
foundation” of the processes of social production, a system which produces and 
reproduces “its own grave-diggers”, those who have a vested interest in 
supplanting the existing social structure (Marx and Engels 1848: 102). 
Proponents argued that accumulation of financial capital (and money, the new 
metric of all relations) was being achieved through market mechanisms which 
depleted human and social capital, corrupting the social structure from top to 
bottom. The bonds of local community (and the social responsibilities of feudal
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lords) were severed as peasant welfare shifted from a focus on rural life and 
subsistence farming to urban life and industrial employment. Faced with more 
anonymous and heterogeneous population and the market as the arbiter of 
welfare, it was argued that the prevailing ethic would be nothing more than the “icy 
water of egotistical calculation..., naked self-interest, [and] callous cash payment” 
(Marx and Engels 1848). Market capitalism was thus generating, not douceur, but 
rather self-destructive tendencies. Individuals were encouraged to “sacrifice the 
best qualities of their human nature”, and pursue “the brutal indifference” of self- 
interest (Engels 1846: 36-37).
The advance of absolute and/or relative deprivation created powerful temptations 
toward deviance that were, at times, so extreme that the “penalties of the law 
[provided] no further terrors” (Engels 1844: 126) to induce restraint. The 
expansion of routine and impersonal market transactions, and its corrosive effect 
on human relations, facilitated centralisation of economic and political power 
within the nation state, the arbiter of the ‘public interest’. Critics noted that 
financial affairs would almost invariably trump the common good because the 
“executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common 
affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Marx and Engels 1848: 91). Whilst the market 
would require fluid economic policies to promote capital accumulation and 
industrial investment, countering its corrosive effects would require an expansion 
of state regulation. Maintaining and reproducing order was vital as problems 
associated with market capitalism provoked an increasingly class conscious
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proletariat, and a seemingly inevitable socialist revolution (Hirschman 1982: 
1467). Marx proposed that the thin separation between market and state should 
be eliminated, that the sovereign state (Leviathan-Unbound) should usurp all 
means of production and act as the architect of social and economic progress.
Clearly, the doux-commerce and self-destruction theses are overly-deterministic. 
The first offers the tautology of a “naive functionalism that stipulates that markets 
necessarily produce the morality necessary for markets to function”, ignoring the 
non-economic institutional context upon which market transactions are grafted. 
(Rosenfeld and Messner 1997: 210). The second neglects the prevalence and 
durability of capitalist societies and their respective differences. Once we 
relinquish the ideologies supporting the two theses, we can demonstrate that the 
moral foundation of market-oriented societies are in alternating states of depletion, 
replenishment, and the simultaneous overlapping of both processes (Hirschman 
1982: 1483). The relative balance between douceur (integrative forces) and 
erosion (destructive forces) will be conditioned by the temporal and spatial context 
in which they occur.
Institutional Anomie Theory (IAT)
Institutional anomie theory or IAT (Messner & Rosenfeld 1994a; Rosenfeld and 
Messner 1995; Rosenfeld and Messner 1997), building upon the foundation 
provided by the doux-commerce and self-destruction theses, provides a macro- 
criminological model to examine structural causation. The model can be usefully
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applied to examine the probability of deviance and crime and its relationship to 
market-oriented economies. Institutional anomie theory looks at the division of 
labour and interaction between several institutional forms: polity (or law), 
economy, family, and education. In this macro-criminological approach to 
analysis, the task is articulate the probabilities of crime linked to the “institutional 
balance of power”: (1) the social conditions (cultural and institutional patterns) in 
which markets generate differential consequences; (2) the processes by which 
social conditions may lead to crime; and (3) the paradoxical interdependence and 
conflict between major social institutions (Rosenfeld and Messner 1995: 169; 
Rosenfeld and Messner 1997: 212). The theory pays particular attention to the 
progressive intensification of institutionalised economic dominance, and its 
consequences for deviance as proposed by Durkheim and Merton. The former 
argued that this type of anomie is a product of the absence of society wherein the 
shift from mechanical to organic solidarity (Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft) 
deregulates institutional social controls just as economic objectives are recklessly 
flaunted. The latter argued that this type of anomie is a product of the presence of 
society wherein a social structure promotes an inordinate emphasis upon goal 
achievement, but with little attention to the moral status of the available means.
Market-Oriented Power Imbalance
Employing techniques of elaboration and integration, IAT also draws on insights 
from related criminology discourse such as control theory (Hirschi 1969). 
Emphasis is placed upon bonding which is believed to exert a considerable
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regulatory effect on individual behaviour. The regulatory importance of bonds to 
social institutions has been enhanced by progressive economic intensification and 
associated development in the size and complexity of social structure. The 
relative regulatory effectiveness of social institutions within a cultural environment 
of economic intensification, however, paradoxically fosters the very behaviours 
that are subject to the restraints imposed by social institutions (Rosenfeld and 
Messner 1997: 219). The decline of the moral order may be attributed to an 
“institutional balance of power” tipped toward market-driven orientations within 
both economic and non-economic spheres (Messner and Rosenfeld 1994a: 75- 
88). At a macro-social level, the ongoing integration of economic and non­
economic institutions may be imperceptible to many. At the micro-social level, 
patterned symptoms of moral decline may become perceptible as dominant 
market orientations force continued devaluation of the non-economic sphere. In a 
society overrun with market orientations, “the pursuit of private gain becomes the 
organising principle of all areas of social life — not simply a mechanism that we 
may use to accomplish certain circumscribed economic ends” (Currie 1991: 255).
Capitalist ethics may be depicted on a continuum with “asceticism” at one extreme 
and the “anomic ethic” at the other. Asceticism involves a macro-social balance 
between the immanent and the transcendental, an ethic which blends the pursuit 
of individual and social goals within a social structure providing clear direction as 
to the legitimate use of available means. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism (1920), Weber discusses the fusion between religious and bourgeois
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values that provided a necessary step for the emergence of capitalism. Wealth 
was the product of craftsmanship, of hard work in a life-long calling that fused 
individual identity with one’s contribution(s) to society. The socially approved 
means for the enjoyment of material rewards, obviated by the norms of ascetic or 
frugal living, centred on the investment of capital into further production and 
accumulation, and church-building donations intended to bring one’s community 
closer to God. Work and capital accumulation are thus in a mutually-reinforcing 
symbiosis at the immanent and transcendent level (Rosenfeld and Messner 1997: 
215).
In contradistinction to the causal flow posited by Montesquieu, other observers felt 
that “any inner relationship between certain expressions of the old Protestant spirit 
and modern capitalist culture were to be found” as flowing from religious 
characteristics such as the record of asceticism or piety (Weber 1920: 45). 
Though it may certainly have provided an initial base for capital accumulation, the 
immanent-transcendent balance of asceticism was undermined by the constraints 
on individual enjoyment of acquired wealth (Rosenfeld and Messner 1997: 215). 
This disjunction constrained the incentive for continuing capital accumulation by 
the individual. Indeed, subservience to theology in moral and natural philosophy 
fostered the view that the perfection of virtue would derive only from austere 
behaviour. It was “almost always inconsistent with any degree of happiness in 
this life [resulting from the] ...liberal, generous, and spirited conduct” of individuals 
engaged in market-based social interaction (Smith 1776: 830).
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The Anomic Ethic
In contrast to the ascetic ethic, the anomic ethic results from the macro-social 
imbalance between the legitimate means available for achieving market-oriented 
success goals, and the micro-social focus on the technical efficiency, rather than 
the moral status, of available means (Merton 1938). The utilitarian disposition 
toward technical efficiency rather than moral status progressively collapses the 
distinction between the immanent and transcendental, the means and ends of 
wealth. The pursuit of self-interest takes on the role of means and ends. 
Economic dominance stimulates the anomic ethic at the macro- and micro-social 
level by progressively undermining the regulatory potential of social institutions 
and corroding the ethical choices of individuals (Rosenfeld and Messner 1997: 
214, 216). Aside from the periodic variance that emerges among individuals, and 
the prevailing orientation toward conformity with norms (Merton 1938), the most 
pure manifestation of the anomic ethic will tend toward a strict economic-utilitarian 
calculus:
In the most rigorous expressions of capitalistic ethics, crime is simply 
another economic activity that happens to have a high price (jail) if one 
is caught. There is no social obligation to obey the law. There is 
nothing that one ‘ought’ not to do. Duties and obligations do not exist.
Only market transactions exist. (Thurow 1997: 159)
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The dominant behavioural standard is unlikely to be either the purely self- 
interested and under-socialised homo economicus, or the socially-driven and 
over-socialised actor of many sociological theories. Of greater interest than this 
raw dichotomy between the under-socialised (Becker 1968) and the over­
socialised (Wrong 1961) actor, are the individual, social and institutional relations 
in which such behavioural patterns are embedded (Granovetter 1985: 490). The 
probability of deviant behaviour, in the IAT framework, principally relates to the 
institutional balance of power and its effects on morality and ethics. The moral 
foundations of capitalist society are likely to be, consistently replenished where 
there is a reasonable institutional balance of power, or continuously eroded where 
the economy dominates the institutional balance of power (Rosenfeld and 
Messner 1997: 217).
An imbalance of institutional power may foster “criminogenic asymmetries” 
defined as “conflicts, mismatches and inequalities in the sphere of politics, culture, 
the economy and the law” (Passas 1999a: 400). The relative balance between 
douceur and erosion can help in specifying the nature and causes of deviance. 
For instance, a significant (widening) gap between de jure and de facto social 
norms may promote an institutional crisis (Thoumi 1995: 67-68). Throughout the 
social structure, such a crisis can lead to the industrial production of “perverse 
social capital” which reinforces decision-making toward deviance and crime as 
normative behaviour (Rubio 1997: 808). The globalisation of industry and trade is 
a key factor underpinning an institutional power imbalance in many countries.
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Globalisation and Empire
Post-World War II -  Part A
Krehm (1997) argues that, following the Second World War, there have been two 
globalisation movements. Globalisation I (the Global Great Society) occurred 
immediately following the war, and continued up to the 1980s. Globalisation II 
(the Juggernaut),which is addressed in further detail below, apparently began to 
take shape in the 1980s, and advanced rapidly with the collapse of the former 
Soviet Union. In the first period of globalisation, the prevailing aim appeared to be 
the realisation of social and economic goals: a capitalist world order that would 
raise the living standards and quality of life of the mass of people and head off 
communist influence. This version of globalisation involved a strong commitment 
to a mixed economy, a generally doux-commerce view operating within the 
restraints imposed by the expanded regulatory intervention of the nation-state. 
This maternal approach to social policy has a relatively short history among 
industrial nations, particularly in North America, dating back to the end of the 
Second World War (Kristol 2000). Within this version, the welfare state operates 
based on compassion, providing a safety net that offers ongoing support to those 
experiencing misfortune in the market economy as well as to an expanding 
proportion of the population viewed as in need of help or support, for instance, the 
undeserving poor.
132
The maternal welfare state owes its impetus, in large part, to women’s suffrage 
and increased participation in public life (Lott and Kenny 1999), but the more 
common referent relates to ideological concerns following the Second World War. 
With the forces of democracy triumphant over fascism, but still facing the potential 
threat of communism, an opportunity was created for the establishment of a 
strong democratic-capitalist order at the domestic and international level. This 
democratic-capitalist order was intended to rival all foes, not only in terms of 
promoting the welfare of its population, but also in generating a powerful national- 
international economic substructure that would underpin the development and 
expansion of the Global “Great Society”. As President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
argued in a 1941 speech:
We have learned too well that social problems and economic problems 
are not separate water-tight compartments in the international any 
more than in the national sphere. In international affairs, economic 
policy can no longer be an end in itself. It is merely a means for 
achieving social objectives. (Sharp 1944: 931-932).
In order to counter the self-destructive tendencies of capitalism, and the potential 
attractiveness of communism, an institutional framework needed to be developed 
to establish capitalism as the pre-eminent system for organising the world. This 
system of global organisation included establishment of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the United Nations System of National Accounts 
(UNSNA), and the economic underpinnings of the Modern Welfare State. The
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IMF would offer financial support to assist industrialised countries in the process 
of structural adjustment toward progress. The World Bank would provide similar 
facility for the developing world. The UNSNA would provide the 
international/domestic model for calculating progress, measured via the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), and the revenue stream on which the Welfare State 
would sustain itself. President Truman’s 1949 announcement of a modernist “Big 
Push”, to remedy poverty in the developing world, signalled a global expansion 
that was perceived as the invocation of a programme of universal American 
interests (Goudzwaard and de Lange 1995: 1112). A new “internationalist” outlook 
was promoted among Americans, the construction of a stable and prosperous 
international economic system that would promote progressive humanism, with 
the United States as leader and centre of the global convergence (Greider 1997: 
16-17). This “One World” programme of “internationalism” (Willkie 1943), mocked 
by Republican Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce as “globaloney”, could no 
longer be ignored with the widespread recognition of “global interdependence” by 
the seventies (Schulzinger 1983: 46).
Post-World War II -  Part B
The second post-World War II globalisation movement is termed by Krehm (1997) 
as Globalisation II (The Juggernaut). This period apparently began to take shape 
in the 1980s, and advanced rapidly with the collapse of the former Soviet Union. 
In this second period of globalisation, the prevailing aim appears to consist of pure 
economic goals: rapid market expansion and accessibility, unending growth and
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profits, with little regard to the social consequences or concern to head off the 
apparently redundant threat of communism. This paternal approach to social 
policy enjoys a longer historical tradition, dating back to the turn of the 20th 
century in North America and earlier in Europe (Kristol 2000). Within this version, 
the welfare state operates on the basis of sympathy, providing a safety net that 
offers temporary support to those experiencing misfortune. The temporary nature 
of the support is aimed, not at building dependency upon the support mechanism, 
but rather to cultivate self-reliance and individual life skills to cope with the 
difficulties of life.
At the end of the Second World War (Globalisation I), these two sets of ideas 
were complementary and mutually reinforcing. The institutions of globalisation, the 
UNSNA, IMF, and World Bank would provide the means, an economic 
substructure for the construction and expansion of the Great Global Society. The 
institutions of national social welfare would serve the ends, the material and 
ideological enabling and enrichment of citizens. These two sets of ideas and the 
associated institutions grew enormously over the decades, and reinforced each 
others’ development. The punctuated equilibrium of the late 1980s (Thurow 1997) 
led to a radical questioning of this symbiotic relationship. The welfare state 
system was deemed to have become bloated and inefficient. The means to 
achieve social welfare objectives, the global economic substructure, had decided 
that its sibling required market-based correction. The means took on the role of 
both means and ends. Today it seems common-sense that the welfare state has
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outgrown much of its utility, and requires much trimming, if not outright abolition 
for its rampant inefficiencies (Davidson and Rees-Mogg 1997). In his classic work, 
The General Theory of Employment. Interest, and Money (1936: 383-384), 
Keynes wryly remarked:
[T]he ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they 
are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is 
commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical 
men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual 
influences are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.... I am 
sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared 
with the gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately, but 
after a certain interval; for in the field of economic and political 
philosophy there are not many who are influenced by new theories... so 
the ideas which civil servants and politicians and even agitators apply 
to current events are not likely to be the newest. But, soon or late, it is 
ideas, not vested interests which are dangerous for good or evil.
Keynes contribution to the creation of the modern welfare state is widely known, 
however, his many other contributions are largely un-recognised or under­
recognised. The irony of the above material is that the current macro- 
(globalisation) and meso-micro- (welfare state) level debates are actually a 
competition between two sets of Keynesian-inspired ideas and institutions. 
Keynes figured prominently in the creation of: (1) the economic underpinnings of
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the Welfare State; and (2) Globalisation institutions such as the World Bank, and 
to a lesser though not insignificant extent, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and, in collaboration with Sir Richard Stone, the United Nations System of 
National Accounts (UNSNA) (George and Sabelli 1994; Waring 1989). Given the 
above quotation, Keynes may have been well aware of the potential for abuses of 
his ideas. What remains unclear is the degree to which contemporary structures 
of political economy reflect a ‘natural evolution’ of Keynes’ ideas or the opportune 
historical conditions for stakeholders to “renounce allegiances” (Schumpeter 
1946).
The modernist “Big Push” and its asymmetrical later cousin impacted heavily upon 
the financial circumstances of many countries. Though there has been some 
respite in recent years, the entire debt of the developing world amounted to some 
$1.35 trillion in the 1990s (Goudzwaard and de Lange 1995: 15), and debt service 
payments by developing countries in the year 2000 amounted to some $78 billion 
(United Nations Development Programme 2001: 111). This financial albatross 
limits the institutional capacity of countries to invest in the development of its 
citizens, and to buffer them against market forces. While the impact on 
industrialised nations such as Canada (discussed further below) may be more 
subtle, the trend is quite similar.
137
Empire
A longer-range view of the relationships between capitalism, the state and its 
citizens, is helpful in understanding the contemporary manifestation of Empire and 
the seeming paradoxical impacts it produces. Hardt and Negri (2001) emphasise 
three phases.
The first phase involved the emergence of large-scale industry from 1848 to 1914. 
This involved individual work being tied increasingly to the functioning of machines 
controlled by the capitalist class. Overseeing but providing little interference 
between workers and capitalists, the state would focus on imperial expansion 
(invasion) and control of non-capitalist territories to generate raw materials and 
markets for other goods.
The second phase continues the development of large-scale industry from 1914 to 
1968. It involves the rise of an increasingly complex division of labour and the 
emergence of the mass worker. More involved in regulating the relationship 
between workers and capitalists, the nation-state focuses within its own borders 
because imperial intentions create tension and conflict with other nation-states. At 
the same time, this also tends to impede the flow of trade and social relationships 
between nation-states.
The third phase follows from the year 1968 and involves the automation and 
computerisation of production. The division of labour is more complex and 
abstract and workers are involved in social networks of production. The state
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must manage increasingly diffuse relationships between workers and capital. This 
spells the emergence of ‘Empire’ in which nation-state sovereignty is undermined 
by appeals to transnational values of democracy, multinational corporation access 
to markets, and the management of culture, knowledge and communication.
Hardt and Negri (2001: 160-183) argue that current United States dominance 
reflects the third phase, the development of ‘Empire’ rather than imperialism. 
Countries are drawn into the ambit of the prevailing network power, the United 
States and, in many instances, may find themselves confronting American-style 
problems. This is perhaps nowhere more acute than in Canada, a nation-state 
that is closely tied to the United States in terms of geography, history and trade.
The Peaceable Kingdom
Whereas the American constitution guarantees “life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness”, Canada presents the alternative constitutional guarantee of “peace, 
order and good government” which “combines a vigorous American-style 
capitalism with the social provision and socially liberal attitudes of Western 
Europe” (The Economist 2005: 9). While the commitment to a market society 
seems undiluted, the latter commitment has come under increasing strain in 
recent decades. The “peaceable kingdom” (Antonides 1978) confronts similar 
generalised problems to those faced by other nations in the present era of post- 
Fordism (Taylor 1999) or informational capitalism (Castells 1998). The Canadian 
experience is specifically bound up in the depth and breadth of ties to, and
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growing integration with its largest trading partner the United States. Patterns of 
extreme and (un- and/or under-) recorded violence seem endemic to the diffusion 
of the American way of life (Currie 1997) and, consistent with IAT, I argue that HIR 
reflects in Canada a similar construct which facilitates social conditions conducive 
to the industrial production of anomie and “perverse social capital” (Rubio 1997). I 
will restrict my analysis below to the issues of public debt and its management as 
well as education and its relation to employment.
Debt, Deficit and Other Liabilities
Examination of statistics on Canada’s debt presents a bleak outlook over the 
short-and medium-term. Ernes and Kreptul (1999) argue that this is troubling 
problem in terms of the:
• Federal debt which stands at $584 billion
• Total obligations and liabilities of all levels of government (local, 
provincial/territorial and federal) which stands at over $3.5 trillion
• Overall liabilities which represent 410% of GDP, and 1,018% of 
exports
• Total liabilities per person amount to $115,772 per citizen or $243,632 
per taxpayer
Some consider this level of liability (for debt, debt guarantees, contingent 
liabilities, contractual commitments and programme obligations) unsustainable.
For instance, Ernes and Kreptul (1999) argue that Canadian governments would 
have to tax 100% of all income for over four years to eliminate the debt and fully 
fund all programmes; and government re-structuring to respond to deficits to-date 
represents a small fraction of the ongoing changes that must be made to restore a 
sustainable financial involvement of government. Proponents of a conservative 
approach, such as the Vancouver-based Fraser Institute think tank authors above, 
argue for a continued need to restructure government programmes. This 
prevailing view of the financial state of affairs conveniently ignores the topic of 
causation: why dramatic increases in deficits and debts have occurred. The 
federal debt was $56 billion in 1974-75, over $400 billion in 1989-90, and $584 
billion in 1999. At this debt load and interest rate, Canada’s debt service liability is 
about $42 billion annually.
Though Canada eliminated its deficit by the mid-1990s, its continuing economic 
challenge relating to debt can be traced to the mid-1970s and deliberate public 
policy decisions that were intended to set Canada up to participate in the 
emerging global economy. Social programmes continue to be blamed for deficits 
and debts, but spending is only one part of the equation. For instance, for the 
period 1975-76 to 1990-91 if unemployment insurance revenues were deducted 
from the overall cost of social programmes, there would be no net increase in the 
ratio of social programme spending to GDP. If unemployment revenues were not 
deducted, social programmes contributed 2% to the growth of the federal debt 
over this period. By contrast, spending on the criminal justice contributed approx.
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8% to the growth of the federal debt over this time period. What’s the other part of 
the deficit/debt equation, Revenue, and it is a crucial part of the equation. Tax 
changes in the 1970s reduced government revenues substantially. These 
changes included tax burden shifts, from corporations to individuals, and from 
income taxes to consumption taxes. In 1979, the Finance Department estimated 
that the effect of these changes was to lower federal revenues by $14.2 billion. By 
comparison, the federal deficit for 1979 was $11.6 billion. Nevertheless, the bulk 
(70%) of the increase in spending relative to GDP was the result of the lacklustre 
economic growth and elevated debt charges associated with “stagflation” and its 
implications during the 1970s and 1980s (Mimoto and Cross 1991).
Educational Access
For much of human history, access to education was an inaccessible privilege for 
people without financial means. Indeed, prior to the invention of printing (a 
“vendible commodity”), scholars and beggars were synonymous terms; where the 
former were indigent they may be granted licenses by the university to beg as a 
means to support their continued education (Smith, 1776: 152). Public education 
and the development of social sciences in particular, formed key elements of 
Durkheim’s (1897) vision for a new secular moral order. Abilities, skills and 
knowledge acquired by individuals constitute the development of human capital 
and, collectively, networks of social capital for further education and employment 
markets. Those who do not do well in the educational system (and who have little 
access to other forms of capital, social and economic) will find little opportunity for
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further education and are often not well equipped (save the very fortunate or 
highly-talented) to expand their economic opportunities beyond low-paying work.
Since the 1960s rhetoric of equality of opportunity, rapid growth in post-secondary 
education has been systematically oriented toward the certification of individuals, 
profitability of institutional product(s), and the industrial production of graduates 
who set the standard for the consumption levels to which all other members of 
society will aspire (lllich 1971: 35). Education is degenerating into a utilitarian 
means for economic-employment goals. Despite the commercial clarity linking 
human performance, educational means, and goal achievement, the education- 
employment system in Canada (and I suspect many other countries) has gone 
awry. For the high- and low-achiever alike, contemporary social structure delivers 
progressively less even while it extracts an ever-increasing share of citizen time 
and resources.
Many individuals within (and particularly those excluded from) this matrix embody 
considerable risk. That is, they possess or exhibit aspirations for market success 
but the ‘legitimate’ pathways are either inaccessible and/or unaffordable, or are 
simply too lengthy, serpentine, and unrelated to economic-occupational goals. 
Aspiration demands greatly exceed the supply of viable and reasonable education 
and employment opportunities.
The twentieth century was a period of marked transformation for the Canadian 
education system and citizens. Whereas school-aged child attendance in
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education was modest at the turn of the century, due to an agriculturally-focussed 
society, by the end of the century post-secondary graduates outnumbered those 
with grade nine. Students have been successfully encouraged to prolong their 
education so as to fulfil rising expectations for work opportunities, upward mobility, 
and an improved standard of living, for themselves in particular and society in 
general (Clark 2001). This has generally proved to be beneficial for individuals 
and Canadian society, in spite of the inevitable economic fluctuations, and 
periodic crises, that occur within a capitalist society. In the 1990s, however, this 
social contract (which had been temporarily breached on previous occasions) was 
seriously undermined. Enrolment was flat for post-secondary education even 
while it became the standard for borderline employability status, marked rise in 
costs further depleted family resources that were flat since the 1980s, and the 
nexus between educational training and suitable job opportunities eroded.
Bouchard and Zhao (2000) argue that the educational paradox of the 1990s may 
be understood with reference to five trends: (1) enrolment slow-downs and/or 
decreases; (2) sharp tuition increases; (3) continuing enhanced returns for 
university graduates relative to the lesser educated; (4) a higher drain on family 
resources and marked increases in student indebtedness; and (5) consequent 
effects upon equity in educational access. The reason for using data from a 
decade ago is that it establishes key trends immediately prior to the 1998 to 2002 
period that is the focus of the home invasion robbery case study in chapter six. 
First, from 1991 to 1997, full-time new entrant participation in Canadian
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universities remained flat with an overall increase approaching 2%. By contrast, 
part-time new entrant participation in university dropped nearly 63% from 1992 to 
1997. Second, tuition costs have skyrocketed and show no signs of abatement in 
trajectory. In 1997 constant dollars, undergraduate arts tuition increased from 
$1,448 in 1986/87 to $2,655 in 1996/97. Further, using 1999 constant dollars, 
tuition fees for an average undergraduate arts programme rose from $1,595 in 
1988/89 to $3,379 in 1999/2000, nearly a 212% increase (Clark 2001: 22). Third, 
whilst the costs have increased, the relative benefits of university education 
remain. Graduates of 1995 reported in 1997 the following average income 
relative to educational attainment: $23,400 for trade or vocational, $25,700 for 
college, $32,000 income with bachelors, and $47,000 for Master’s and Ph.D.’s. 
Rates of employment were (and are) higher amongst university than non­
university graduates (85% versus 75%, and 50% for those with grade 8 
education). The gap tends to widen over time as university graduates start at 
higher earnings levels, and they are less likely to be affected by economic cycles 
and unemployment.
Fourth, the relative benefits of post-secondary education are eroded by high 
costs, which deplete family income (flat since the 1980s) and hobble students with 
rising indebtedness. As a share of family income (in 1997 constant dollars) 
comparing 1986/87 to 1996/97, tuition costs rose from 2.5% to 4.6%, and the total 
costs (tuition, fees, accommodation, meals) rose from 8.9% to 9.9%. Average 
family income since 1980 has risen only 1% after adjusting for inflation and, not
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surprisingly, students are more indebted with 1995 bachelor’s graduates owing an 
average of $13,300 upon graduation, an amount 140% higher than that of the 
class of 1982 (Clark 1998: 2425). From 1980/81 to 1997/98, student fees as a 
percentage of university revenues rose from 10% to 20%. This may be attributed 
to reductions in federal and provincial government funding. Fifth, while the effects 
of these trends have been widespread, the most significant impacts have been 
experienced by individuals of lower socioeconomic status. Indeed, amongst low 
and middle socio-economic status individuals, 1986 participation rates were 
respectively 13.7% and 14.5%, and in 1994 18.3% and 25.3%. The gap in 
participation rates is continuing to widen and impacts most significantly on poorer 
students who are more dependent on financial aid and are more likely to study on 
a part-time basis (while working full- or part-time). Participation rates amongst 
high socio-economic status individuals were at 33% in 1986, and continue to rise 
modestly.
High school education is simply inadequate to access employment that offers a 
living wage. Progressively, post-secondary graduation is becoming the standard 
for employability, but it provides few guarantees for decent employment 
opportunities. Of 1995 graduates surveyed in 1997, 80% had found jobs, but only 
40% who were working full-time had jobs that were directly related to their training 
(typically higher-paying), and 30% of were still engaged in low-paying service 
sector jobs (Canadian Centre for Social Development 1999: 27, 47-48, 53). 
Those high school students who possess sufficient literacy for employment must
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compete with post-secondary students, not for reasonable labour market 
opportunities and a living wage, but rather for low-wage service sector jobs (i.e., 
traditional retail sector employment, part-time, little security, few or no benefits). 
Contemporary post-secondary graduates may be “holding their own” in relative 
earnings even though they confront “stunted expectations” (Finnie 2000), 
however, the disjunction between the goals and the ‘legitimate’ means is inducing 
considerable strain upon Canada’s young people at multiple points along the 
scale of socio-economic statuses. Moreover, while averages may not look so 
bleak, the median is a deceptive message (Gould 1985). Students face 
“differential pressures” to find well-paying jobs that will allow them to repay 
student loans, at an average of $13,300 for 1995 graduates, but with 22% owing 
more than $20,000 and 14% owing less than $5,000 (Clark 1998: 25). Students 
are compelled to gamble, with varying degrees of intelligent calculation, 
indebtedness against employment prospects in a destabilised opportunity 
structure.
An Anomic Division of Labour
The shift from Fordist industrial organisation toward post-industrial or post-Fordist 
organisation (Bell 1967a,b, 1973; Taylor 1999) is a process that promotes an 
anomic division of labour. This is most acutely evident in the declining labour 
market position of young people in many industrialised countries, including 
Canada. Some argue that this unfolding process, “while...arduous and unsettling 
for many, ...ultimately creates employment opportunities for many more [however]
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accessing the [information age] earnings potential will require much education and 
skills-training” (Crompton and Vickers 2000: 12-13). The empirical evidence for 
young persons is not as comforting as the above position. With stagnant 
economic growth and high inflation or “stagflation” during the 1970s, and follow on 
effects into the 1980s, inconsistent growth was paired with a rapid expansion in 
labour market stratification. That is, the division between primary and secondary 
labour markets, between well-paying and stable jobs and the reduced wages and 
insecurity of mainly service sector jobs (Hagan and McCarthy 1997: 127).
For the period 1970-1999, the service sector grew from 62% to 73% of total 
employment in Canada. Excluding (generally well-paid and full-time) public sector 
employment, nine of ten part-time jobs are in the service sector wherein average 
weekly earnings are $554 (versus $777 for the goods sector), but can be much 
lower on average for sub-groups, for instance, $210 average for food and 
beverage workers. Secondary labour market jobs are dominated, though not 
exclusively, by young persons who pay into, but are largely excluded from, several 
mechanisms of public protection against market forces. In a 1998 survey, fully 
68% of youths aged 15_24 were ineligible for (un)employment insurance because 
they had never worked, quit their last job, or did not meet the minimum required 
days of insurable work. While technology and workforce reorganisation since the 
1970s reduced the returns to workers under the age of 35, the 1990s were a 
watershed. While productivity increased, wages remained flat, and firms 
controlled labour costs through workforce re-organisation (use of short-term
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contracts and self-employment) and by avoiding the hiring of new workers. Young 
persons were neglected in the dismal 1% overall job growth in the first half of 
1990s, and in the economic renaissance of robust economic growth and 
expansion of full-time employment opportunities in the second half of the 1990s. 
Unemployment in 1998 stood at 6.9% for those aged 30_64 and 15.2% for those 
aged 15_24, and less than 50% of all youth aged 15_19 had jobs during the 
summer of 1997, down from 66% in 1989 (Canadian Centre for Social 
Development 1999: 53). (Crompton and Vickers 2000)
Fortunately, there are some ‘legitimate’ means of escape from this pathological 
opportunity structure, but these pathways are somewhat exclusive. Canada 
enjoys good access to a vast buffer for domestic policy failure, the United States. 
There is much concern about the so-called “brain drain”, the movement of talented 
labour from Canada to the United States. A study on university graduates (Frank 
and Belair 2000) reveals that while relatively few are going to the United States 
overall, it is significantly tapping Canada’s most talented labour. Of 1995 
graduates, 4,600 or 1.5% of 300,000 moved to the U.S. between 1995 and 1997. 
Those who left tended to be the top performers, that is within the top 10% of their 
graduating class, and particularly amongst those holding Master’s or Ph.D.’s. 
Most found better work opportunities and higher salaries in the U.S. Median 
salary for bachelor degrees in Canadian dollars was 42% higher in the U.S., 
$43,400 versus $30,500. Fully 82% of those who left in 1995 were still in the U.S. 
as of March 1999. Additionally, 80% had acquired or were planning to seek
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permanent resident status in the U.S. in 1999. Curiously, 43% indicated that they 
planned to return to Canada. The somewhat paradoxical finding may be related 
to an interest in retaining access to both labour markets. For the very talented and 
highly-educated, the gravitational pull of the expansive U.S. opportunity structure 
is indeed seductive.
The Canadian opportunity structure is inadequate to absorb its internal resources 
of human capital. Whereas the talented and/or highly educated may pursue the 
broader American opportunity structure, the redundant peasantry lacks the 
flexibility to ‘legitimately’ exit the anomic division of labour. Poverty and affluence 
may well hold little explanatory power as isolated variables, but these take on 
renewed resonance for crime causation within a context of institutionalised 
anomie, of systematic scarcity and affluence. Confronted with such structural 
contradictions,
appreciable numbers of people become estranged from a society that 
promises them in principle what they are denied in reality. And this 
withdrawal of allegiance from one or another part of prevailing social 
standards is what we mean, in the end, by anomie. (Merton 1964: 218)
Young people continue to bear the brunt of concentrated anomic social currents. 
These derive from inherited and modern evils of Western societies, from the 
development of market capitalism and the incompleteness of that development 
(Marx 1867: 4). Given its history, it would be misleading to portray Canada as
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anything other than a trade-based nation, whether mercantile or institutionalised 
quasi-free market. What is interesting about Canada’s contemporary economic 
pursuits is how it expresses a conscious drive toward participation in global 
markets. More presciently it expresses a (semi-)conscious drive toward the 
unfolding logic of manifest destiny (Pratt 1927), the expansion of U.S. influence 
and dominance across the North American continent. Accompanying Canada’s 
industrial production of perverse social capital, persons affected by the anomic 
currents are experiencing a gravitational pull toward networks of “criminal capital” 
(McCarthy and Hagan 1995 2001) to foster goal achievement. Individuals are not 
freed to engage in deviance and crime in my perspective, rather individuals are 
pressured into this by a system in which education contributes little toward a 
stable career, and provides few advantages in the ‘competition’ for a scarce 
supply of well-paying jobs. Further, high school students are railed against their 
university counterparts in a pathetic ‘competition’ for low-paying service sector 
jobs that the latter ‘desperately’ require to reduce or merely contain rising 
indebtedness. The key labour issue in the information age is not the “end of work” 
or “when work disappears” (Rifkin 1996; Wilson 1996), but rather the qualitative 
condition of workers and the low-skilled and vulnerable in particular (Castells 
1998: 149).
The limited availability of, and differential access to, legitimate or illegitimate 
learning and performance structures may well have been a problem throughout 
much of the twentieth century (Cloward and Ohlin 1960). Since the 1990s,
151
however, the legitimate opportunity structures have become destabilised to the 
point that these are dissolute for a substantial number of the Canadian population. 
Home invasion robbery, which I explore in the following chapter, is a curious 
phenomenon that highlights the anomic state of Canadian society.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I examined the sociological foundations of institutional anomie 
theory (IAT). These foundations involved the rise of the doux-commerce and self- 
destruction theses (Hirschman 1982) of market society. Respectively, the 
eighteenth century Enlightenment view that markets help to perfect human society 
and the nineteenth century Industrial revolution view that markets have a 
corrosive effect on human society. Building upon these ideas, IAT offers a macro- 
criminological model to examine structural causation. It posits that a market- 
oriented imbalance in social institutions may cause criminogenic tendencies in 
various parts of society and simultaneously undermine institutional and individual 
observance of social rules.
I then examined key issues relating to the ideas of globalisation and empire. In 
particular, the post-World War II view of globalisation as a system of economic 
means to improve the condition of humanity and social organisation. This was 
followed by the late-1980s shift toward a view of globalisation as a system of 
economic means apparently operating for its own abstract purposes. These
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issues are then linked to the concept of empire (over imperialism) in the 
contemporary period of United States dominance.
My analysis then turned to how Canada experiences several anomic trends. 
Canadian sovereignty is not assaulted directly by an imperial aggressor but rather 
national participation in contemporary Empire compels a market-oriented focus in 
social institutions. This produces considerable inter-related problems and limits 
the ability of social institutions to regulate individuals and society. Despite the 
successes of the market-oriented society, those individuals and groups who find 
themselves marginalised represent a substantial problem to Canadian society.
The following chapter provides a case study of the phenomenon of home invasion 
robbery.
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CHAPTER SIX:
A CASE STUDY OF HOME INVASION ROBBERY (HIR) 
Introduction
In this chapter, I will provide a case study of home invasion robbery as an 
example of serious and organised crime. I am not arguing that all HIR cases are 
organised crime, either in the sense that they meet stereotypical notions of 
permanent hierarchy or that they necessarily fit neatly into official definitions. This 
is central to the earlier debates and issues raised in the thesis about the evolving 
definitions of ‘organised crime’ (See Chapter Two). Not the least of these issues 
is that the term itself and official definitions are problematic, and they are often 
unhelpful when examining the variable organisation of serious crimes. My aim is 
to examine how HIR exhibits, and may be linked to, a spectrum of criminal 
enterprise.
I begin with a range of definitional issues relevant to the discussion of HIR. This 
includes discussion of the two most proximate categories for HIR, residential 
break and enter (RB&E) and robbery, as defined by the Criminal Code of Canada. 
I then turn to the definition of HIR, which is not a distinct crime category but rather 
a subdivision of the categories of RB&E and robbery. The narrow definition 
focuses on robbery that occurs in a private dwelling. The broad definition focuses 
on a robbery, or any RB&E involving a violent offence, that occurs within a private 
dwelling. Given the potential overlap in the broad definition, a given incident
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should only be counted once and as the more serious offence. I also provide a 
brief discussion of definitional issues relating to serious and organised crime, and 
I discuss how HIR exhibits, and is linked to, a spectrum of criminal enterprise.
I then turn to attempt to quantify the magnitude of the HIR problem. This is no 
straightforward task given that HIR does not exist as a distinct official crime 
category. For this reason, Uniform Crime Reports (UCR 1) that contain a 
nationally representative picture of police-recorded crime cannot be used to 
identify HIR incidence. It is possible to gain some idea of incidence using the more 
detailed UCR 2 survey of police-recorded crime. However, UCR 2 represented 
less than 50% of the national volume of police-recorded crime and, therefore, it 
does not provide a representative picture of Canada as a whole or any of its 
regions. The General Social Survey (GSS), which includes a criminal 
victimisation component, provides some insights. However, the GSS does not 
have sufficient sensitivity to provide reliable statistics at a national, or census 
metropolitan area, level. The International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) is a 
comparative instrument and its typically small sample sizes (around 2,000) for 
each country produce sampling errors that make precise domestic estimates of 
existing crime categories problematic. Thus, the ICVS does not have sufficient 
sensitivity to be able to provide a reliable or precise estimate of the sub-category 
of home invasion robbery.
Then I provide an overview of 25 examples of HIR, 16 drawn from case law and 9 
from newspapers. These are reviewed using the 5ls analytical framework (Ekblom
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2003) and its eleven generic causes of crime to assess the social organisation of 
this phenomenon. My particular aim in using the framework is to examine how 
HIR exhibits, and may be linked to, a spectrum of criminal enterprise. I then turn 
to the Canadian policy response specific to the problem of home invasion robbery.
I have tried to highlight explicitly the profitability inherent in each of the examples 
(where the information is available), and there are a number of quite profitable 
examples that could be flagged by money laundering controls. Whilst to a greater 
or lesser extent in various countries, money laundering legislation may have been 
created to deal with organised crime and drugs trafficking in particular, the 
pertinent legislation in Canada and elsewhere by no means limits itself to 
‘organised crime’ as that is commonly understood. Anti-money laundering controls 
can identify and be used to target a broad spectrum of serious crimes, however 
‘organised’. Reports may result (irrespective of suspicion) from sums over 
$10,000 (objective reporting) and/or from sums that are deemed incompatible with 
the individual’s income and profile with a financial institution (subjective suspicious 
transaction reports that can potentially be triggered at any monetary amount).
Definitional Issues 
Break and Enter and Robbery
Before attempting a definition of HIR, it is necessary to define and discuss the two 
most closely associated offences, breaking and entering and robbery. The 
Criminal Code of Canada offers the following definitions:
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Breaking and Entering:
S. 348(1) Every one who
(a) breaks and enters a place with intent to commit an indictable 
offence therein,
(b) breaks and enters a place and commits an indictable offence 
therein, or
(c) breaks out of a place after
(i) committing an indictable offence therein, or
(ii) entering the place with intent to commit an indictable offence 
therein....
Robbery:
S. 343 Every one commits robbery who
(a) steals, and for the purpose of extorting whatever is stolen or to 
prevent or overcome resistance to the stealing, uses violence or 
threats of violence to a person or property;
(b) steals from any person and, at the time he steals or immediately 
before or immediately thereafter, wounds, beats, strikes or uses any 
personal violence to that person;
157
(c) assaults any person with intent to steal from him; or
(d) steals from any person while armed with an offensive weapon or
imitation thereof.
B&E focuses upon illegal entry into and exit from a place, often a building, for the 
purpose of committing, or with intent to commit, an indictable offence. In the 
absence of contradictory evidence that could raise a reasonable doubt, it is 
presumed that the activity alone constitutes sufficient proof of having committed or 
having a general intent to commit an indictable offence (Section 348(2)). 
Offences against residential premises typically occur when the residents are not at 
home, and offender objectives include the theft of cash, convertible property (e.g., 
electronic equipment), and in some cases vandalism. In the case of robbery, the 
Crown is required to prove both the commission of the offence as well as 
demonstrate specific intent to commit an indictable offence, plus the use and/or 
threat of violence. An attribution of specific intent is context-dependent, and 
derives not only from the explicit or implicit actions of an accused but also a 
reasonable fear of (potential) violence that is perceived by the victim. The 
maximum penalty prescribed by Canadian law is 14 years or life imprisonment for 
B&E occurring, respectively, in any place other than a dwelling or in a dwelling 
house (S. 348(d)). The maximum punishment for robbery is imprisonment for life 
(S. 344). The severity of the law with respect to B&E offences is, however, largely 
a symbolic statement of moral opprobrium, given the low rates of detection, police 
clearance, and prosecution.
Home Invasion Robbery (HIR)
For the purposes of this essay residential breaking and entering or burglary is 
often denoted below by the acronym RB&E or by the term residential burglary. 
Home invasions represent a difficult crime category, one that bridges the 
distinction between RB&E and robbery. Representing a small subdivision of both 
these offence categories, HIR tends to elude consistent definition and 
classification. Kowalski (2000: 5) suggests two complementary approaches to 
capturing the HIR phenomenon:
• Narrow definition: a robbery occurring in a private dwelling; and
• Broad definition: a robbery, or any RB&E involving a violent offence, 
occurring in a private dwelling (with overlapping incidents counted only 
once as the more serious offence)
The purist form of HIR is represented by residential robberies that entail specific 
intent in the instrumental use of threats or actual violence to affect a theft. The 
borderline form of HIR is represented, largely, by RB&E offences that entail 
general intent and are then combined with the use of threats or violence.
The Alberta Court of Appeal in the landmark case of R. v. Matwiy defined a home 
invasion robbery as existing where an individual(s):
(a) plans to commit a home invasion robbery (although the plan may be 
unsophisticated), and targets a dwelling with intent to steal money or
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property, which he or she expects is to be found in that dwelling or in 
some other location under the control of the occupants or any of them;
(b) arms himself or herself with an offensive weapon;
(c) enters a dwelling, which he or she knows or would reasonably 
expect is occupied, either by breaking into the dwelling or by otherwise 
forcing his or her way into the dwelling;
(d) confines the occupant or occupants of the dwelling, even for short 
periods of time;
(e) while armed with an offensive weapon, threatens the occupants 
with death or bodily harm; and
(f) steals or attempts to steal money or other valuable property.
This definition tends to locate HIR under the narrow definition, the category of 
robbery with specific intent found in the convergence of confrontation, weapons, 
confinement, threats and theft of property. One could envisage examples that are 
substantive home invasions but do not fit so neatly under the narrow definition. 
For instance, a victim may return home to an offence in progress or an offender 
may select a target home that is mistakenly believed (even with reasonable due 
diligence) to be unoccupied at the time. Even without the explicit presence of 
weapons, an offender may represent a credible threat against a victim (for 
example if he belongs or appears to belong to a group that has a reputation for
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serious violence). An offender may also engage in violence to affect a theft where 
circumstances produce a confrontation. A vulnerable citizen such as an elderly 
person may feel sufficiently threatened by a young adult or youthful offender so as 
not to resist a theft. Whereas the Alberta Court of Appeal has provided the key 
components of a viable definition, the parameters should not exclude broad 
definition cases of HIR in which the elements of the crime may indicate general 
intent. Under many circumstances, offenders should be presented with the 
opportunity to avoid confrontation with victims they believed were not at home, to 
not threaten or exact violence and only to use sufficient force to escape and avoid 
confrontation. These factors demarcate the boundary between a residential 
burglary and a broad definition home invasion. The definition used here is 
focused on initial intention in order to draw some practical divisions. 
Nevertheless, initial intention can be supplemented, or superseded, within the 
dynamics of ‘slippery slope’ crimes and the associated phenomenological 
experience (Katz 1988).
Serious and Organised Crime
One remaining definitional issue is whether home invasion robbery is an example 
of serious and organised crime. Recalling the discussion in chapter two, there is a 
basic division between disorganised crime and the mafia-octopus. The examples 
of HIR discussed further below support the disorganised crime model; there is 
little or no empirical evidence that would substantiate a Godfather model even in 
the more organised examples. The phenomenon is a serious crime that typically
involves offences with more than four years imprisonment as a maximum penalty. 
Moreover, home invasion emerged as a significant public and policy concern in 
late-1990s Canada and remains a topical issue that afflicts many parts of the 
country.
Before addressing whether HIR meets existing definitions of serious and 
organised crime, it is important to consider the social context surrounding this 
phenomenon. Home invasions are a consistent theme in the annual reports of 
Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006). These reports implicate Asian Organised Crime and Outlaw 
Motorcycle Gangs as being behind much of this activity in relation to illicit drugs 
and other efforts at market control. Members of the recognisable organised crime 
groups may not often be directly involved in such activities given the risk of 
detection. Street gangs or ‘wannabee’ members may perform home invasions at 
the behest of these groups (as subcontractors or potential recruits), or such 
activities may reflect individuals and groups that are independent of key criminal 
organisations. The variable involvement of independent actors and typical 
criminal organisations may also relate to key drivers such as the marijuana 
market. One economic estimate indicated a value of $5.7 billion wholesale and 
$19.5 billion retail for the marijuana market across Canada (Mulgrew 2005). While 
some of this volume is oriented to the internal Canadian market where 7.5% of the 
population are current users and 23% have used marijuana at least once in their 
lifetime, the goldmine market is exporting to the United States (Easton 2004).
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The Hells Angels and Vietnamese groups tend to dominate the commercialised 
marijuana industry, and they may prefer to exert control over the wholesale aspect 
of the business. Nevertheless, the market is diverse with many small and medium­
sized growers. This diversity is central to what police believe is increasing 
competition and a turf war between growers that involves home invasions and 
booby trapping to protect their property (Fong 2000). This competitive market 
derives from the profits that can be made, notwithstanding the risks from law 
enforcement and competitors. It is hardly surprising that a market will have many 
new entrants when an occupant with a 10 square metre room can generate more 
than $100,000 from cultivating marijuana; this over a one-year period involving 
100 plants with the average value of a mature marijuana plant estimated at $1,000 
(Boyd 2000).
Few of the home invasion cases discussed below will meet the earlier definitions 
of organised crime, as these definitions too often focussed on rigid rather than 
fluid activities and associations. Several of the cases do tend to approximate the 
United Nations Convention on Transnational Crime (2000) definition. Readers 
may refer to chapter two for a more complete discussion, but the key elements 
may be summarised as follows. The Convention defines an “organised criminal 
group” as having formal or informal association and/or roles involving at least 
three members, and its participants act in concert to commit crimes specified in 
the convention (or serious crimes with four years imprisonment or more) for the 
purpose of obtaining a financial or material benefit. The cases below demonstrate
163
a spectrum going from examples of low-level offenders trying to maintain a drug 
habit by targeting the elderly and vulnerable, to examples of medium- and high- 
level offenders involved in gang disputes and theft of valuable legal and illicit 
goods. I am not trying to argue that the former represent or are necessarily linked 
to ‘organised crime’. My goal is to illustrate the spectrum of a phenomenon 
affecting Canada and to highlight variability in the organisation of crime.
Magnitude of the Problem
Before delving into the social organisation of HIR in the case study information 
below, it is important to first identify the magnitude of the problem. The first 
approach to assessing magnitude is “incidence”, that is the number of cases that 
become known as recorded by official police data or other sources. The second 
approach to assessing magnitude is “prevalence”, that is how widespread the 
problem is or the number of victims within a specified population as recorded by 
victimisation surveys, and other sources of information. My attention is focused on 
HIR within the context of Canadian crime statistics, but readers may refer to 
Maguire (2007) for a detailed review of contemporary crime statistics issues in the 
United Kingdom.
Incidence
Even if we disregard unreported and unrecorded offending, it is tricky to determine 
with accuracy the incidence of HIR offences using official data. This stems from 
disparities in the definition and classification of HIR offences between different
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jurisdictions, and the exclusion of a specific offence category under the Criminal 
Code that may permit HIR to be captured in the collection of the general wave of 
the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR 1). The UCR 1 survey offers a representative 
national survey of virtually all police recorded crime. Aggregate level statistics on 
HIR are documented in the detailed UCR 2 survey of police recorded crime, a 
sample that is not representative of Canada as a whole or any of its regions. In 
1999, UCR 2 data were collected from a non-representative sample of 164 police 
agencies in seven provinces, representing 46% of the national volume of police 
recorded crime.
Using the UCR 2 we may identify incidence for residential robbery (narrow HIR 
definition) as well as the combination of residential robbery and RB&E with a 
violent offence (broad HIR definition, with overlapping cases counted only once as 
the more serious offence). In 1999 Canadian police agencies recorded 1,154 
(narrow definition) and 2,449 (broad definition) incidents of HIR, so the more 
inclusive approach would more than double the rate. Thus, HIR incidence is 
distributed almost evenly amongst the narrow definition (47%) and the broad 
definition (53%). Of total robbery incidents recorded in the UCR 2, some 5.3% 
occurred at a place of residence. By contrast, only 1% of B&E incidents involve a 
violent offence (nine out of ten incidents occurring at a place of residence) and, 
typically, the confrontation will be limited to an assault. Of the offences captured 
by the UCR 2 survey, reported HIR represents at most 0.2% of total crime 
incidents (1,169,836), 0.3% of property crime incidents (821,414), or 1.6% of
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violent crime incidents (149,929) (Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics 2000: 51, 
54; Kowalski 2000: 5). Of course, such measures disregard dollar value and the 
economic & social impact of HIR compared with other offences.
The statistical probability of the average citizen becoming an HIR victim appears 
to be minuscule. This statistical improbability will be of little comfort to those who 
have been victimised by, or may fall victim to, a home invasion. Moreover, 
standard cautions regarding data interpretation are greatly amplified given the 
definition, sampling, and other problems that obfuscate the volume and 
distribution of risk for HIR.
Clearly, we should expect that reported HIR incidents would over-represent 
offences targeting those who are not substantively involved in criminal activity and 
will tend to focus on cases where victims, especially vulnerable groups such as 
the elderly, are caused fright and harm. Indeed, 1999 data on residential 
robberies from the UCR 2 survey indicate that: (a) 18% of victims were 60 years 
of age or older (a marked contrast to 3% of violent crime victims); and (b) 58% of 
incidents involve the presence of a weapon, typically a firearm (22%), or cutting 
instruments such as a knife (21%) (Kowalski 2000: 5).
Some observers may reasonably expect that home invasions will generally be 
treated and recorded as RB&Es where only minor violence occurs and as 
residential robberies where any substantive violence and harm occurs (Hurley, 
1995). However, those who are involved in criminal activity may be presumed to
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be less likely to report a home invasion for fear of attracting unwanted official 
attention. Others who are not involved in criminal activity may be fearful of 
reporting due to the potential threat of further privatised violence: a fear that is 
likely to be all the stronger if they believe the imagery of HIRs and organised 
crime in Canada purveyed by CISC.
Prevalence
Police recorded statistics reflect only those cases reported to authorities, which 
leaves observers with the “perennial bugbear” (Maguire 1982: 10), the unknown 
dark figure of the extent of crime problems. The 1999 General Social Survey 
(GSS) revealed that 37% of all victimisation incidents were reported to police. 
The highest and third highest reporting rates were, respectively, 62% of RB&E 
incidents and 46% of robbery incidents. High reporting rates for these types of 
criminal victimisation may be attributed to a sense of civic duty, to help catch and 
punish offenders, for the purposes of insurance claims, and to obtain protection or 
stop an incident. Approximately 25% of Canadians 15 and over suffered one or 
more incidents of criminal victimisation in 1999. Of the 8.3 million incidents of total 
criminal victimisation, 7% or 587,000 incidents (rate of 48 per 1,000 households) 
were cases of RB&E victimisation, and nearly 3% or 228,000 incidents (rate of 9 
per 1,000 population 15+) were cases of robbery (not limited to HIR) victimisation. 
Consistent with definitions used in the Criminal Code, the GSS defined residential 
break and enter as “illegal entry or attempted entry into a residence or other 
building on the victim’s property”, and robbery as “theft or attempted theft in which
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the perpetrator had a weapon or there was violence or the threat of violence 
against the victim”. The survey revealed that in robbery (not limited to HIR) 
victimisation incidents, 51% involve a stranger to the victim, 49% involve more 
than one offender, 69% involve an offender aged 18-34, and 84% of offenders are 
male. Such survey data are not available for RB&E victimisation incidents 
(Besserer and Trainor 2000: 3, 19, 21).
The GSS data provides useful insights into the “dark figure” of the broad category 
of RB&E and robbery, but provides no insight into the problem of HIR. This is 
primarily because the HIR numbers are too small, in quantitative terms, for such a 
broad based survey. In other words, such a representative population survey 
instrument does not possess sufficient sensitivity to capture many (quantitatively) 
small scale problems. Moreover, victimisation surveys use the household as the 
unit of analysis and/or as the base for those 15 and over who are included in the 
survey. It is possible that those who might be at higher risk for RB&E victimisation 
and HIR, particularly in cases related to organised crime, may be less likely to be 
included in the survey, report fully their experience, or to have their higher risk 
adequately portrayed. Greater effort to identify and include high risk groups would 
not likely skew the overall results, given the relatively small proportion of incidents 
they represent, but it may well demonstrate a different profile of risk.
This still leaves the question of the overall prevalence for HIR. With an estimated 
12,163,000 households and 587,000 incidents, the victimisation prevalence for 
RB&E in 1999 was 4.8%. With an estimated 24,260,000 persons aged 15 and
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over and 228,000 robbery incidents, the victimisation prevalence for robbery (not 
limited to HIR) in 1999 was 0.9%. Using the UCR 2 numerical guidelines above 
that 5.3% of robberies occur at a place of residence and 0.9% of B&E incidents 
involving violence occur at a residence, the extent of HIR victimisation may have 
included as many as 5,283 residential robberies (0.02% prevalence) and 12,084 
RB&E incidents involving violence (0.099% prevalence) in the 1999 GSS.
Theoretically, it should be possible to estimate with greater precision the volume 
of HIR using Canadian victimisation survey data. In the United Kingdom, many 
data sets including criminal victimisation are freely available to academics who 
register with the appropriate data archive. Statistics Canada does make available 
selected victimisation data sets that relate to commonly requested items but not 
specialised items. Detailed data sets and specialised information from Statistics 
Canada appear to be made available on a fee basis only, whether for academics, 
other Government departments or the public.
Nevertheless, I made email and phone inquiries with Statistics Canada about the 
availability and possibilities of analysing victimisation data for evidence of home 
invasion robbery distribution, concentration, etc. My inquiries produced the 
following information results. The GSS involves an initial sample of 26,000 
respondents and then drills down into the various relevant social and victimisation 
categories. The method of coding responses means that victimisation is counted 
once in its most serious category. This means that the proximate category for 
home invasions is robbery. Robbery represents some 9 incidents per 1,000
population or less than 1 % of the GSS database. According to Statistics Canada 
officials, subdividing this further into robberies that occur in a home produces 
numbers that are “too small to be published at a national level” and this makes “it 
impossible to provide reliable statistics on robbery even at a CMA [census 
metropolitan area] level for home invasions” using GSS data.
Comparative Victimisation Data
The 2000 International Crime Victims Survey (van Kesteren et al 2001: 1), or 
ICVS (See Table 1), revealed that averaged across 17 industrialised countries, 
21.3% of respondents reported being victimised once or more for 11 categories of 
criminal victimisation. The eleven categories included: car theft, theft from car, car 
vandalism, motorcycle theft, bicycle theft, burglary, attempted burglary, robbery, 
personal theft, sexual incidents, and assaults and threats. Criminal victimisation 
in Canada (for the four categories of most concern to this study) is substantially 
higher than the average of the surveyed countries: 11 crimes (10.5%), burglary 
(21.7%), attempted burglary (21.7%), and robbery (11%). For the four categories 
of crime and the 10 countries included in the table below, Canada's rank order is 
as follows: 11 crimes (5th), burglary (3rd), attempted burglary (4th), and robbery 
(4th). Australia, and England and Wales, rank as the 'leading' jurisdictions for 
criminal victimisation. The overall rate of victimisation, compared with Canada, is 
20.6% higher in Australia and 9.9% higher in England and Wales. Canadians 
should not, however, be overly cheerful about our comparative rates of criminal
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victimisation, particularly given the United States and its 8th place finish and its 
12.7% lower rate for overall victimisation.
Table 1: 2000 International Crime Victims Survey
Prevalence Victimisation Rates — Percentage (%) 
Victimised Once or More
Country
11
Crimes Burglary
Attempted
Burglary Robbery
17
Countries
(average) 21.3 1.8 1.8 0.8
Australia 30 3.9 3.3 1.2
Belgium 21.4 2 2.8 1
Canada 23.8 2.3 2.3 0.9
England 
& Wales 26.4 2.8 2.8 1.2
France 21.4 1 1.3 1.1
Japan 15.2 1.1 0.8 0.1
Netherlands 25.2 1.9 2.7 0.8
Scotland 23.2 1.5 1.9 0.7
Sweden 24.7 1.7 0.7 0.9
U.S. 21.1 1.8 2.7 0.6
Source: van 
179)
Kesteren, Mayhew, Nieuwbeerta (2001: 178-
Victimisation in the year preceding the survey.
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According to the 1999 GSS, the victimisation prevalence for RB&E was 4.8% of 
Canadian households, a stark contrast to the 2.3% rate reported in the ICVS. 
This disparity may reflect the “fairly wide sampling error on ICVS estimates” 
resulting from typically small sample sizes of around 2,000 persons (van Kesteren 
et al 2001: 1). Small sample sizes relate to the economic feasibility of conducting 
an international survey. This may certainly affect data comparability with larger 
national survey instruments, but not the comparability between jurisdictions as per 
the objective of the common instrument. In the countries surveyed for the 
purposes of this chapter (Australia, Belgium, Canada, England and Wales, The 
Netherlands, South Africa, and the United States), residential B&E is an all too 
common form of crime victimisation experienced by citizens.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to use 2000 ICVS data (available freely online) to 
provide meaningful or precise estimates of HIR. This edition of the survey 
involved a Canadian sample size of 2,078 respondents. The ICVS data above 
indicates 2.3% of respondents reported being the victim of a burglary, 2.3% the 
victim of an attempted burglary, and 0.9% the victim of a robbery. Respectively, 
this means that nearly 48 respondents were the victim of a burglary, nearly 48 
were the victim of an attempted burglary, and nearly 19 were the victim of a 
robbery. The ICVS sample sizes make it difficult to provide precise estimates on 
existing crime categories within a given country. The survey does not appear to 
have sufficient sensitivity to unpick existing categories, orto provide reliable or 
accurate data on the sub-category of home invasion robbery.
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Home invasion robbery may be viewed as an insignificant problem from a 
quantitative perspective. The same, of course, would apply to homicide. The 
demonstrable and potential rates of incidence and prevalence for HIR are 
miniscule compared to many other crimes notwithstanding reasons to be sceptical 
of the representativeness of the data. It is the qualitative dimension, the 
terrorising of direct victims and the potential impact on public safety that makes 
HIR a valid object of social concern and inquiry. Studying the spectrum of the 
social organisation of HIR can help us to appreciate the risks that this 
phenomenon poses.
Case Study of Home Invasion Robberies
This section examines sixteen (N=16) case studies of home invasion robbery 
drawn from case law for the period 1998 through 2002. These are supplemented 
by nine (N=9) examples drawn from Canadian newspapers for the same period. 
This involves twenty-five (N=25) examples in total. Each case is presented 
separately to permit an overview of a selected spectrum of HIR examples. The 
cases are then assessed using the 5ls (Ekblom 2003) analytical framework (See 
the tabular representation in Appendix A), specifically its eleven generic causes of 
crime, to assess the social organisation of this phenomenon. The eleven generic 
causes include: criminality (predisposition), resources to avoid crime, readiness to 
offend, resources for crime, anticipation of risk, effort and reward, offender 
presence in situation, target person or property, target enclosure, wider 
environment, absence of crime preventers, and crime promoters. My aim in using
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the 51s framework is to examine how HIR exhibits, and may be linked to, a 
spectrum of criminal enterprise. Readers may refer to chapter three for discussion 
of the methodology.
Examples from Case Law 
R. v. A.J.C.
In August 2001 in the province of British Columbia, a young offender and an adult 
along with an accomplice who remained unknown to authorities robbed and 
terrorised a family. The perpetrators had come to the knowledge that the family 
had enjoyed financial success from their jewellery store and had further learned 
when a time lock safe would open in the morning. Upon arriving with two shotguns 
(without ammunition), pepper spray, a knife and duct tape, the group made 
various threats to and demands of the victims. The offenders used cell phones to 
facilitate their communication and concealed their faces with hockey (goalie) 
masks and clothing. When the robbery began, there was only a 76-year-old 
woman present: she suffered a pre-existing heart condition and spoke little 
English, and was treated roughly, bound and gagged and faced yelling and 
swearing from her assailants.
About fifteen minutes after the incident began, at around 5:45 p.m. a 15-year-old 
returned home accompanied by a 13-year-old friend. The two teenagers were 
bound but not gagged. With guns held to their heads, a discussion took place 
about taking $50,000. The perpetrators realised they would have to wait for the
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teenager’s mother to arrive in order to realise the large sum. The perpetrators 
ransacked the house taking $300 and some electronic equipment until 7:30 p.m. 
when the teenager’s mother arrived home. At gunpoint, she was taken to the 
living room and there she was bound but was not gagged. One of the 
accomplices took $1,700 from the mother’s purse but again the group was 
convinced that the husband, who was still at the store, would have to be involved 
to acquire the large sum of money. The 76-year-old woman was becoming 
extremely distraught and had trouble breathing because of the gag. After the 
offenders extracted a promise of silence from her, one of the offenders removed 
the duct tape gag that took with it a layer of skin, thus causing further pain to the 
elderly woman. The young offender took the teenager as hostage and in addition 
to being bound; he was blindfolded and hooded with a jacket. It was made clear 
that the teenager would be held as a hostage until the funds were provided to the 
group, and the young offender drove away in the family vehicle with the teenager 
in the trunk of the car. There were a couple of telephone conversations between 
the mother and father and shortly after 8:00 p.m., he arrived home.
Upon entering the home, the father was confronted by a gun pointed at him and 
an order to come into the house. He instead ran outside, shouted to his 
neighbours for help and used his cell phone to call police. While fleeing the scene 
one of the group called the young offender to advise that the plan had collapsed 
and the teenage victim was left abandoned in the trunk (boot) of the family vehicle 
around 8:30 p.m. The young offender returned to the vehicle to open the trunk,
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but did not untie the victim who had to make his way home. The two main 
offenders in this case had extensive prior criminal records. The victimised family 
continued to live in fear of one of the accomplices but, interestingly, they did not 
wish to identify the accomplice for fear of being branded a “rat”. The victims were 
all thoroughly traumatised by the incident notwithstanding that there were no 
significant physical injuries. They sold their house and car to help forget about the 
incident and their emotional and mental health has continued to suffer and has 
been reflected in decline of the family business and impairment of the teenager’s 
school life.
R. v. Bergman
In 1998 in Abbotsford, British Columbia, Dawn Amanda Bergman and a male 
companion broke into a home in order to obtain money to purchase drugs. They 
entered through an open window to a ground floor apartment, demanded money 
under the threat of beating up the 87-year-old widow they confronted. Her refusal 
prompted the two offenders to conduct a fruitless search of the apartment. 
Bergman ripped the telephone from the wall and the senior’s complaints resulted 
in her being pushed to the floor as many as three times by the defendant. The 
male companion fled the scene upon realising the elderly woman was hurt (a 
pelvic injury that subsequently required hospitalisation for six days). The female 
offender stole a small television as well as a small box of silverware and then left 
the apartment. The two offenders were aware that an occupant was present
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before the confrontation began. Bergman was a drug addict and had a lengthy 
criminal record, mainly for theft and a couple of assault counts.
R. v. Bernier
In 1997 in Sooke, British Columbia David Clayton Bernier and as many as three 
others, including one young offender, broke down the door of a house and 
proceeded to the basement suite at about 5:30 p.m. They shouted to the 
occupant “police, on your hands and knees”, they handcuffed the victim and 
ordered him to face the wall. They told the victim they were looking for money or 
dope (marijuana), and the victim directed them to $300 on the dresser, they took 
the money but found no marijuana. The victim was struck on the head with the 
butt end of a firearm that caused bleeding. The victim reported that the firearm 
was a gun or rifle weapon but he was unable to identify any of the invaders. 
Fortunately, the owner of the house and his family were not upstairs at the time of 
the invasion. When the owner returned at 8:00 p.m. he found his place ransacked 
and missing were electronic items with a combined value of less than $5,000.
Two days before the incident Bernier had asked two acquaintances visiting his 
home if they knew any places where people had pot (marijuana), and when one 
said she did, he said he wanted the information so he and his friends could go 
and steal the marijuana. On the day of the incident, the two friends who had 
visited Bernier accompanied him and two other men so that the female 
acquaintance could identify the target house. The acquaintances were dropped off
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and told they would get a phone call later that night. The participants in the 
invasion were displeased with the female acquaintance that had identified an 
incorrect target and it was communicated that the group would take a couple of 
thousand dollars to compensate for the misinformation as well as the publicity the 
invasion had provoked in the local media.
To intimidate the acquaintances into producing the funds, Bernier read one of the 
acquaintances a newspaper article about a recent murder where the victim was 
apparently burned to death. He indicated that one of the parties to the invasion 
had committed the reported murder. It appears the funds were paid. Although the 
evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bernier was directly 
involved in the home invasion, his participation in the planning and his possession 
of some of the proceeds and a shotgun was sufficient for conviction. Moreover, a 
separate witness also testified that Bernier had asked her if she knew any places 
that had marijuana in the house and she had declined to comment. In the 
judgment of the court Bernier was found to be part of a home invasion gang and 
that he participated in a common criminal enterprise to raid marijuana grow 
houses. The court also found little evidence of planning in that the group seemed 
to act on an ad hoc basis.
R. v. Cooper
In September 2000 near Labrador City in the province of Newfoundland Douglas 
Lee Cooper committed a residential burglary and theft while masked. He claimed
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that he was only interested in breaking in to find money (which yielded little 
results) and that he did not intend to harm a sixteen-year-old girl who was home 
alone asleep in her basement bedroom. He entered the home through an 
unlocked window and was wearing a black ski mask, gloves, dark clothing and 
was armed with a large hunting knife. He entered the girl’s bedroom and 
assaulted her causing serious wounds to her neck, face, hand, abdomen and 
liver. He claimed that the bedroom door was closed but unlocked and that he 
simply opened it. When the girl jumped out of bed he claimed that in the ensuing 
struggle she was unintentionally injured. In short, he argued that this was simply 
a burglary gone wrong.
He argued that he only went into the home the once, that he did not know the girl 
was at home or in her room when he entered it. The court found that Cooper had 
entered the house on more than one occasion and that he had found the knife 
used in the assault within the home. The girl testified that she always locks her 
bedroom door and leaves the television on, especially if she is alone. The court 
also found that he knew she was present and was not in any way surprised to find 
her there and he further closed the door behind him as demonstrated by the blood 
spatter on the inside of the door. The judge found that Cooper closed the door 
behind him, went over to her bed, held her down and put a knife to her throat. 
When she struggled to get up, her throat was cut and she started to fight for her 
life. In the ensuing struggle, she received additional injuries but managed to 
survive the attack.
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R. v. Curtis
In December 1998 in the province of Manitoba a couple went shopping for the 
evening and returned home to go to bed about 10:30 p.m. Michael Curtis spent 
most of that day at a local hotel and returned home around 3:45 a.m. from his 
drinking session. His residence was next door to the victimised couple whom he 
knew. He decided to break into the couple’s residence to look for money to buy 
cocaine given that he did not have sufficient monies. He wore a balaclava and 
removed the bathroom window from the home to gain entry and a search through 
the kitchen led to a wallet and car keys. Finding no money in the wallet Curtis 
decided to search the victim’s bedroom and the intruder picked up an eight-inch 
butcher knife from their kitchen.
The male occupant awoke and confronted the accused and a struggle took place. 
The male victim was stabbed twice to his upper left arm and once to the upper left 
abdomen area. Curtis immediately left the home and fled in the victim’s car. 
Although the struggle only lasted for seconds, the knife had punctured the liver, 
diaphragm, pancreas and stomach. The male victim’s heart stopped during the 
ambulance ride to the hospital, but he was revived, and he was in a precarious 
state for a few days. The police located Curtis the next day and found him in 
possession of the male victim’s briefcase and the female victim’s watch. The 
intruder’s bloody clothing was found nearby, as was the victim’s vehicle in which 
was found the bloodied knife that was used in the assault. The intruder had an
180
extensive criminal record involving robberies, thefts, parole violations and efforts 
to escape from custody.
R. v. DaSilva
A couple was driving along well-lit streets in Toronto, Ontario sometime after 10 
p.m. in January 1999. Two adults and one young offender driving in a stolen 
vehicle randomly chose the couple to be their victims. However, the offenders 
had engaged in pre-planning to work in concert with one another. The offenders 
intentionally crashed into the rear of the other vehicle and then proceeded to drag 
the couple from their car. The victims were kicked and punched, sprayed in the 
face with mace. The trio drove off in the car of the victims with the male owner in 
the trunk and the female in the back seat and they were taken to an underground 
parking garage. Repeated demands were made for money and the production of 
personal identification numbers (PIN) to bank accounts, hesitation on the part of 
the victims was met by the adult offenders with repeated blows to the head and 
face of the victims.
When the female victim indicated her purse, credit cards and other valuables were 
in her home the victims were pressured to reveal their address and to provide the 
necessary security access codes. DaSilva went upstairs to an apartment in the 
building of the parking lot and he obtained a replica semi-automatic firearm (pellet 
gun) which was given to the young offender to guard the two victims whilst the 
adult offenders robbed the victims’ home. Another vehicle was stolen from the
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parking garage and the victims were driven to another location and placed under 
the supervision of the young offender. The young offender received a cell phone 
call at
1:20 a.m. requesting verification of the security access code for the home of the 
victims, the victims provided the information under demand backed up with 
menaces. The home of the victims was robbed of jewellery and other valuables 
and these along with the victims were transported back to the original parking 
garage.
The victims were separately taken up to the apartment where DaSilva had 
obtained the pellet gun and continued demands for PIN numbers to bank 
accounts were backed up with beatings to the head and facial area of both 
victims. DaSilva revealed a semi-automatic handgun that he placed to the male 
victim’s head and began cocking the gun to intimidate. At 5:00 a.m., the two adult 
offenders left the young offender in the apartment to guard the victims. The young 
offender fell asleep and the victims were able to make their escape at around 9:30 
a.m. The young offender was immediately arrested and the property recovered 
while the two adults were arrested in the next few days in cities proximate to 
Toronto. Both adult accused held serious criminal records involving multiple 
convictions for crimes of violence. The justice in this case viewed cars as 
extension of our homes and that the carjacking acted as an entry point to what 
became, in effect, a home invasion.
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R. v. Harris
In April 1999 in Halifax, Nova Scotia Paul Harris a woman and a young offender 
met at a coffee shop. The young offender had indicated his wanting to do a break 
and enter to obtain money and the woman introduced him to Harris who was 
willing. The pair identified a target home of potentially wealthy people two blocks 
from the coffee shop where they met on two to four occasions. On the evening of 
the incident they went on the property around 9:30 p.m., the owners were startled 
and called the police who later arrived to find no one suspicious in the area and 
cleared the call at
10:04 p.m. The duo had been at the home on at least two other occasions and 
had cut the screen on the kitchen window as much as possible each time without 
being caught. On returning to the coffee shop, the woman told the two that if 
people were present then it would no longer be a break and enter, that it would be 
a home invasion where people could get hurt and they could get a minimum 
sentence of six years imprisonment. The elderly couple was awake later than 
usual because of what had taken place earlier.
At 11:30 p.m., the female victim went to close the kitchen window (which was 
generally left open) and she felt a large gush of wind. She opened the blinds to 
close the window and then Harris and the young offender jumped through the 
open window into the kitchen. The female victim ran to the hallway screaming for 
her husband, the young offender pushed her, and the female victim broke her hip
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as she fell to the floor. Harris came upon the male victim who was holding a small 
saw. After being struck by the saw and bleeding from his knuckles, Harris 
disarmed the male victim and then began to kick, punch and strike the victim with 
his wood walking stick until it shattered. The victim was left drifting in and out of 
consciousness. The young offender pulled the phone off the wall and one of the 
two intruders cut the exterior phone lines. Among other items that they stole 
included $1000 as well as jewellery, electronics, credit cards, chequebooks and 
the male victim’s war medals. The female victim asked the offenders to help her 
husband and to leave a light on in the house so she could see where she was 
going. Harris and the young offender refused her request, rubbed down the 
house to remove fingerprint evidence and then left the couple in the dark. Early 
the next morning, the female victim was finally able to pull herself into a chair at 
her front window and attract the attention of a neighbour who then called for help.
The invaders had taken a taxi to the apartment of the woman they had met with in 
the coffee shop and the stolen property was divided between the three. Whilst at 
the apartment, the young offender called emergency services to request 
assistance for the elderly couple. Emergency services returned their call because 
of inaccurate information on the location of the problem but the female resident 
denied that there was any problem. The trio went to a pharmacy to buy hair 
colouring products and Harris tried to colour his hair. At the crime scene, the 
police found a fingerprint that was later identified as belonging to the young 
offender. Two days later the police saw the young offender and Harris and both
184
were arrested. They were in possession of a knife, screwdriver, rubber gloves and 
a ski mask and were on route to do another robbery (the particular target was 
unclear). On being placed in the police car, the young offender indicated that 
Harris had accompanied him on the night of the break and enter. In his 
statement, Harris described that as the victim was pushing the kitchen window 
down he felt his blood pressure go up and that there was no way out. The female 
victim required a full hip replacement and the male victim suffered major brain 
damage and that his physical and psychological functions are impaired to the 
point that he will require twenty-four hour care for the remainder of his life.
R. v. H.(D.G.)
In the province of Alberta, a 17 year old with a crack addiction was seeking money 
to fund his drug addiction. He had been performing odd jobs for a 69-year-old 
woman who lived alone. Although he planned with two accomplices to rob the 
senior, it appears the young offender proceeded on his own, while masked, to 
enter the home at night. The victim was unexpectedly at home watching 
television. The offender disconnected the phone line, pushed the victim out of her 
chair onto the floor (hurting her arm and knee), demanded money, called her a 
“bitch” and, with a closed fist, struck the victim’s face. The victim was again 
pushed to the floor. The offender then entered the victim’s bedroom to remove her 
purse from a hiding place under the bed and then he fled. The purse contained 
$350 as well as an un-cashed cheque for over $18,000. The offender had a 
previous record for one count each of assault and theft. A police check stop
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several days later resulted in the offenders arrest whilst in a vehicle with two 
others, a hash pipe and a small quantity of crack cocaine were seized.
R. v. Ivan
In April 1999 in the village of Sussex Corner, New Brunswick, Stephen Andrew 
Ivan purchased gasoline for his vehicle but he did not have enough money to pay 
for the purchase. He left a false name and the correct license plate number (for 
his recently acquired vehicle) with the gas station/convenience store attendants. 
It appears that the offender broke into the convenience store in the early morning 
hours. This was confirmed by the offender’s fingerprints on an empty rum bottle 
and footprints found inside the store including on the orange “closed” sign that 
had fallen from a broken window. Subsequently at about 1:30 a.m. the offender 
went to a mobile home park some 200 meters or less from the store and knocked 
on a door asking for the use of a telephone as his car had (supposedly) broken 
down. After pretending to make several calls, he asked the woman occupant (the 
only other occupant was her 10-year-old boy) for money and she offered him $20 
because she felt intimidated. He then ripped the phone off the wall and took her 
bankcards. When she refused to provide the PIN number, he threatened “Good 
let’s get your little boy back out here”. She gave him the PIN number and he put a 
fingernail file to her throat and pushed her neck and head back. He also 
threatened to tie her up. The victim’s confinement continued for approximately 45 
minutes. Following up on a 911 emergency call from the mobile park the police 
noticed the offender’s car driving with no lights and heard the tires squealing. Mr.
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Ivan was pulled over and arrested for impaired driving. He later claimed to have 
been intoxicated by alcohol as well as prescription medication and opiates. The 
police found the bankcards of the victim on Ivan’s person. Ivan had a lengthy 
record of 48 previous convictions including robbery, break and enter and theft.
R. v. J.C.
In April 1998 in the province of Ontario, a young offender entered the bedroom of 
a couple and the husband woke at around 3:30 a.m. to find a masked intruder with 
two large knives. The intruder was slashing at his legs and he felt his body wet 
from the other wounds that had been inflicted. The wife awoke screaming and 
she managed to grab the intruder’s sweatshirt. She retreated to the bed bleeding 
as she was slashed about her head, ear and her hands. The intruder took a chair 
from the next room and removed his mask as he sat down by the door. He 
indicated that he intended to kill them at about 4:30 a.m. The reason he provided 
for why they were going to die was that they had abused their daughter and did 
not want her to continue her friendship with the youth. The couple’s daughter was 
in the room next door and she called the parents of her boyfriend indicating that 
they should come to the house, as “it was a matter of life and death”. The father 
of the offender arrived and when he asked who had attacked them they told him to 
take his son home.
The victims then called emergency services to report the home invasion. As later 
evidence revealed the HIR formed part of a plan between the young offender and
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his girlfriend. She spoke to him about the beatings and sexual abuse she 
allegedly suffered, her controlling parents and that she wanted them out of her life. 
She was an active participant in the plan, she let him into the home once her 
parents fell asleep and she was talking with him in a room adjacent to her parent’s 
room about the plan to stab them. Further, she was listening in the adjacent room 
while the attack took place, she pushed the chair forward for the young offender to 
sit on and she passed paper and a pen when her mother said she wanted to 
prepare a will. When the mother asked her to get help, the daughter replied “Mum, 
this is only psychological”. The daughter along with her parents reported a false 
description to the police that the assailant was a black man with a Jamaican 
accent. After being charged with obstruction of justice and public mischief and 
detained, the girl told a social worker that the slashing was her idea and that it 
seemed like the only way out was to remove her parents from her life.
R. v. Jones
In December 1998 at Saltspring Island, British Columbia, Kevin James Jones, his 
brother and another adult party broke into a home around 3:30 a.m. A male adult 
and his girlfriend occupied the home. Upon hearing the sound of the front door 
being forced open, the male victim went to the front door. Three males 
screaming, “Police, search warrant, get on the ground” confronted him. The 
offenders carried flashlights and one held a handgun which he used to strike the 
victim on the face.
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This victim was hog-tied with plastic flex-cuffs, duct tape and a plastic strap and 
items were placed over his head to obstruct his view. He did not see the faces of 
the offenders throughout the incident but did hear his girlfriend approach and 
believed she was laid down beside him for a while. He could hear the offenders 
ransacking the home and hear them talking. The invaders said they were there 
for the marijuana grow operation, they expressed their disappointment at finding 
only eight plants in the basement, and they threatened the male victim if he didn’t 
reveal where the rest of the drugs were located and any drug monies. Whilst the 
female victim was taken toward the male victim’s location, she saw that the 
offenders were wearing gloves, toques and dark jackets that had the word 
“POLICE” in yellow lettering. For a while the female victim was placed beside her 
boyfriend, she was also hog-tied and had a blanket placed over her head.
One of the offenders (Kevin James Jones) said “Interrogation time” and took the 
female victim into a room where she was asked if there was anything else, he 
should know about. Her refusal to provide information was met with the offender 
sexually fondling her, then removing her clothes and sexually assaulting her. He 
re-dressed the victim and told her to stay put and be quiet adding, “Do you know 
whose neighbourhood this is? It belongs to H.A.” (a phrase the victims interpreted 
as referring to the Hells Angels). Before the offenders left, the female victim could 
hear them threatening that they would be back and that one of them would stay 
behind to make sure the victims did not do anything. As things became quiet, the 
male victim managed to free himself and released his girlfriend. Aside from the
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eight marijuana plants, $40 cash had been taken, the phone had been ripped out 
of the wall, the home ransacked and the offenders left a large set of tire tracks in 
the fresh snow of the driveway. Jones had a criminal record and was on probation 
at the time of the offence. The court noted the planning involved in this incident 
and the offenders’ use of a weapon, the assailants posing as police, the use of 
scanners (to listen for possible police response) and the clear premeditated nature 
of this armed robbery. Police suspected the trio of involvement in other home 
invasions conducted in the lower mainland of British Columbia.
R. v. K.(J.)
Mr. K. and two others, one adult and one young offender, targeted an 85-year-old 
World War II veteran living in his own home in the province of Ontario. A break 
and enter of the young offender’s own home had been conducted by the trio and 
they assessed the victim’s home as a suitable target. The young offender knew 
the grandchildren of the victim. There had been some planning and scoping of 
the target location. While they had believed nobody would be at home during the 
break and enter, upon opening a door to the landing, they could hear sounds of 
occupancy and proceeded regardless. The young offender confronted the victim 
in the kitchen and the victim resisted. Mr. K. grabbed the victim by the foot and 
dragged him off the young offender onto the floor. The other adult offender 
entered the kitchen and directed the other two to search the home. The direction 
is followed even though Mr.
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K. (who had no prior knowledge a weapon was present) sees the other adult 
offender draw a butcher’s knife from a homemade sheath up his sleeve and the 
former sees an arm motion toward the victim and the victim’s hand over his 
stomach with blood coming out between his fingers. The search netted a modest 
amount of money and some costume jewellery. Once the two returned downstairs 
the elderly victim was seen in dire circumstances lying in a pool of blood. The trio 
then left the house to go to another location and then they cleaned up and divided 
the modest spoils.
R. v. Simmonds
In 1995, William Bedford was discovered secured by duct tape to a tree near 
Hope, British Columbia. He had died from a minimum of two .22 caliber gunshots 
just below his left eye. Bedford was a drug dealer and he owned a construction 
company, the accounts of which were used to launder drug money. It appeared 
that Bedford’s construction office was ransacked and $25,000 in cash had gone 
missing after Bedford went missing. Simmonds was interested in purchasing one 
or two kilograms of cocaine at the rate of $40,000 per kilogram, with Susan Popp 
acting as the go-between. Tim Smith and Mike Frank, who were friends of 
Simmonds, were also involved in the incident. Bedford was drunk and not 
available to go to one meeting, and then did not arrive for an agreed second 
meeting to conduct the drug transaction. While Popp and Simmonds drove in a 
rental car to a location close by to watch for Bedford’s arrival, Smith and Frank 
had left in their truck and returned a half hour later . The victim had been
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kidnapped (from his hotel), his mouth and eyes covered and hands restrained with 
duct tape, and he was bloody and beaten up. At the time of their arrest, Tim 
Smith and Mike Frank had records for weapons offences, violence and a 
conviction for a home invasion in which they both participated. Both men denied 
knowledge of the kidnapping, confinement or murder of Bedford. The 1995 
investigation did not result in any charges relating to the death of Bedford.
In early 1999, Simmonds sought to acquire membership in an unspecified 
motorcycle-gang and criminal organisation. Simmonds indicated to members of 
the organization that he was involved in a $120,000 cocaine deal with respect to 
Bedford before he was found murdered. Before being allowed to join as a member 
and participate in more profitable activities, Simmonds was told that he would 
have to demonstrate total loyalty to the leader of the organisation and be 
completely honest about any previous criminal activities. When asked why he was 
involved in the killing of Bedford, Simmonds indicated that the former owed him 
$90,000 but that he had no apparent intention of paying and was avoiding 
Simmonds. Despite continued beatings while taped to a tree, Simmonds recalled 
that Bedford did not cooperate in disclosing the location of drugs or monies. 
Simmonds indicated that he fired the fatal shots and that Tim Smith was present 
at this point. Members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) were 
running the fictitious criminal organisation, using the so-called ‘Mr Big Strategy’ to 
elicit confessions and key investigative information. Later under arrest, Simmonds 
denied the scope of his involvement and argued that he had stated this to be
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more appealing for membership in the criminal organization. He argued that Tim 
Smith and Mike Frank committed the violence and murder, with the former 
shooting the gun in the presence of the latter without Simmonds or Popp being 
present. Simmonds said he went to the remote location to see if Bedford was 
alive and to confirm whether Smith and Frank were trying to cut them (Simmonds 
and Popp) out of their part of the drug deal. Simmonds was arrested outside the 
Beford residence where he had been drinking and fell asleep in the rental car.
R. v. Taing
In January 1996 five or six men, two of whom were unmasked, entered a 
residence at gunpoint (an imitation handgun) in the province of Alberta. The 
occupants were a couple along with their two daughters, one a teenager and the 
other a two-year-old. The invaders searched the home looking for money and 
valuables. They were not satisfied with what they found. They threatened that 
they would hold the infant for ransom. The mother then offered to take the men to 
a jewellery store that was owned by the family. The two unmasked men took the 
mother to the store. The others, including Taing, remained at the residence to 
confine the other members of the family. Approximately $70,000 in jewellery was 
removed from the store and the culprits then returned to the home. The two 
unmasked men were arrested shortly after the robbery. A former girlfriend of 
Taing identified the offenders whom she said divided the jewellery at her home 
and she said that Taing had described the events of the robbery to her. Shortly 
following the robbery, one of the offenders showed a piece of the stolen jewellery
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to a neighbour who the former knew to be a trained goldsmith as well as the 
brother of the woman’s family who had been victimised. The item was impressed 
with a mark that the goldsmith recognised as belonging to his sister’s family.
R. v. Varga
In 1998, Timothy Varga and three other men executed a plan in the province of 
Alberta to rob a specific victim of marijuana as well as the proceeds of his 
marijuana sales. Three of the men, one armed with a baseball bat, approached 
the home. Also armed with a baseball bat, the victim confronted the men outside 
his home. The victim was attacked, forced into his home and forcibly subdued, 
losing a tooth during the initial encounter. Two of the assailants went in search of 
the marijuana and were later joined by the offender who had remained in the 
offenders’ vehicle to load (an unspecified quantity) of marijuana into their vehicle. 
During this time, Varga was alone with the victim for a half-hour, and the former 
had beaten the latter from head to foot with the baseball bat of the victim. The 
aim of the beating was to get the victim to disclose the whereabouts of proceeds 
from the sale of marijuana. A further incentive to talk was introduced by Varga 
poking the victim five times with a steak knife that caused superficial wounds. The 
other offenders tried to dissuade Varga and even kicked away the steak knife but 
the assault continued. Despite this, no money was found as the victim lay 
incapacitated and bloodied on the floor. Varga instructed one of the others to bind 
the deceased with tape, but the victim’s body was sufficiently bloody that the tape 
would not adhere. Prior to the group leaving the scene, one of the men
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disconnected the telephone thereby limiting the victim’s potential access to help. 
The victim was later found dead in his living room. At the time of the incident 
Varga was on parole for robbery, use of a firearm during the commission of an 
offence, break and enter and theft. Two of the others had criminal records, but 
the third had none.
R. v. Confidential-A
In 1998, several adults and one young offender engaged in a home invasion with 
the aim of recovering a debt for cannabis (marijuana). The apartment where the 
leader of the group was living was used as a location for those wishing to pick up 
drugs. The group leader advanced the young offender two ounces of marijuana 
and repayment was to be in three days. The young offender later explained that 
he had advanced the drugs to a third party and had been unable to collect 
payment. At 2:30 a.m. on the day of the incident, a group of six made masks for 
themselves and set off with the intent to beat up the third party who had received 
the drugs advance. Six persons entered the apartment and proceeded to the 
bedroom, three entered and began punching and kicking the victim, who curled up 
in a ball on the floor while he received punches and kicks to his side, head and 
stomach. The victim’s girlfriend who was also in the bedroom at the time 
recognised one of the persons engaged in the assault when one offender 
accidentally pulled off the disguise of another. The group leader threatened the 
girlfriend with a small axe and told her to shut up or he would kill her too. He
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further threatened her with a potential sexual assault, but one of the other 
attackers told him to leave her alone.
The victim tried to protect his head with his hands as he was struck repeatedly 
with the small axe. However, the victim’s right hand and left baby finger were 
virtually amputated and there were multiple lacerations that penetrated the skull 
and entered the victim’s brain tissue. The bleeding was profuse with blood spatter 
on the walls and ceiling and blood spilled onto the carpet. All those involved in the 
attack returned to the group leader’s apartment, where he washed blood from his 
weapon and leg and a green garbage bag was used to dispose of their bloodied 
clothing. The attackers then left the apartment and the weapon was discarded in a 
shopping mall parking lot before they proceeded on to a friend’s house.
Examples from Newspapers
Whilst the case law contains some clearly organised examples of home invasion 
robbery, this source does tend to over-emphasise examples at the low- to 
medium- end of the spectrum. It would appear that the examples are often 
reported in the case law to denounce the activity and to confirm and expand upon 
the precedents in prior cases of sentencing offenders involved in home invasions. 
Thus, I will now turn to newspaper sources to highlight selected examples of more 
organised cases that tend not to be represented, or are only nominally 
represented in the case law. It is not clear why not all of these cases are
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represented in the case law. However, a number will involve plea bargaining or 
informer privilege.
A -  Aboriginal Gangs
In 1999, two male and two female adults kicked in the back door of an inner-city 
house in Edmonton just past 6 a.m. One of the invaders was a member of the 
Manitoba Warriors and one of the females indicated affiliation with the Indian 
Posse, both of these groups are Western-based aboriginal gangs. Apparently 
conducted in retaliation for a previous home invasion by another aboriginal gang, 
this example involved the offenders breaking in, demanding where the Red Alert 
gang members were, and threatening to kill them. An 18-year-old male member of 
the Red Alert was beaten. A samurai sword was used to nearly sever the hand of 
a 21-year-old, break the arm of a pregnant 17-year-old, and leave a 13 centimetre 
cut on the arm of a 14-year-old girl. One of the female offenders slashed a 15- 
year-old girl with a butcher knife, and then she stabbed the 17-year-old in the 
shoulder, and then proceeded to stab the 14-year-old girl at least five times. Two 
adult offenders were convicted of aggravated assault and possession of a 
weapon, while the prosecution stayed charges against two others not directly 
involved in the violence. The convicted male received a sentence of 8/4 years, 
whereas the 71/4 years of the convicted female was reduced to 2 years due to her 
aboriginal heritage and hard life of parental abandonment, heavy drug and alcohol 
use, teenage motherhood, flight from domestic abuse and involvement with 
members of the Indian Posse (Kent, 1999).
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B -  Small Vancouver Ring
Between 1997 and 1998, a group was involved in a string of home invasions in 
Vancouver, British Columbia. These included Justin Lance Perrier (21), Chung 
Tien (George) Wang (25), Casey Edward Gerald Smith (22), Chi Cheong 
Raymond Chan (no age given), and Jean Guy Lahn (19). The first of the two were 
convicted whereas the remaining three faced a new trial. The offenders were well 
organised in a number of respects. One of them dressed up as a deliveryman in 
order to gain access to the homes with the initial consent of the occupant(s). 
Victims were often beaten, bound and gagged while their homes were searched 
for money and valuables. The offenders used surgical gloves to avoid leaving 
fingerprints, carried a police scanner to monitor possible emergency responses, 
and one had six rolls of tape and a list of potential victims with names in Chinese 
and English at his home. The suspects were arrested due to the good fortune of 
one of the victims being on the telephone (at the time of the attack) and being 
able to call for help, and the continuing pressure of a Vancouver region police task 
force of 60 members (Hall 1999).
C -  Large Vancouver Ring
From 1994 to 1999, possibly a dozen people were involved in ring that committed 
some fifty-four home invasions that targeted senior citizens. During an incident in 
1997, one adult (21) and two young offenders (one female and one male) broke 
down the back door to the home of an elderly couple in the early morning hours.
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They beat the elderly couple severely, one of whom died from their injuries. The 
other victim was able to make a phone call for help. The object of this invasion 
appeared to be the theft of various items including electronic equipment from the 
home. The offenders were frightened away by the sound of approaching 
emergency vehicles. They made their getaway in a stolen vehicle. The accused 
were all arrested together within a few days. At the time of arrest, the three 
offenders were in a vehicle in the company of a middle-aged Vietnamese- 
Canadian man, 42-year-old Eddie St. Pierre who was never charged in the 
incident. This man had been involved in several legitimate businesses; however, 
he self-identified himself to authorities as a cocaine dealer. Police probed links 
between this group (the identified offenders and the Fagin-like middle-aged male) 
and a larger group of home invaders (Morton 2000; Proctor 2000). In a connected 
example from 1998, three people were charged for a robbery in which eight family 
members were attacked, some pistol-whipped, and the offenders took $200,000 in 
jewellery, cash and gold. Police charged three adults including two females (aged 
21 and 22) and one male (32) who were believed to be responsible for home 
invasions in British Columbia and Ontario. Police linked the 1997 and 1998 cases 
to a jewellery store and suspect that the invaders had received client lists from the 
jewellery storeowner with identification of valuable objects to guide their targeting. 
At the time of the arrest in the 1998 case, police seized 41 diamonds, along with a 
passport, gold jewellery and a replica handgun (Morton 2000; Proctor 2000).
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D -  Small Montreal Ring
A North-Montreal, Quebec, home invasion ring was investigated over 10 months 
in 1999. This resulted in the arrest of two ringleaders, Benoit Richer (23) and Eric 
Sirois (25) and the expected arrests of five more individuals. The group was 
suspected of stealing tens of thousands of dollars in property over the previous 
two years. During one home invasion, the masked men wielded stun guns, 
attacked the three residents and burned them, including a pregnant 17-year-old. 
The invaders managed to escape undetected, in part with the aid of a police 
scanner (Lampert 1999).
E - Large Montreal Ring
In 2002, Chenier Dupuy (26), seven of his lieutenants, and forty-two other 
members of the Bo-Gars street gang were charged with over 200 charges relating 
to a series of home invasions. The charges included armed robbery, sexual 
assault, attempted murder, drug and weapons trafficking. One of the ways in 
which the targets were selected was if they had advertised weapons for sale in 
newspapers; gang members would turn up as prospective purchasers but would 
rob the victims (The Montreal Gazette 2002).
F -  Firearms Cache
In 1999, a 79-year-old woman in Scarborough, Ontario was confronted by four 
men who broke into her home around 2 p.m. on a Monday afternoon. One man 
choked her and pushed her to the floor, and she suffered a cut to her face and a
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bloody nose. Three other men ransacked her home, and the men grabbed four 
handguns and fled the scene. When police arrived to the home invasion call, they 
found a weapons cache and seized 43 rifles and shot guns, one crossbow, and 
3,000 rounds of ammunition. Charges of improper storage were pending against 
the weapons owners who were relatives of the elderly woman (Abbate 1999).
G - Teen Groups Target Marijuana Grow Operations (MGOs)
In 2002, police discovered that two groups of teenagers (some of them local high 
school students) were attempting home invasion robberies of two marijuana grow 
operations. The suspects were to be paid a fee for delivery or a set amount for 
each pound of marijuana delivered to a broker who had contracted the teenagers’ 
services. (O’Brian 2002)
H -  Asian Groups Target Marijuana Grow Operations (MGOs)
In 1999, a group of five to eight men arrived at a Surrey, British Columbia home 
armed with baseball bats and machetes. Answering a 1 a.m. knock at the door, 
the 30-year-old boyfriend of the homeowner reported that two men knocked down 
the back door as a man armed with a handgun entered through the front door. 
The male victim and the 27-year-old female fled the home in opposite directions. 
Two men caught the male victim and beat him with a baseball bat and a machete, 
resulting in the victim requiring stitches to his head and arm. It appeared the 
motive for the home invasion was drug-related as it contained 50 marijuana
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plants. The male and female victims were both Vietnamese as were, reportedly, 
all but one of the attackers (Culbert 1999).
I -  Dai Huen Jai
In a 1998 case, Vinuse News MacKenzie and his family awoke to the sound of 
breaking glass. As they looked down from the second floor staircase they saw four 
or five people who shot at them, striking his mother in the leg, his father in the 
chest and MacKenzie in the head. MacKenzie was affiliated with gang members, 
primarily through his brother who along with five others was acquitted of a 
gangland slaying in 1994. The police believe that the targeting of MacKenzie’s 
home was deliberate and that the offenders believed they would find guns, drugs 
and money. The invaders included three young offenders (ages 15-16) of 
Chinese descent along with Jin Min Zhou and Hak Chau Wong (both 25). Wong 
had been ordered deported from Canada in 1994 but the order had been delayed 
by appeals and court proceedings. Police suspected that the home invasion had 
been organised by the Big Circle Boys, also known as Dai Huen Jai, an Asian 
gang to which Wong was linked. According to an Asian organised crime expert 
with the Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada (CISC), Dai Huen Jai is the pre­
eminent Asian crime network in Canada. With some five hundred members in 
Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal, this organisation is a flexible business 
enterprise in which a Dai Lo (older brother) runs an individual cell to maximise 
income from a range of illegal enterprise. This may include drugs importation, 
extortion, credit card counterfeiting and fraud, gambling and robbery. According to
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the Canadian Bankers Association, Dai Huen Jai was alone responsible for $44 
million in losses due to counterfeit credit cards in 1997. (Kines 1998; Kines and 
Ouston 1998)
Assessment of Cases with the 51s Framework 
Criminality (predisposition)
The intent that accompanies participation in a home invasion is an unambiguous 
indicator of predisposition. Individuals are demonstrating general intent where 
they participate in a residential break and enter (residential burglary) and 
reasonably believe that no one is at home. If these individuals avoid 
confrontation, and leave the scene upon realising someone is at home then they 
will continue to demonstrate only general intent to commit a crime.
If these individuals approach the home knowing someone is at home (or they find 
someone to be at home) and they continue in the commission of the crime, then 
they are demonstrating specific intent. This is core to the distinction between a 
residential break and enter and a robbery (see the definition discussion above). 
The former involves general intent to cause harm without having direct contact 
with victims. The latter involves specific intent to cause harm through the direct 
use (or threat of use) of violence against victims.
More broadly, a predisposition toward criminality should be assumed where 
people have shown willingness to engage in serious or organised crime activities 
(Levi and Maguire 2004: 433).
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Resources to Avoid Crime
Resources to avoid crime, as a category, are somewhat helpful in distinguishing 
variable levels of organisation in the HIR cases. Many of the cases involve 
members of society who are engaged in a criminal lifestyle or a marginal 
existence complemented by criminal lifestyles and extensive criminal records. 
The low-level cases tend to involve those struggling to feed a drug addiction or 
meet subsistence needs that do not appear to be being met within the legitimate 
social structure of society. The medium- to high-level cases involve those who 
appear sufficiently clever that they should be able to meet their needs in the 
legitimate world. In both cases, participation in HIR may be reflective of the 
anomic division of labour discussed in chapter five. That is, opportunities to earn 
a living wage may simply not be available to those noted in the low-level cases or, 
in the medium- to high-level cases, the value of such resources may be too small 
relative to what can be earned in criminal activity.
Readiness to Offend
At face value, the motivations toward participation in HIR are not very prescriptive 
in determining variable levels of organisation. In twenty of the examples, the 
motivation generically related to money, drugs, or valuables. There are 
differences in the scope of that motivation, however, with some targeting 
suspected marijuana grow operations (Bernier, Jones, Varga) or known drug 
dealers (Simmonds). In other cases the motivation was revenge for alleged
abuse (J.C.) or to intimidate a rival gang (Newspaper A), to recover a debt for 
marijuana received (Confidential-A), or to steal weapons (Newspaper E, F). The 
latter four are more prescriptive in indicating greater organisation.
Resources for Crime
The primary skill required for home invaders is the capacity to threaten or use 
physical violence and to overwhelm victims as necessary. This may involve a 
willingness to severely injure, terrorise and, in some cases, the victims may be 
killed whether this was intended or not. In the examples above, only one individual 
died (Varga). The expressive rather than instrumental use of violence can help the 
general reputation and make future extortion work easier for organised crime 
members and aspiring members. Home invasions may be conducted on a low- 
cost basis with minimal or no resources for crime. For instance, there are cases 
where no resources are apparent (Bergman), the phone line of the victim was 
disconnected (H., Ivan) providing the resource of time to offenders. In other 
examples, there are no apparent additional resources involved (Newspaper E, F, 
G) despite the offenders targets being weapons theft and theft from a marijuana 
grow operation, respectively. Some involve only nominal resources such as a 
balaclava and a knife (Curtis, J.C., K.) combined with a screwdriver and rubber 
gloves (Harris), or a replica gun (Newspaper C, Taing) along with mobile phones 
and cars (DaSilva). Other examples illustrate that the choice of resources 
indicates the willingness to inflict potentially severe and life threatening harm upon 
victims or resources to avoid detection. The former are indicated by the use of an
axe (Confidential-A), a samurai sword and butcher knife (Newspaper A), baseball 
bats (Newspaper H, Varga) baseball bats and machetes (Newspaper H) that are 
sometimes combined with or use firearms separately (A.J.C., Bernier, Newspaper 
I, Simmonds). The latter are indicated by the use of police scanners along with 
stun guns (Newspaper D) or gloves, restraints/handcuffs (Jones) and a list of 
potential victims (Newspaper B).
Anticipation of Risk, Effort and Reward
The anticipation of risk, effort and reward should provide important insights into 
the variable organisation of HIR. The high-end of the rewards in the HIR 
examples, include:
• $200,000 in jewellery, cash and gold (Newspaper C)
• $70,000 in jewellery, and modes money and other valuables (Taing)
• 50 marijuana plants of unspecified value (Newspaper H)
• Unspecified value of weapons (firearms) and other property
(Newspaper E, F)
• $25,000 stolen cash, and perhaps $80,000 worth of cocaine
(Simmonds)
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• Tens of thousands of dollars suspected stolen by ring over two years 
(Newspaper D)
• An un-cashed cheque for over $18,000 (H.)
Each of these examples involve values of money or convertible assets that if 
saved after being resold, are likely to trigger both objective and subjective 
reporting under money laundering legislation (see chapter seven). Upon trying to 
submit such values (even after division amongst co-offenders) into a financial 
institution, it is not clear that any of the suspects have a profile that would justify 
such a deposit. This creates a further detection risk beyond that of conducting a 
home invasion(s), including revenge by victims or detection by the police using 
standard enforcement means. Clearly, the un-cashed cheque would likely require 
a suitable female accomplice with appropriate fake identification in order to cash 
the cheque.
It would be unwise to focus solely on anticipated and actual profitability as the only 
reward. Intangible (and ultimately more profitable) reward may be derived from 
intimidating rivals or competitors to potential secure greater dominance in criminal 
markets (Confidential-A, Newspaper A, I). This may involve the use of contracted 
third parties to create fear for independents involved in the market for illicit 
cultivation of marijuana (Newspaper G).
It seems clear that the bulk of home invaders tend to underestimate the risk and 
effort relative to the rewards. The rewards can be as low as $20 (Ivan) or a small
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television and a box of silverware (Bergman). Even where the rewards are more 
significant at $1,000 and unspecified values of jewellery, electronics and credit 
cards, the offenders involved do not appear to be engaging in any accurate 
calculation of risk and effort versus reward. Most of these lower value amounts 
are unlikely to trigger anti-money laundering reports; however, subjective reporting 
is always possible where the value of deposits does not meet with the client’s 
profile.
The privatised use of violence attracts substantive law enforcement attention and 
the returns are generally poor or modest. Where the returns are more significant, 
the predictable problem is convertibility and this takes either talent or access to 
networks that are capable of converting assets while mediating the risks. That is, 
individuals or groups acting independently of the more recognised ‘organised 
crime’ groups may find it necessary to work with such groups to reduce risk and to 
more successfully launder the proceeds from their criminal activity.
Offender Presence in Situation
In some of the examples above, a lone individual commits the robbery (Cooper, 
Curtis, H., Ivan, J.C.). Seven of the examples involve three offenders (A.J.C., 
Bernier, DaSilva, Harris, Jones, K., Newspaper A). The remainder involve four or 
more offenders, with some examples involving a ring of as many as twelve or up 
to fifty possible participants (Newspaper C, E), not all of these necessarily 
participating in each invasion. Not all of the individuals will be active participants
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in the home invasions per se. Some will act as go-betweens and/or fences to 
introduce parties (Harris, Simmonds) or provide client lists as possible targets 
(Newspaper C).
Target Person or Property
In terms of risk in home invasions, the key target is the assets or property in the 
possession of the person at home rather than the household and the assets it 
contains. This is necessarily the case in HIR as the offenders attempt to extract 
maximum value by terrorising victims. Household security features seem to be a 
secondary consideration, as discussed in the next section. As noted above, the 
most common target is money, drug monies, or valuables. However, sometimes 
the target is more related to the person, such as inter-gang violence to intimidate 
rivals and secure shares in a criminal market. It may also involve raiding locations 
of individuals thought to have successful businesses, whether legitimate (A., 
Taing) or illegitimate (Newspaper H, Varga).
Target Enclosure
The target enclosure for home invasions is the household and it does not present 
a substantive barrier in the majority of the examples above. Some examples 
involve ruses to gain entry to the home, including dressing up as postal delivery 
personnel (Newspaper B), posing as a prospective purchaser of newspaper- 
advertised goods (Newspaper E), or purposeful car accidents and car-jacking the 
occupants and then robbing them and their home (DaSilva). Nevertheless, most
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involve simply entering through unlocked windows or doors, breaking down doors 
or windows, or the method is unspecified and may simply involve pushing past 
victims once they open their door.
Wider Environment
Linkages to the wider environment, which I shall delimit to the wider criminal 
environment, offer helpful insights into the variable organisation of HIR. The 
knowledge that most of the offenders in the examples discussed above have 
criminal records is only helpful in a generic way. What is more helpful is to look at 
those examples where the offenders are more substantively connected to various 
criminal markets. For instance, those who are involved in ongoing raiding activities 
targeting marijuana grow operations (Bernier, Jones, and more substantively, 
Newspaper H) or sub-contracting others to raid such targets (Newspaper G). We 
should include those activities linked to markets in weapons and/or drugs 
trafficking (Newspaper E, F). Finally, gang rivalry and intimidation are also 
important indicators of variable organisation in its links to the wider criminal 
environment (Confidential A, Newspaper A, I).
Absence of Crime Preventers
Unfortunately, the HIR examples above demonstrate a chronic absence of crime 
preventers. There is typically no intervention from neighbours, either intervening 
directly or calling police. It is likely that neighbours or passersby did not hear or 
see anything that they would deem suspicious. Victims who do receive help from
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neighbours or passersby usually have to go to great lengths to secure the 
attention of such persons. Offenders will often cut the phone line and thereby add 
further delay to crime preventers arriving at the scene. Homes and properties in 
Canada are often much larger than those in the United Kingdom. Isolation may 
thus be easier to achieve in Canada in urban, suburban, or in rural or remote 
areas. Readers should note that the data set did not include failed HIR attempts 
where the presence of crime preventers may have deterred or dissuaded would- 
be offenders. The nature of home invasion also makes it difficult for victims to act 
as crime preventers. Few victims appear to secure their home against unwanted 
entry, and those who attempt to confront invaders may receive worse injuries. 
Victims often have difficulty in identifying their attackers, and in some cases, they 
offer no description or give a false description to avoid reprisals or other potential 
consequences.
Crime Promoters
This is an important area in identifying variable HIR organisation. This includes 
where an accomplice appears to have identified the target by disclosing the 
success of a legitimate jewellery business (A., Taing), or a legitimate jewellery 
business discloses its client list to HIR offenders (Newspaper C). It also includes 
third parties identifying or potentially identifying suspected marijuana grow 
operations for raiding (Bernier, Newspaper H), and where the victim(s)’ 
involvement in illicit drug activity attracts negative interest (Jones, Simmonds). In 
other examples, the victim avoids payment for drugs received (Confidential A), or
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is involved in efforts to intimidate a rival gang through the use of home invasion 
(Newspaper A, I). Some victims may inadvertently advertise for a home invasion 
by publicising the sale of weapons (Newspaper E), or the offenders may learn of a 
weapons cache through unidentified third parties (Newspaper F).
In concluding this section, it should be noted that the 51s framework focuses on 
offender and situational causes and victims are only featured “indirectly because 
they play remarkably diverse roles” (Ekblom 2003: 249). Among other things 
these roles may include being the target or occupier of the target location, acting 
as a crime preventer, or promoting crime by being careless or provocative. 
Clearly victims can play a role in reducing their risk of being subject to a home 
invasion or mitigating its consequences. However, in attempting to understand the 
causes of HIR we should try to avoid blaming the victim, given the harm and 
trauma they may suffer. The consequences can range from the loss of monies 
and property, emotional trauma, serious physical injuries such as brain damage 
and death. It can undermine a victim’s faith in their fellow human beings and 
society and some victims face continued suffering that reduces their ability to 
function at work or school. However low the risk of being victimised, this sort of 
harm is conceivable to a broad spectrum and this helps to explain the asymmetric 
impact home invasions can have with respect to fear of crime and concerns about 
community safety.
Few of the examples above could meet the stereotypical view of organised crime 
(see chapter two for a more thorough discussion of the issues highlighted below).
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Experts indicate the presence of Asian groups and Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs 
(OMGs), but the involvement of these groups is only explicit in one of the 
examples discussed above. The majority of the cases do not correspond to earlier 
official definitions of what constitutes organised crime. Nevertheless, a number do 
meet the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Crime (2000), or 
Palermo Convention, definition of organised crime. All nine of the newspaper 
examples could be included under this definition, along with the case law 
examples of Jones, Simmonds, Taing, Varga and Confidential A.
The Policy Response to Home Invasion Robbery
Continuing reportage on home invasions and prosecutions stressed the image of 
‘ideal victims’ alongside modest attention to MGOs (Tibbetts 2000). The public 
concern was sufficient for Ottawa to consider several options such as creating a 
new offence category specific to home invasions, having the new offence contain 
a mandatory minimum penalty of 4 years imprisonment, or to make home invasion 
an aggravating factor in sentencing guidelines for judicial determinations. To my 
knowledge, these tough options were the only ones given consideration. No 
analysis or consideration was given to the sorts of options that might have 
emerged from a detailed look into the issue and the preventive points that could 
be derived from the 51s framework.
Other commentators argue that the drive to expand the imposition of mandatory 
minimum penalties further expresses the bankrupt status of punitive “quick fix”
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sentencing principles (Campbell 2000), and the “cult of mindless toughness in 
justice policy” (Cayley 1998: 71). Moreover, U.S. experience aimed at enacting a 
new and specific offence category has shown that constitutional and other 
considerations tend to dilute the practical utility of such laws, despite the symbolic 
gains that may be achieved (Hurley 1995).
An Aggravating Factor in Sentencing
The federal minister of justice preferred to pursue, among several available 
options, making home invasion an aggravating factor in sentencing (Tibbetts 
2000). This option neatly sidestepped the potential constitutional challenges that a 
new offence category and especially mandatory minimum sentencing might 
attract. In March 2001, the Government of Canada introduced Bill C-15 (the 
Omnibus Bill, HIR and other selected provisions were subsequently separated out 
to form Bill C-15A) that would compel judges to treat home invasion as an 
aggravating factor in sentencing. To my knowledge, there was no opposition to 
this component of the legislative development. Fear of violence provided the 
warrant and the new provision only served to formalise a pattern of sentencing 
that had already been adopted by the judiciary (see below). Upon receiving Royal 
Assent, Bill C-15A (passed by the House of Commons October 18, 2001) added 
the following provision to the Criminal Code:
348.1 If a person is convicted of an offence under any of subsection
279(2) or sections 343, 346 and 348 in relation to a dwelling-house, the
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court imposing the sentence on the person shall consider as an 
aggravating circumstance the fact that the dwelling-house was 
occupied at the time of the commission of the offence and that the 
person, in committing the offence, (a) knew that or was reckless as to 
whether the dwelling-house was occupied; and (b) used violence or 
threats of violence to a person or property.
These provisions do not add a great deal with respect to existing trends in how the 
courts treat home invasion incidents. Rather, the addition of section 348.1 will 
merely formalise the current course of jurisprudence. In a landmark case, the 
Alberta Court of Appeal established the precedent that:
The starting point for sentences for a home invasion robbery... should 
be eight years. The use of actual force against the occupants, the 
causing of injuries to any of them, a prolonged detention, terrorisation, 
the discharge of firearms, gang activity or acting in concert with others, 
prior record for violent offences, the theft of substantial sums of money 
or valuable property, are all considered to be aggravating factors. 
Some examples of mitigating factors might include the youthfulness, or 
other circumstances, of the offender, a lack of planning, or an early 
guilty plea. (R. v. Matwiy 1996)
Courts across Canada have continued to apply this precedent whilst adjusting the 
sentence for particular offences and offenders. Downward adjustments in
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sentencing tend to be used in the case of younger persons and those who 
demonstrate greater potential for rehabilitation. Upward adjustments in 
sentencing tend to be applied in cases where there is elevated terrorising of 
victims and where victims suffer very serious harm or fatal injuries. Canadian 
precedents may often in practice be limited to the provincial or territorial 
jurisdiction (or even municipal jurisdiction on certain issues) where the decision 
took place. Courts across the country may take note of and apply external 
precedents. Of course, this is more likely where Courts of Appeal or higher-levels 
of the judiciary issue decisions. Decisions from the Federal Court of Canada have 
impact across the country and decisions are definitive precedents in the case of 
the Supreme Court of Canada, the last step of the appeals process.
A Right to Firearms for Self-Protection?
Home invasions are an affront to the value of public safety. However, many 
believe that it constitutes more, that HIR is “a personal attack on sacred and 
fundamental principles” (Hurley 1995: 9). Specifically, a householder’s right to 
unmolested enjoyment of their property and personal safety. With a crime as 
offensive as home invasions, we invariably hear the call that citizens should have 
the right to firearms with a view to protecting themselves and their property and 
deterring would be offenders. Despite stringent gun controls in Canada, the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) guarantees, among other 
things, the right to “life, liberty and security of the person” under section 7. Thus, 
Canadians may be immune to prosecution where they use weapons to defend
their constitutional rights. Indeed, a Justice of the Provincial Court of Alberta 
dismissed charges of possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace (s. 
87) against an accused, arguing that:
Apropos of the [Criminal] Code's self-defence, provisions [s. 34-42], 
broad statements claiming that gun possession by ordinary Canadians 
for self-defence purposes is illegitimate contradict current Canadian 
law. Even if voiced by someone high within government such 
statements are at their best innocent misrepresentations of law. 
...Yearly, across Canada, innocent persons are deprived of life by 
murderers, of liberty by kidnappers, and of security of the person by 
arsonists, home invaders, rapists, robbers and thieves. ...Intelligent 
Canadians who believe they, at some point in life, might well be 
victimised by a criminal attack of the types discussed are not being 
phobic. They are being realistic.
...[Discreet forms of self-protection] against both four-legged and two- 
legged predators...[and other forms of] 'home invasion risk insurance 
coverage' all have one thing in common. They all manifest a desire and 
an attempt to exercise or realise upon their four s. 7 Charter rights. 
...They reject paternalistic platitudes voiced to persuade ordinary 
Canadians to leave their protection in the hands of government. They 
understand perfectly that, no matter where one fits on Canada's social 
ladder, depending solely on big government to protect oneself from
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criminals is a big mistake a big mistake that sometimes costs decent 
Canadians their lives. Intuitively or otherwise, they know justifiable self 
defence does not constitute vigilantism despite proclamations of those 
who would have the populace believe it does. (R. v. Bray, 1999)
Positions such as those expressed above are invariably premised on the view that 
if offenders perceive that they have a reasonable prospect of facing an armed 
householder they will be less inclined to commit the offence (Sheremata 1996, 
1998; Slobodian 1999a,b; Tonner 1999). At face value there may be some appeal 
to the “More Guns, Less Crime” thesis (Lott 1998) and the general appeal to arm 
the citizenry. Nevertheless, practical problems intervene to undermine the 
potential effectiveness of this approach as a means to prevent home invasions. 
Prospective victims would have to always be on guard, ready and capable of 
deploying their weapon with little or no notice, and face the potential that their use 
of weapons may escalate the situation or their weapon may be seized and used 
against them (Kellermann et al 1995; Suter et al 1996).
Observers might find it difficult to appreciate just how much this issue has 
penetrated public consciousness in Canada. I will offer an illustrative example. In 
Montreal a five-man drug investigation team conducted a pre-dawn raid involving 
a dynamic entry with the use of a battering ram (Ha 2007). A couple and their 
teenage son occupied the home. The father believed this was a home invasion. 
He fired four shots from a legally registered firearm toward the intruders, and the 
police returned ten shots. A 42-year-old constable was killed during the shooting.
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I suspect that in most industrialised countries a person, who kills another human 
being, particularly when the deceased is a police officer, will be highly unlikely to 
be granted bail, pending trial. In this case, the judge believed the account 
provided by the defendant and he was granted bail. The defendant faced charges 
of murder and attempted murder along with firearms offences, and police seized 
four loaded handguns, 0.3 grams of cocaine and 1.7 grams of marijuana among 
other items. The defendant was later acquitted.
I am not aware of projects or strategies in Canada that have been developed and 
implemented to (directly) tackle the phenomenon of home invasions. These 
problems are addressed by the existing architecture of the criminal justice system.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I provided a case study of home invasion robbery as an example 
of serious and organised crime. I did not argue that all HIR cases are organised 
crime, either in the sense that they meet stereotypical notions or that they 
necessarily fit neatly into official definitions. This is central to the earlier debates 
and issues raised in the thesis about the evolving definitions of ‘organised crime’ 
(See Chapter Two). Not the least of these issues is that the term itself and official 
definitions are problematic, and they are often unhelpful when examining the 
variable organisation of serious crimes. My aim was to examine how HIR exhibits, 
and may be linked to, a spectrum of criminal enterprise.
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I began with a range of definitional issues relevant to the discussion of HIR. This 
included discussion of the two most proximate categories for HIR, residential 
break and enter (RB&E) and robbery, as defined by the Criminal Code of Canada.
I then turned to the definition of HIR, which is not a distinct crime category but 
rather a subdivision of the categories of RB&E and robbery. The narrow definition 
focuses on robbery that occurs in a private dwelling. The broad definition focuses 
on a robbery, or any RB&E involving a violent offence, that occurs within a private 
dwelling. Given the potential overlap in the broad definition, a given incident 
should only be counted once as the more serious offence. I also provided a brief 
discussion of definitional issues relating to serious and organised crime, and I 
discussed how HIR exhibits, and is linked to, a spectrum of criminal enterprise
I then turned to attempting to quantify the magnitude of the HIR problem. This 
was not a straightforward task given that HIR does not exist as a distinct official 
crime category. For this reason, Uniform Crime Reports (UCR 1) that contain a 
nationally representative picture of police-recorded crime cannot be used to 
identify HIR incidence. It is possible to gain some idea of incidence using the more 
detailed UCR 2 survey of police-recorded crime. However, UCR 2 represented 
less than 50% of the national volume of police-recorded crime and, therefore, it 
does not provide a representative picture of Canada as a whole or any of its 
regions. The General Social Survey (GSS), which includes a criminal 
victimisation component, provides some insights. However, the GSS does not 
have sufficient sensitivity to provide reliable statistics at a national, or census
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metropolitan area, level. The International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) is a 
comparative instrument and its typically small sample sizes (around 2,000) for 
each country produce sampling errors that make precise domestic estimates of 
existing crime categories problematic. Thus, the ICVS does not have sufficient 
sensitivity to be able to provide a reliable or precise estimate of the sub-category 
of home invasion robbery.
Then I provided an overview of 25 examples of HIR, 16 drawn from case law and 
9 from newspapers. These were assessed using the 5ls analytical framework 
(Ekblom 2003) and its eleven generic causes of crime to assess the social 
organisation of this phenomenon. My particular aim in using the framework is to 
examine how HIR exhibits, and may be linked to, a spectrum of criminal 
enterprise. I then turned to the Canadian policy response specific to the problem 
of home invasion robbery.
I have tried to highlight explicitly the profitability inherent in each of the examples 
(where the information is available), and there were a number of quite profitable 
examples that could be flagged by money laundering controls. Whilst money 
laundering legislation may have, to a greater or lesser extent in various countries, 
been created to deal with organised crime and drugs trafficking in particular, the 
pertinent legislation in Canada and elsewhere by no means limits itself to 
‘organised crime’ as that is commonly understood. Anti-money laundering 
controls can identify and be used to target a broad spectrum of serious crimes. 
This may result objectively from sums over $10,000 (objective reporting) and/or
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from sums that are incompatible with the individual’s income and profile with a 
financial institution (subjective suspicious transaction reports that can potentially 
be triggered at any monetary amount). There are limits to what money laundering 
controls can achieve, and I am critiquing the idea what such controls can achieve 
when they are ostensibly directed at ‘organised crime’. Whereas, in reality, these 
controls are directed at the finances generated by (potentially) any serious 
predicate crime (i.e., monies or convertible assets).
In the following chapter, I turn to a major policy and operational development in 
Canadian efforts to address serious and organised crime, the creation of a 
national financial intelligence unit.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
THE CONTEXT OF ORGANISED CRIME PREVENTION 
AND CONTROL IN CANADA
Introduction
In this chapter, I will discuss the rise of anti-money laundering (AML) controls and 
a national financial intelligence unit (FIU) in Canada. Although many persons may 
think that AML relates primarily to organised crime, as it is commonly understood, 
and drug trafficking, these controls cover a broad range of serious and organised 
crimes. This diversity may include virtually any proceeds of crime as well as so- 
called ‘hot money’. This occurs where otherwise legitimate actors attempt to 
evade taxes and engage in deposits or wire transfers to convert or conceal such 
monies. To follow-up on the case study in the previous chapter, I will also discuss 
how AML controls may potentially detect or affect the phenomenon of home 
invasion robbery.
Financial intelligence may be considered the vanguard of efforts to tackle serious 
and organised crime. Its purported centrality in the anti-crime arsenal should 
therefore, also provide useful insights into more general aspects of the prevention 
and control of serious and organised crime.
The chapter begins with a brief discussion of getting inside a FIU, in particular the 
author’s involvement with the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre 
of Canada (FINTRAC). It discusses the difficulties of obtaining and using
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information about this very secretive area of public policy and operations. I then 
provide an overview of the policy and operational structure in Canada such as the 
jurisdictional division of governmental and investigative responsibilities.
Attention is then focused on issues surrounding the creation of FINTRAC in 2000. 
These include the domestic and international pressures for its creation, the 
substantive components of the reporting regime, and key components of 
FINTRAC’s design. The discussion also looks at the operational potential of 
FINTRAC. This includes its tactical mandate via the disclosure process, levels of 
analysis that are possible in context and the potential utility of external 
enforcement/intelligence and open source databases.
I also examine FINTRAC as representing an example of policy transfer from the 
United States but with a Canadian twist. Its design features are specific to the 
legal and cultural rules in Canada. These design features, in turn, have an effect 
on the potential impact of FINTRAC. This has resulted in a variety of public 
criticisms of the institution. I provide a brief discussion on Phase II of FINTRAC’s 
legislative mandate, which is a response to various criticisms and a general 
deepening of the AML controls in Canada.
Finally, I explore how AML controls may potentially detect or affect the 
phenomenon of home invasion robbery. This includes discussion of how HIR, as a 
serious and/or organised crime, can generate sufficient proceeds to trigger 
investigative interest and/or AML detection. This is especially the case with
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respect to the more organised examples discussed above, and, in particular, with 
respect to the multi-billion dollar marijuana grow operation (MGO) industry.
Inside a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)
There is a substantial and growing literature on money laundering, terrorist 
finance and financial intelligence units (Beare 2003; Beare and Schneider 2007; 
Biersteker and Eckert 2007; Cuellar 2003; Levi and Reuter 2006; Reuter and 
Truman 2004; Schneider 2004; van Duyne et al. 2002, 2003, 2004). However, 
other than their annual reports, there is a paucity of accessible literature on the 
Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC). The 
few examples of systematic analysis in relation to this institution tend to focus on 
particular and specialist concerns (Murphy 2006) or superimpose external models 
that do not encapsulate the institution (Beare 2003, Thompson and Turlej 2003). 
This gap in research is troubling given the public resources devoted to this 
institution and its potential impact upon residents and the broader society. This 
impact may be positive in the form of improved targeting of those involved in 
serious and organised crimes for investigation, prosecution and the seizure of 
assets as well as the reduction of such crimes. This impact may also be negative 
in respect of the threat it may pose to privacy as well as the potential for criminal 
and civil liability that is created for disclosed parties.
The author of this work was a member of FINTRAC for some two-and-a-half years 
beginning in 2003. Through participant observation I was able to glean
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considerable information about the structure and function of this organisation, both 
internally and in respect of its relationships with outside bodies. As a pre- and 
post-condition of employment, members are precluded from divulging information 
on several levels. First, the unauthorised disclosure of information that could 
directly or indirectly identify individuals or entities who were the subject of a report 
or a disclosure is a criminal offence. Unauthorised disclosure may be prosecuted 
as a serious criminal offence with severe penalties of up to five years 
imprisonment and/or a fine of $500,000 dollars. Second, there is a more general 
restriction against the public release of privileged internal information as provided 
for in internal policies consistent with, for instance, the Code of Ethics for federal 
employees.
As a matter of legal self-protection and ethical accountability I will not cross either 
of the research limitations above. There is in place no restriction against the use 
of my experience to interpret and assess in the light of open source information. I 
have no ethical qualms about the indirect use of my participant observer 
experience, given that my status as a postgraduate researcher was made plain in 
an email that my manager dispatched to the entire organisation on my first day of 
employment. I am not disclosing to the reader privileged information about 
FINTRAC, but rather piecing together a range of materials to illustrate general and 
specific aspects and the probable range of its operations and its potential impact 
for crime reduction. These findings should be capable of validation and replication 
by others who may review the (otherwise serpentine and opaque) roadmap of
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evidence I have assembled and other items that may become available over time. 
The findings of successive scholars in this area could be further enhanced 
through a course of participant observation within the agency.
Information about the Centre is most readily available in respect of the public 
release each autumn of an Annual Report that is first provided to Parliament and 
then released to the public. It is of little surprise that the publication trumpets the 
organisation and its work and that this precipitates a wave of media publicity: 
such is normally the case with Annual Reports of many intelligence and law 
enforcement bodies. Typically this involves coverage of key findings such as the 
dollar values of detected money laundering and terrorist finance. Related media 
coverage tends to divide into two camps, the proponents and the critics. This 
polarised reportage can be linked to the “ultra-secretive” nature of the agency and 
the consequent lack of systematic information to interpret it. Beyond cursory 
attention to FINTRAC’s annual report and the associated media, there is a 
substantial amount of largely untapped open source information. Analysis of the 
language of the enabling legislation is central, both for the purposes of this work 
and for understanding the AML regime in Canada. The Annual Reports contain 
various potential insights and this may be complemented by books and articles, 
committee hearings of the Canadian Parliament, public consultation documents 
and external reviews by agencies such as the Auditor General of Canada. Media 
accounts are not to be frowned upon as a source of information. Aside from the
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general reportage on the Annual Report, newspaper clips may reveal a wealth of 
information about FINTRAC.
One of the more helpful contributions in the AML research literature is provided by 
Levi and Reuter (2006). Their work offers insights into the proliferation of the anti­
money laundering regime at the international level. This has occurred at a rapid 
pace from the late-1980s onward through various supranational bodies such as 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) founded at the impetus of the Group of 
Seven (G7) leading industrial nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the United Nations. They also provide considerable insights into 
the domestic AML situation mainly in the United States and selected comparisons 
with the United Kingdom and other jurisdictions as well as insights into the 
possible effectiveness and efficiency of the AML regime. Of greatest utility for the 
present study, Levi and Reuter (2006) offer a helpful template to assess other 
AML regimes in respect of its components and subcomponents and possible 
broader implications. This offers the framework within which I may conclude this 
work with an assessment of the nature and scope of AML policy transfer from the 
United States and the potential impact of FINTRAC to prevent and control serious 
and organised crime in Canada.
An Overview of the Policy and Operational Structure
This section provides an overview of the policy structure and separation of 
responsibilities at the federal, provincial and municipal level. It then provides an
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overview of the operational structure and division of responsibilities between 
major actors such as the RCMP, other federal agencies and the major police 
agencies. There are a wide range of institutions with mandated responsibilities for 
the prevention and control of serious and organised crime in Canada. The key 
policy branch is headed by Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada 
(PSEPC) which has ministerial responsibility for federal criminal justice as well 
national security issues such as terrorism. Entities which report to the Minister of 
PSEPC include the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Canada Border Services Agency 
(CBSA), Correctional Services Canada (CSC), Criminal Intelligence Service 
Canada (CISC) and other institutions. Additionally, Canada’s security and 
intelligence functions are complemented by contributions from other departments. 
This includes the Department of National Defense through its Intelligence Division 
(J2) as well as the signals intelligence of the Communications Security 
Establishment (CSE) and intelligence units of various other departments such as 
Foreign Affairs, Justice Canada, Transport Canada and Revenue Canada. It also 
includes an operational contribution from the Department of Finance in the form of 
Canada’s national financial intelligence unit, FINTRAC. Specialised units of the 
Privy Council Office (PCO), which are linked to the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
analyse and distribute signals intelligence as well as offering broader policy 
coordination and integrated intelligence assessment.
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A simple note on the division of powers and responsibilities amongst the federal, 
provincial and territorial, and municipal governments may be helpful for readers 
unfamiliar with Canada. Please note that some of the divisions are overlapping. 
The federal government is responsible for national policy development (e.g., the 
Canada Health Act), defence and foreign affairs, and it has sole jurisdiction to 
enact criminal legislation. The provinces and territories receive policy direction 
from the federal government, and the former are responsible for the 
implementation and delivery of policies (e.g. providing health services, enforcing 
criminal laws, etc.). Under policy direction from the province or territory, 
municipalities deliver local services and provide criminal and by-law enforcement.
The RCMP is the only federal police force and it enforces federal statutes. In a 
number of cases the RCMP is also under contract to provide policing services at 
the provincial and municipal level. Aside from the provinces of Ontario, Quebec 
and Newfoundland (the RCMP shares responsibilities with the Royal 
Newfoundland constabulary) the RCMP acts as the provincial police. With the 
exception of Ontario and Quebec as well as major centres across the country, the 
RCMP is often contracted to provide municipal policing services. The RCMP 
plays a key role in the investigation of financial crime in Canada, not least through 
their leadership in bodies such as the Integrated Proceeds of Crime Units 
(IPOCs). The IPOC bodies operate in major Canadian centres and combine the 
work of other investigative and revenue agencies to coordinate and target money 
laundering investigations.
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Notwithstanding the key AML role of the RCMP, the structure of policing and 
security and intelligence structures to deal with organised crime is diversified and 
complex. For instance, CISC facilitates criminal intelligence sharing and 
development across the country and the agency has over 380 members. One 
might imagine that issues of strategy and coordination in tackling organised crime 
regularly arise. Some may view financial intelligence as critical to improved 
success. As I shall explore in greater detail below, FINTRAC is simultaneously at 
the centre and the periphery of efforts to tackle serious and organised crime. This 
bifurcation has had considerable influence on the potential impact of the institution 
and the Canadian AML regime.
Creation of FINTRAC
Canada has long been an active supporter and contributor to international 
institutions and the pursuit of multilateral policy goals. As a contributor and 
supporter to the United Nations and the group of leading industrial nations, 
Canada is a party to various international agreements including the 1988 United 
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs Psychotropic 
Substances (the Vienna Convention) and the recommendations of the FATF 
beginning in the early 1990s. The Proceeds of Crime Act (1989) embodied much 
of the enforcement, prosecution and forfeiture mechanisms necessary to address 
laundering tied to drugs and other designated offences within Canada and to 
support international processes such as mutual assistance. The Act also included 
a system whereby financial institutions could provide voluntary suspicious
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transaction reports (VSTRs) to police, typically the RCMP, for further investigation. 
Readers who would like additional information on the historical developments 
relating to Canada may turn to several sources (Beare 1996; Murphy 2003).
Despite this legislation, Canada was the subject of criticism for being soft on 
organised crime in general and financial crime in particular. These criticisms 
emanated mainly from domestic and international law enforcement as well as a 
general sentiment from the U.S. that Canada was not contributing sufficiently to 
the cause. In the context of international political economy, the reputational risk of 
appearing to be soft on money laundering could have considerable consequences 
across various industry sectors and for the country in general. Moreover, in the 
late 1990s Canada was at risk of being named by the FATF as one of the 
countries that had failed to take sufficient steps to address money laundering 
(Cordon 2006). Being included on a blacklist of Non-Cooperative Country or 
Territory (NCCT) would be politically very embarrassing in addition to the potential 
economic consequences (Levi and Gilmore 2002).
FINTRAC was brought into formal existence via the Proceeds of Crime and 
Money Laundering Act (PCMLA 2000). The mandate expanded to include 
terrorist finance under the Proceeds of Crime, Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing Act (PCMLTFA 2001), both to implement the UN Convention and as 
part of the post ‘9/1T global anti-jihad pressure. Unless otherwise stated below I 
shall refer to these two pieces of legislation as the PCMLTFA or the Act for the 
purposes of continuity. The expanded mandate formed a part of a wide-ranging
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legislative overhaul, that is, an omnibus anti-terrorism bill which was drafted and 
rapidly pushed through Parliament in short order following the attacks of 11 
September 2001. My focus here is delimited to the PCMLTFA and FINTRAC. 
The driver behind the 2001 legislation should not require explanation. It should be 
noted that the PCMLA and its successor represented an intensification of tensions 
that had been building and then reached the stage of an imperative. American 
patience was dwindling with regards to the relative inaction of its northern 
neighbour on the issue of money laundering and the push for policy transfer was 
considerable. There was even a threat that Canadian access to U.S. electronic 
payment systems such as FedWire might be terminated if suitable policy action 
was not forthcoming in a timely fashion. This threat was considerable given the 
breadth and depth of economic ties between the two countries. The payment 
system termination threat was issued by Senator John Kerry, Chair of the U.S. 
Senate Banking Committee (Beare and Martens 1998: 403).
In summary form, the Act ushered in a reporting regime imposed upon financial 
institutions to maintain records and to report prescribed financial transactions as 
well as the reporting of all currency and monetary instrument imports or exports 
over a prescribed value. It created FINTRAC (hereafter referred to also as ‘the 
Centre’) as an independent agency to receive the reports mandated above and to 
analyse and assess these together with other information available to the Centre. 
Where there existed reasonable grounds to suspect that information would be 
relevant to investigating an offence of money laundering, terrorist finance or a
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threat to the security of Canada, FINTRAC was authorised to disclose designated 
information to police forces and other specific federal agencies under particular 
conditions. The Centre was also authorised to engage in research and education 
to inform the public, reporting entities and the law enforcement community about 
the nature and extent of financial crime and effective measures of deterrence and 
detection. Additionally, the Act created offences for failing to report prescribed 
transactions as well as for the inappropriate disclosure or use of FINTRAC 
information.
Substantive Components of the Reporting Regime
To build upon the above summary, the reporting regime ushered in considerable 
requirements upon a range of institutions and associated practitioners. Entities 
included in the reporting entity (RE) framework included traditional financial 
institutions (FIs) such as banks and credit unions, life insurance companies, 
securities dealers and portfolio managers as well as certain investment dealers, 
foreign exchange, money services businesses (MSBs), Crown Agents that accept 
deposits or issue money orders, accountants, real estate brokers, casinos, 
individuals transporting large sums of currency across the border and others 
under various conditions involving the provision of financial services. The REs 
were required to provide to FINTRAC several types of reports, including:
• Suspicious Transaction Report (STR)
• Large Cash Transaction Report (LCTR)
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• Electronic Funds Transfer Report (EFTR)
• Cross-Border Currency Report/Cross-Border Seizure Report 
(CBCR/CBSR)
• Voluntary Information (VI)
• Financial Intelligence Unit Queries (FIUQ)
In respect of LCTRs, CBCRs and EFTs, the trigger for reporting is an objective 
criterion, that is, transactions involving $10,000 CAD or more must be reported. 
On the other hand the trigger for an STR report is subjective, that is, where the 
reporting entity is suspicious of transactions a report must be filed. It is worth 
noting that this differs from voluntary STRs which, under the Proceeds of Crime 
Act (1989), could be reported to police agencies for follow-up or investigation. 
The subjectivity of STR reporting may obviously engender a diversity of reasons 
why some transactions are reported and these may involve transactions of various 
amounts. The Centre may also receive voluntary information from any agency or 
person in Canada. Any individual or agency may submit voluntary information to 
the Centre; however, we may reasonably assume that most VI derives from the 
police and other investigative agencies that may in turn receive disclosures which 
could assist their inquiries or investigations. Finally, foreign financial intelligence 
units that have signed a reciprocal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with 
the Centre may submit information that, in part, requests whether FINTRAC can 
contribute additional information to the investigations of other jurisdictions.
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Certainly, the capacity of REs to file such reports requires a substantive 
programme of record-keeping and regulation to ensure compliance. The record­
keeping would necessarily entail that know your client processes be adhered to, 
as well as documenting all the key components required to fill in the prescribed 
report forms.
Those who import or export currency or monetary instruments over $10,000 
across the border are required to file a CBCR with the Canada Customs and 
Revenue Agency (CCRA); this reporting was later referred to the Canada Border 
Services Agency (CBSA) following a re-structuring of federal departments in 2004. 
Those who fail to report the cross-border transportation of such amounts are at- 
risk of having their funds seized, which would in turn generate a CBSR.
Key Components of FINTRAC’s Design
The Act created an agency to receive the mandated reports, to analyse these with 
other information lawfully available to the Centre and provided it with a mandate to 
disclose operational and strategic information. FINTRAC is one of several quasi- 
governmental organisations that are known as “separate agencies” (equivalent to 
Non-Departmental Public Bodies in the United Kingdom); other examples include 
the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP). These agencies are the official representatives of the 
government on mandated issues and as a part of government they are also 
subject to many of its policies. Separate agencies are also given latitude to
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pursue their policy and operational mandate. In the case of FINTRAC this latitude 
is evident in its political accountability, the peculiarities of its status as an 
independent agency and its organisational structure. Before addressing these 
issues, it is important to distinguish between tactical and strategic levels, as 
defined by FINTRAC. Tactical information or intelligence explicitly identifies 
individuals or entities who may be the subject of a report or an analysis conducted 
by the Centre. Strategic information or intelligence is aggregated and does not 
directly or indirectly identify individuals or entities.
The Director of FINTRAC is accountable to report to the Minister of Finance. This 
accountability extends to policy issues and the strategic direction of the Centre as 
well as the filing of an Annual Report that is presented before Parliament. This 
accountability does not extend to operational matters. It is unlawful and a serious 
crime under the PCMLTFA for any person to divulge to any party (including the 
Minister) any (tactical) information that could directly or indirectly identify 
individuals or entities who are the subject of a report or internal analysis. This bar 
has only one caveat, the strictly limited exception that allows for disclosure to 
investigative agencies under prescribed conditions. That is, where there are 
“reasonable grounds to suspect that the information would be relevant to 
investigating an offence”, FINTRAC is required to disclose the information to the 
appropriate investigative agency. Investigators are the only recipients of a 
disclosure and, by law, the Minister of Finance may not receive from FINTRAC 
any information that could directly or indirectly identify individuals or entities. This
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operational window is further constrained by two factors. First, disclosures may 
lawfully only include a limited set of prescribed data called “designated 
information” (further information below). Second, the PCMLTFA requires that 
FINTRAC operate at “arm’s length” with respect to all the agencies to which it may 
disclose.
FINTRAC is therefore perhaps best represented in metaphoric terms as a black 
box. It functions as a repository of flows of incoming information into which only 
authorised persons (designated employees) can see and its delimited tactical 
product may be made available to a limited investigative audience. The arm’s 
length concept invokes a permanent distance and lack of familiarity between the 
Centre and investigative agencies. The latter are not permitted access to 
FINTRAC databases nor are they allowed to submit queries (only give voluntary 
information) or in any way attempt to direct the operations of the Centre. Given 
the secrecy which attends the mandated reporting as well as voluntary information 
from investigative agencies and foreign FlUs, it may be a reasonable supposition 
that, in practice, FINTRAC operates at arm’s length to all bodies with which it may 
interact. Indeed, the Centre is exempt from warrants issued by Canadian courts 
and need only respond to specific compulsory court processes such as those 
issued by the Federal Court of Canada at the request of an investigative agency, 
namely “production orders” that compel the release of an analytical report 
supporting a disclosure and ostensibly adding further substance to its designated 
information.
238
The Director of FINTRAC enjoys broad authority in terms of the structure of the 
agency and its human resources, including but not limited to departmental 
divisions, appointments, policies and pay scales. This authority is intended to 
empower the Director to set about meeting policy and operational objectives in the 
way he or she sees fit. This is not tempered by the influence of civil service 
unions, as FINTRAC is a separate employer and not a part of the public service 
per se.
Strategic information or intelligence may be released to a wide range of parties. 
However, such information must not be capable of directly or indirectly identifying 
individuals or entities, as this would constitute the offence of unauthorised 
disclosure. We might expect that a broad range of aggregated information could 
be made available. This information sharing may be limited in practice because 
the data holdings of investigative agencies and reporting entities may make direct 
or indirect identification of tactical information a possibility. These problems could 
understandably be worsened in respect of strategic information relating to 
disclosed cases and laundering practices. The imperative to share aggregate 
information but avoid unauthorised disclosure should tend to push strategic 
information sharing toward generalities and sanitised content. This is a problem 
not just for FINTRAC but for other bodies in the organised crime and financial 
intelligence arenas: from Europol Organised Crime Threat Assessments to FATF 
typologies exercises.
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The structure and design of Canada’s AML regime may be puzzling to observers. 
The Act was designed to establish a balance between detection and deterrence of 
serious financial crime as well as the privacy rights of Canadians. In this respect, 
the Centre acts as a passive or non-investigative analytical body mandated to 
disclose “designated information” to CSIS, the RCMP and other investigative 
agencies where the information would be deemed useful to the “investigation of 
ML, TF or threats to the security of Canada”. An analysis of the debates 
surrounding the creation of the PCMLTFA is beyond the scope of the present 
work. Readers may be contemplating the policy evaluation question as to 
whether any gaps or failures are due to theory problems or implementation issues. 
These questions are illuminated in the context of the operational potential of the 
Centre and discussed further below.
Operational Potential of the Centre
The secrecy surrounding its operational activities does not permit any direct 
insights to be drawn about the analytical processes and technologies employed by 
the Centre. That having been said, we can discern various possibilities given the 
input and output variables that are linked to this institution. It is perhaps most 
profitable to begin with the outputs and connect these back to the inputs.
The Disclosure Process
The primary product of FINTRAC is its disclosures to law enforcement agencies. 
A disclosure provides identifying (tactical) information about individuals or entities
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whose transactions are deemed relevant to investigating financial crime. The 
financial crime which is the primary focus here is money laundering (to which is 
added terrorist finance and threats to the security of Canada). Under the Criminal 
Code of Canada (s. 462.31(1)) Parliament provided the following definition:
Every one who commits an offence who uses, transfers the possession 
of, sends or delivers to any person or place, transports, transmits, 
alters, disposes of or otherwise deals with, in any manner and by any 
means, any property or any proceeds of any property with the intent to 
conceal or convert that property or those proceeds, knowing or 
believing that all or a part of that property or those proceeds was 
obtained or derived directly or indirectly as a result of (a) the 
commission in Canada of a designated offence; or (b) an act or 
omission anywhere that, if it had occurred in Canada, would have 
constituted a designated offence.
As Murphy (2003: 6) notes, this was limited in the 1990s to designated offences, 
but by 2001 the list was abandoned in favour of including all serious (indictable) 
offences save those excluded by regulation. With such a broad and flexible net it 
is difficult to determine the parameters of what would not constitute laundering 
once the individual has any awareness or wilful blindness toward their 
involvement in disposing of proceeds of crime (van Duyne 2003).
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The breadth of what may constitute laundering offers a stark contrast with the 
scope of information that may be included in a disclosure from FINTRAC. 
Disclosures are limited to “designated information” which may include the 
following categories:
• Names and addresses of persons and companies involved in the 
transactions and for the former, the date of birth, citizenship and 
several identification documents
• Transactional details such as the type of currency or monetary 
instrument and amount, dates and times, and transit and account 
numbers
• Reporting entity information on the name, address and type of 
business which effected the transaction
• Public information about the transactions and persons or entities that 
are contained in a particular report.
Financial intelligence may contribute to investigations through the identification of 
individuals or entities at three levels: (1) those who are already known to 
investigators; (2) those who are unknown to investigators but may be linked to 
known examples; (3) and those who are unknown to investigators. A 
straightforward method would be for investigators to search a disclosure for the 
names of individuals or entities identified in voluntary information they had
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previously submitted to the Centre. Investigators may also begin to add additional 
dimensions to their inquiries where viable connections are present or can be 
drawn. In the case of those who are unknown, investigators would need to initiate 
a preliminary investigation to determine whether there may be sufficient evidence 
to warrant investigation.
FINTRAC does not indicate the depth and breadth of information that may be 
deemed relevant to an investigation. We should assume that it provides 
information about offenders, those who appear to be participating in suspicious 
transactions. This leaves open the question of how far the inculpatory net 
reaches. Disclosures may contain information about the families, friends and 
acquaintances who may contribute in various ways to the activities of those who 
are directly involved in a scheme. It could also include accountants or other 
professionals who acted on behalf of suspected companies or dealers even if 
there may not be evidence that they were conspirators. This is a logical 
application, given the inclusion of those who contribute or support criminal 
organisations under the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organised 
Crime (2000) and parallel domestic legislation.
This also begs the question of far the exculpatory net reaches. In cases of fraud- 
related money laundering, for example, we should expect that information on 
victims will often be crucial to identification of the patterns necessary for 
investigation and prosecution. Given the complexity of some schemes there might 
also be overlap of roles where a victim (or an apparent victim) is also an offender.
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It is unclear as to whether “non-adverse” information may be relevant to an 
investigation. The term non-adverse could apply to individuals or entities that may 
attract concern by virtue of parallels to suspect transactions (e.g., amount 
volumes, dispositions, etc.). It may also include individuals whose transactions 
have no basis for suspicion other than temporal or spatial proximity to suspect 
transactions (e.g. a person conducts a transaction immediately before or after 
someone suspected of laundering). Both of these non-adverse examples could 
provide useful insights to determine which transactions are suspicious as 
compared with standard sets of transactional behaviour.
It is not indicated how a disclosure is structured in presentational terms. Given 
that disclosures can relate to hundreds of transactions involving millions of dollars 
it would seem that recipients are faced with lengthy lists of tombstone data. It is 
unlikely that disclosures contain any information that would assist investigators in 
differentiating between the spectrum of possibilities within the broad domains of 
inculpatory and exculpatory information. Recipients would only be able to draw 
such distinctions with reference to materials they already had on hand or 
generated by further investigation.
The reader should note that the scope of designated information precludes the 
provision by FINTRAC of a narrative which explains why the information may be 
relevant to an investigation. It bears repeating that to divulge information outside 
the scope of designated information constitutes unauthorised disclosure, as 
discussed above. The arm’s length concept ensures that tactical information
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released by the Centre is unidirectional, and investigative agencies are not 
permitted to make a query to FINTRAC at any point, including queries for 
additional information they may believe is pertinent in respect of a disclosure. 
These agencies may submit further voluntary information and/or they may apply to 
the Federal Court of Canada for a production order which offers access to the 
underlying analytical report supporting a disclosure.
From its inception to the end of March 2006, FINTRAC reports that it has received 
9 production orders (FINTRAC 2006: 11). The volume of production orders seems 
quite low given the 610 disclosures of this time period (see below). This may 
reflect difficulties in obtaining a production order and/or investigator expectations 
on the extent to which an analytical report may assist their inquiries. I have noted 
above the tombstone information that can be included in a disclosure. Perhaps 
the main contribution that may be provided by an analytical report is the thinking 
behind how connections are drawn and why certain patterns are deemed to be 
suspicious. In practical terms this could include link charts, assessments using 
indicators and known typologies, and reference to information from external 
databases.
Levels of Analysis
Given the discussion above it would seem that FINTRAC could most easily please 
its investigative stakeholders by focusing on Level I persons or entities that are 
already known to investigators and, to a limited extent, Level II persons or entities
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that are unknown but linked to known parties. To put this in simple terms, 
satisfying investigators over the short-term can be achieved by providing 
disclosures that correspond to the substance of voluntary information. This 
primary level of analysis may be described as a have-name-will-search approach.
If the Centre is able to add further dimensions to an investigation, it may provide 
financial intelligence on Level II persons or entities. Investigators may be very 
interested in this information over the short- to medium-term provided that the 
linkage to known cases can be drawn with reasonable effort. For instance, family 
and friends who live at the same address as those who are directly involved in 
laundering money. Here we have a second level of analysis which may be 
described as correlative. The goal here is matching variables based on hard or 
soft links. Hard links would include items that provide substantive evidence such 
as account information; and soft links would include items such as behaviour that 
corresponds to known typologies (e.g. repeated deposits involving large gym bags 
full of cash).
Over the medium- to long-term the Centre may add new dimensions to 
investigative knowledge and prosecution potential through the identification of 
Level III persons or entities (i.e. persons who are unknown to investigators). This 
tertiary level may be described as advanced analysis. In practice name-searching, 
correlation and advanced analyses may be overlapping and mutually reinforcing. 
For example, searching for names drawn from voluntary information and 
correlative matching may highlight networks of activity beyond the scope of what
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Table 2: Volume of Mandated Reports to FINTRAC
200102 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06
Suspicious Transaction 
Report (STR)
3,772 17,358 14,794 19,113 29,367
Cross-Border Currency 
Report/Cross-Border 
Seizure Report 
(CBCR/CBSR)
650 29,369 75,821 54,506
Large Cash Transaction 
Report (LCTR)
226,916 2,792,910 3,658,462 6,003,488
Electronic Funds 
Transfer Report (EFTR)
1,859,237 6,689,626 7,077,675 8,887,093
Total Reports 3,772 2,104,161 9,526,699 10,831,071 14,974,454
Source: FINTRAC Annual Report (2006: 17)
is known to investigators. The primary and secondary analyses will also build a 
pool of information on hard and soft links that can contribute to the development of 
indicators and typologies to identify networks of activity. Name-driven searches 
are clearly dependent upon the voluntary information provided by investigators 
and this is also, to a certain extent, the case in correlative searching. Advanced 
analyses should be able to function with some degree of independence from 
voluntary information and this should increase over time. We should expect that 
this independence will remain relative rather than absolute, given that
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investigators are best placed to document the novel activities that emerge and 
recede and how criminal activities evolve.
In contrast to criminal intelligence databases, the overwhelming majority of 
information contained in FINTRAC databases is non-adverse. That is, the 
information pertains to legitimate transactions that are conducted by Canadians 
and this may account for more than ninety-five per cent of the data holdings. 
Name-searching approaches could perhaps be achieved with a limited set of data, 
possibly STRs on their own would suffice. Instead, the Centre receives a 
comprehensive set of mandated reports and claims that nearly one hundred per 
cent of reporting is received electronically. The sheer volume of incoming 
information is striking (See Table 2) with more than 37 million mandated reports 
for the period 2001-02 through 2005-06. Aside from STRs which could involve 
various amounts, the other mandated reports involve amounts of $10,000 or 
more.
The suite of mandated reporting and the volume of these reports are, of course, 
critical to the analytical prospects for name-searching and even more so for 
correlative and advanced analyses. As the data set grows over time and 
analytical experience deepens, the hard and soft links should become tighter and 
more refined in identifying suspect transactions.
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External Databases
Mandated reports may be complemented by access to external databases and the 
Centre is authorised to negotiate its access to law enforcement and intelligence 
sources as well as open source or public information databases. I am not aware 
of any open source discussion of the external databases to which FINTRAC has 
access. However, there are several highly probable sources. One would be the 
Canadian Police Information Computer (CPIC) which is run by the RCMP and is 
used by Canadian enforcement agencies for mundane activities through to 
specialised collections of information. An example of the former includes police in 
their patrol cars searching vehicle registration, license and address information 
through a CPIC link. An example of the latter includes criminal record checks 
against individuals.
Other useful policing databases could include the criminal intelligence holdings of 
major Canadian enforcement agencies, including the RCMP and Criminal 
Intelligence Service Canada (CISC). Open source private sector databases that 
could be useful in adding context to an analysis of FINTRAC data could include 
credit agencies such as Equifax and comprehensive reference services for 
business and legal information such as Lexis/Nexis.
While the analytical possibilities are numerous, it is important to recognise the 
limitations that may result from FINTRAC’s design. Its limitations are focused on 
core design principles: the imperative to maintain an arm’s length relationship to
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law enforcement and potential disclosure recipients; and the prohibition on 
unauthorised disclosure. Transmission of tactical information is constrained to the 
voluntary information and disclosure process. It would take considerable 
imagination to describe a scenario under which a FINTRAC analyst could discuss 
any case information with members of an enforcement agency, let alone with 
Money Laundering Reporting Officers from banks and other regulated institutions, 
without running the risk of making an unauthorised disclosure. A strategic level 
discussion such as sanitised cases is also problematic, given that you may be 
addressing yourself to those who investigated the relevant case or its details may 
be well known amongst the investigative community. It may not matter in theory to 
discuss issues that investigators are already aware of: however, the line for 
unauthorised disclosures would tend to prompt a conservative stance for both 
personal survival and the avoidance of institutional scandal.
Another limitation relates to FINTRAC’s use of external databases. Given that a 
portion of its interests in external data may relate to tactical intelligence gathering, 
any recording of user activity is inherently problematic. The interest of a 
FINTRAC analyst in particular persons or entities could be determined by the 
operators of an investigative database or the operators of open source databases. 
It is not clear whether the Centre minimises these risks through insularity or 
whether suitable conditions can be negotiated with database operators.
Arguably, the most significant limitation is imposed by the legislatively required 
distance between the Centre and investigative agencies. This removes many of
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the prospects for back-and-forth interaction and learning that would stimulate 
rapid growth in analytical skills and knowledge. More systematically, it intimates 
the possibility of an ongoing disjunction between the tactical and strategic 
alignment of FINTRAC and investigative agencies.
Policy Transfer with a Canadian Twist
The Canadian AML regime represents an effort to emulate systems that have 
been pioneered and promulgated internationally. The epicentre of the design and 
proliferation of AML and related systems is the United States, the pre-eminent 
advocate and marketer of crime controls to deal with serious and organised crime 
in the twentieth and early twenty-first century (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006). A 
cursory review may lead some to conclude that, with the implementation of the 
PCMLTFA, Canada has caught up to its neighbour. The United States had begun 
to build its AML regime in the 1970s and by the 1990s most of the architecture 
was well established. All the generic prevention and enforcement components 
noted by Levi and Reuter (2006) and Reuter and Truman (2004) are in place in 
Canada. The prevention component includes administrative/regulatory sanctions, 
regulation and supervision, reporting and customer due diligence. The 
enforcement component includes civil and criminal confiscation and forfeiture, 
prosecution and punishment, investigation and predicate crimes. Moreover, there 
is a dedicated financial intelligence unit in Canada, FINTRAC, which can interact 
with Canadian stakeholders and other FlUs.
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Nevertheless, policy transfer is by no means a linear process. It has symbolic and 
substantive dimensions and is powerfully shaped by the mediating influence of the 
policy-making context of different political, legal and cultural rules (Jones and 
Newburn 2006). While FINTRAC is symbolically very similar to its most proximate 
analogues, it is a very different institution in substantive terms. Among other 
conclusions the Auditor General of Canada (2004) found that FINTRAC was 
labouring under unusual safeguards by international standards. These focus on a 
strict legislative framework, including the arm’s length principle and the 
circumscribed disclosure process. Other comparable FlUs are free to develop 
much closer links and flows of information with law enforcement agencies. For 
instance, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the Australian 
Transaction Reports Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) offer query access to member 
enforcement agencies. Others are more directly embedded in the law 
enforcement matrix such as the former National Criminal Intelligence Service 
(NCIS) which was merged in 2006 with several other agencies into the United 
Kingdom Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA).
The Context of Political, Legal and Cultural Rules
The peculiarities of FINTRAC’s design are certainly the product of a specific 
context of political, legal and cultural rules. Policy initiatives at all levels of 
government in Canada are required to adhere to the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (1982). Initiatives which run afoul of the Charter may be subject to 
challenge, and courts may undertake several options such as entering exceptions
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or declaring legislation to be unconstitutional and therefore of no force or effect 
under Canadian law. The need to develop and implement Charter-friendly policy 
is thus an imperative for policy-makers. Rights and freedoms under the Charter 
are guaranteed “subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society” (Section 1).
The Supreme Court of Canada articulated the benchmark standard for testing the 
constitutionality of policies that are found to impinge on rights or freedoms in the 
case of Oakes (1986). Two principal criteria must be satisfied for a given policy to 
pass the test. First, it must be demonstrated that the objective of a policy relates 
to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society. 
Second, the means chosen to achieve the objective must pass a three-part 
proportionality test:
(1) the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the 
objective in question. The measures must not be arbitrary, unfair or 
based on irrational considerations but rather must be rationally 
connected to the objective.
(2) the means, even if rationally connected to the objective, should 
impair as little as possible the right or freedom in question.
(3) there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures 
which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom and the 
objective which has been identified as of sufficient importance.
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In the Oakes case, the accused was charged with possession of a narcotic for the 
purposes of trafficking. Persons so charged faced a reverse onus under the 
Narcotic Control Act (1961) which required the accused to prove the drugs in their 
possession were not for the purpose of trafficking. In effect the accused was 
faced with the burden of having to prove guilt for one offence (possession) in 
order to escape conviction for a more serious offence (possession for the purpose 
of trafficking). The court found that the legislation violated subsection 11(d) of the 
Charter, the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. The relevant section 
of the act was declared unconstitutional because of the absence of a rational 
connection between the proven fact of drugs possession and the presumed fact of 
intent to traffic.
Kiedrowski and Webb (1993) discuss the implications of jurisprudence that has 
modified the Oakes principles. First, revisions of the rational connection test have 
made it easier to place limits on Charter rights. Policy makers need only establish 
a credible basis for a particular legislative approach. A consensus in the literature 
or research on a given issue is not required. Second, the little as possible test 
has been revised such that the effectiveness of a given policy becomes the 
central issue. Measures chosen by Parliament may be considered acceptable 
where alternative measures, which are less Charter offensive, would also be less 
effective. The first two elements of the proportionality test are the critical 
components of the Oakes process. The third element, the effects component, has 
rarely been used by itself as a basis for disallowing a challenged provision.
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It is within the context of the Oakes test that we can begin to understand the strict 
legislative framework of the PCMLTFA and the structure and function of FINTRAC 
in particular. Given the international legislative and enforcement attention to 
money laundering and terrorist financing it is clear that these represent a pressing 
and substantial concern. The design is intended to achieve a balance between the 
need to detect and deter serious financial crime and the protection of Charter 
rights. The collection of private financial information creates the potential for the 
violation of the privacy rights of Canadians and the disclosure of information 
allows access without a warrant for enforcement agencies.
Thus, the crux of the constitutionality question revolves around two issues: (1) 
whether this policy is rationally and credibly connected to the goal of detecting and 
deterring serious financial crime; and (2) whether the effectiveness of this policy 
could be matched or exceeded by a less Charter offensive alternative. A less 
Charter offensive alternative was available prior to the PCMLTFA in the form of 
Voluntary Suspicious Transaction Reports (VSTRs) which financial institutions 
could report to police and the option of investigators seeking a judicial warrant for 
further transactional details. One would find it hard to believe that these measures 
would be nearly as effective as the PCMLTFA provisions although I am not aware 
that any systematic study has been undertaken to disprove it.
The more penetrating issue appears to be the rational and credible connection 
between the policy and its goal. It is useful at this point to note again the tri-partite 
division of analytical levels (name-searching, correlation, and advanced analysis)
255
and the known through unknown status of persons for investigators. This is a 
didactic tool which assists our understanding of the design and operational 
potential of the Centre.
Law enforcement agencies are not permitted to have access, without a warrant, to 
the personal financial information of Canadians. FINTRAC is a vehicle through 
which enforcement agencies may, under prescribed and controlled conditions, 
receive financial intelligence on transactions that are deemed to be suspicious 
and relevant to investigating laundering. What is more, the arm’s length 
relationship to enforcement is a further assurance that FINTRAC will not function 
or be perceived to function as a query access database for investigators. Its 
design is intended to balance privacy rights with the needs of those investigating 
serious financial crime. Its design and status as an independent agency has a 
further intention. Specifically, that an agency dedicated to analyse laundering 
should enhance governmental objectives to identify, seize and forfeit the assets of 
those involved in serious financial crimes. This implies that with the passage of 
time FINTRAC should be able to enhance the scale and scope of asset targeting 
under proceeds of crime and related legislation.
Assessing the Potential Impact
In practical terms the rational connection between the policy and its goal should 
emerge over time in the demonstrable value-added that FINTRAC contributes to 
the targeting of larger networks and persons little known or unknown using
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traditional investigative techniques. The first four years of FINTRAC’s operational 
status demonstrate a modest rate of disclosures and an impressive growth of 
more than ten-fold in the value of disclosed transactions, over $5 billion in 2005- 
06 (See Table 3).
Table 3: FINTRAC Disclosures and 
Dollar Values
2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06
Disclosures 103 197 142 168
Value
(millions)
$460 $696 $2,048 $5,004
Source: FINTRAC Annual Report (2006: 8)
Readers should not be seduced by the prolific dollar values. FINTRAC provides 
no accounting for how it arrives at the aggregate values and (recalling the 
discussion of inculpatory and exculpatory information above) therefore the safe 
ground is to assume these values cover the widest possible terrain. In the 
absence of some detailed information on accounting methods, the reader is also 
left with the untested assumption that the number of disclosures and aggregate 
values are discrete variables from year to year. Indeed, there may be overlapping
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of disclosure numbers and aggregate values. We should also expect 
considerable attrition because FINTRAC is disclosing where it has reasonable 
grounds to suspect the information would be relevant to those investigating a 
laundering offence. The information can only be validated by investigators. 
Conversely, FINTRAC cannot properly be blamed if there are insufficient 
resources to follow up its tactical disclosures, unless it could legally provide data 
more helpfully than it does so as to assist prioritisation by investigators.
The Senate of Canada Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce 
(2006) conducted a review of the PCMLTFA. A variety of evaluative insights were 
offered by the RCMP Deputy Commissioner, Federal Services and Central 
Region. He noted that the RCMP had received a total of 382 disclosures from 
FINTRAC (ostensibly from its inception) and of these:
• 9% identified individuals who were new or unknown to investigators
• 14% provided additional information to ongoing investigations
• 16% contained insufficient information to proceed with an investigation
• 25% were the direct result of previous voluntary reports submitted by 
the force
• 29% were associated with concluded investigations where sufficient 
resources were available
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• 53% of the disclosures were concluded for reasons such as no 
criminality detected, insufficient information, no predicted offence, and 
dated information or lack of investigative resources.
Readers will note that the percentages add up to more than one hundred and that 
the information thus relates to overlapping categories. It is also worth noting the 
Deputy Commissioner’s comments regarding VSTRs that private businesses 
continue to disclose directly to the RCMP. He argued that these tend to contain 
more information that what is contained in FINTRAC information and that the 
inclusion of a narrative with the VSTRs helps investigators prioritise the at times 
voluminous lists of transactions.
The RCMP statistics on FINTRAC disclosures do not provide overwhelming 
evidence of a rational and credible connection between the policy and the goal. 
That having been said, the mandate is in its early stages and it should be a 
reasonable assumption that disclosures may become more focused and relevant 
to investigators as time passes. Also, in fairness to FINTRAC it is not obvious 
what would be an appropriate yield from STRs and other transaction sources or, 
for that matter, from voluntary information provided by investigative agencies. In 
terms of value-added, the Centre should contribute to the bottom-line of the 
government’s policy, enhancing the scope of assets targeted and seized. The 
Seized Property Management Directorate (SPMD) provides a helpful baseline of 
statistics (See Table 4). Several cautions should be noted in interpreting SPMD 
statistics. Seizures are not necessarily disposed of within the same year and
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assets are depreciated by factors such as the costs of asset management and the 
business, living and legal expenses of a defendant. Some materials are unsafe for 
sale and are destroyed. Assets are returned to the owner in the event of a not 
guilty verdict. Further, assets may be held under the PCMLTFA and other 
provisions such as drug laws and certain sections of the Criminal Code.
Table 4: Seizures and Net Forfeitures of Proceeds of Crime in Canada
1996- 1997- 1998- 1999- 2000- 2001- 2002- 2003- 2004-
97 98 99 GO 01 02 03 04 05
Value of 
Seizures 
($ millions 
CAD)
31 33 45 35 36 39 71 56 96
Net
Forfeitures 
($ millions 
CAD)
10.3 15.6 19.6 12.7 8.2 8.3 12.8 18 15.3
Source: Seized Property Management Directorate (SPMD)
Like many other FlUs, the Centre must depend upon cooperation with a wide 
range of stakeholders a function which would tend to be more complicated in 
Canada due to the requirement of an arm’s length relationship. This creates a 
challenge for evaluating the PCMLTFA initiative as multiple stakeholders are left 
with an ill-defined responsibility for monitoring what happens to the FINTRAC
260
disclosures they receive. The Auditor General of Canada (2004) found that the 
absence of a comprehensive monitoring system for disclosures renders it 
impossible to assess the value of disclosures, to make improvements to these 
over time, and to assess overall impact in reducing money laundering and terrorist 
financing. In terms of the Oakes test, this means that there continue to be many 
unknowns in respect of both the rational and credible connection test and the 
effectiveness and least possible impact on Charter rights test.
Public Criticisms
The Auditor General of Canada (2004) has provided, thus far, the most detailed 
public critique of FINTRAC. This institution is not often the subject of criticism and 
many critiques that arise tend to remain at a general level, a function of the 
difficulty in penetrating a highly secretive agency. The criticisms that are voiced 
publicly tend to focus on FINTRAC having either “rubber teeth rather than real 
fangs” (Thompson and Turlej 2003) or that it is part of a movement toward a 
domestic and international criminal justice panopticon (Beare 2003). Advocates of 
the former approach tend to focus on providing the police and other investigative 
agencies with as many tools as possible to crack down on those involved in 
financial crime. These parties appear to draw satisfaction from the prolific input 
and output variables that have been generated and promote for ongoing 
increases. Advocates of the latter stance are concerned about the demonstrable 
effectiveness of these measures and the implications it is having upon privacy 
rights, business interests and the broader society.
As noted above, the bulk of media attention on FINTRAC tends to occur around 
the time of the release of the annual report each fall. Of course, the audit report 
generated a range of negative media reports (cf. Gordon 2004; Howlett and 
Waldie 2004; Ward 2004). These and others repeated the findings of the audit 
report and added a touch of sensationalism in arguing that the agency was 
hamstrung by privacy concerns, that its information had not led to one single 
prosecution, and that investigators were not impressed with the agency. In 
several respects the audit report findings and the associated reportage involved 
superficial and misplaced critiques. For instance, FINTRAC began making volume 
disclosures in 2002-03 and laundering investigations may take several years to 
complete. Also, the agency was not hamstrung by privacy concerns as it 
continued to make disclosures, the real question was the limitations created for 
investigators confronted with lists of transactional details and no narrative.
In the months that followed the report, many of the audit critiques were described 
by FINTRAC’s Director as “dated” and out of step with significant advances that 
had been made by the agency, most notably large increases in the dollar value of 
disclosures (Gordon 2005). This was followed up by FINTRAC’s Senior Deputy 
Director responding to nagging audit critiques with the following: “You have to 
remember the auditor general’s report now is two years old it was a snapshot 
taken very early in our history, and we’ve come a long way (Gordon 2006).
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Money Laundering Controls and Home Invasion Robbery
In December 2006, an Act to Amend the PCMLTFA received Royal Assent. Once 
the legislation comes into force, it will introduce several changes. An analysis of 
the minutiae of the amendments is beyond the scope of the present work and 
would be unprofitable given that the implementation of most of the provisions will 
be delayed to the summer of 2008. It is useful to note several of the changes at a 
general level. Customer due diligence will be enhanced and special due diligence 
will be introduced to monitor correspondent banking relationships and foreign 
politically exposed persons. Reporting entities will be required to report attempted 
suspicious transactions. A registration regime for money service businesses will 
be introduced. The amended legislation also aims to improve information sharing 
between the Centre, law enforcement and domestic and international agencies.
As FINTRAC approaches and enters the second phase of its legislative mandate 
several questions arise. Will the amended legislation improve the capability to 
prevent and reduce financial crime and the underlying predicate crimes? Will the 
amended legislation and its implementation overcome systemic issues that may 
impede the effectiveness of the regime? These are questions for further research 
on this topic. However, readers will appreciate the limits that these changes may 
generate given the constitutional issues that continue to be reflected in the 
maintenance of the arm’s length relationship and a circumscribed disclosure 
process. There is not the space here to evaluate these issues broadly, rather I
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shall focus on AML controls with respect to the potential impact on HIR and linked 
criminal enterprise.
Home invasion robbery is a serious crime, and in its medium- to high-level 
manifestations, it could be classified as organised crime under the United Nations 
Convention (2000) and parallel domestic legislation in many countries. In its more 
organised form, HIR generates substantial monies, from $25,000 to as much as 
$200,000 from one incident as discussed in the previous chapter. The focus of 
laundering controls is, of course, on monies and assets. Explicitly or implicitly, one 
might assume that laundering controls target ‘Mr Big’ cases involving only large 
amounts of money, millions or tens to hundreds of millions. The reality is that 
many of the cases triggered or assisted by AML controls tend to target ‘low- 
hanging fruit’. This is a by-product of AML typically being viewed as a complement 
to existing investigations rather than as an analytic resource and guide to 
generate new cases not already under investigation (cf Beare and Schneider 
2007; Cuellar 2003).
HIR seems more about violence than about money. Nevertheless, HIR is a 
predicate offence that generates proceeds of crime. Unless those involved spend 
all the resources, financial institutions are obliged to demonstrate due diligence 
and report on clients whose deposits and other financial transactions do not match 
their income or profile. What FINTRAC discloses is secret aside from the sanitised 
cases it presents in its Annual Report and on the website. However, if a network 
involved in HIR and other activities is under investigation by police, they may
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submit voluntary information to FINTRAC. Any transactions linked to predicate 
offending and money laundering may be disclosed. Except for the higher-dollar 
volumes (or the examples that could be classified as organised crime in the 
previous chapter), it is unlikely that FINTRAC would disclose on this 
independently.
This brings us back to one of the under-represented categories of HIR in the 
examples discussed in the previous chapter; those linked to marijuana grow 
operations (MGOs). I suspect (though available data does not allow proof) that a 
large minority and perhaps a majority of HIR cases in Canada are MGO-related. 
This relates to the value of the trade, which has been estimated at $5.7 billion 
wholesale and $19.5 billion retail for the marijuana market across Canada 
(Mulgrew 2005). Although the number of MGOs is not known, more people are 
drawn into this highly lucrative (though dangerous) enterprise each year. It is 
hardly surprising that a market will attract thousands of participants where a 10 
square metre room can generate more than $100,000 from cultivating marijuana; 
this oyer a one-year period involving 100 plants with the average value of a 
mature marijuana plant estimated at $1,000 (Boyd 2000).
The dollar volume of the marijuana market and the diversity of participants 
involved makes the targeting of MGOs for HIR a highly-lucrative albeit risky 
enterprise. With AML controls in place, those running MGOs may, in addition to 
holding marijuana, tend to have large values of cash on-hand given the risks of 
depositing these proceeds with a financial institution. Unless the marijuana grower
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has a reliable method or outlet to launder their proceeds of crime, they have to 
store their monies and introduce it slowly into financial system or face the risk of 
detection, prosecution and forfeiture. Thus, the popularity of home invasion 
robbery, in part, reflects the paradoxical effects of proceeds of crime enforcement 
and AML controls. HIR also offers a form of market discipline as targeted 
independent producers may find that it is in their interests to engage the protection 
and (laundering) services of established groups like the Hells Angels and Asian 
(Vietnamese) gangs. This helps to explain the durability of HIR in contemporary 
Canada
Conclusion
In this chapter, I discussed the rise of anti-money laundering (AML) controls and 
the national financial intelligence unit (FIU) in Canada. I addressed the common 
incorrect perception that AML relates primarily to organised crime, as it is 
commonly understood, and drug trafficking. Instead, these controls cover a broad 
range of serious and organised crime. This diversity can cover virtually any 
proceeds of crime, including tax evasion. I explored financial intelligence as it 
portrays itself as being the vanguard of efforts to tackle serious and organised 
crime. This supposed centrality offered useful insights into several aspects of the 
prevention and control of serious and organised crime.
The chapter began with a brief discussion of getting inside a FIU, in particular the 
author’s involvement with the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre
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of Canada (FINTRAC). It discussed the difficulties of obtaining and using 
information about this very secretive area of public policy and operations. I then 
provided an overview of the policy and operational structure in Canada such as 
the jurisdictional division of governmental and investigative responsibilities.
I then focused on issues surrounding the creation of FINTRAC in 2000. These 
included the domestic and international pressures for its creation, the substantive 
components of the reporting regime, and key components of FINTRAC’s design. 
The discussion also looked at the operational potential of FINTRAC. This included 
its tactical mandate via the disclosure process, levels of analysis that are possible 
in context and the potential utility of external enforcement/intelligence and open 
source databases.
I also examined FINTRAC as representing an example of policy transfer from the 
United States but with a Canadian twist. Its design features are specific to the 
legal and cultural rules in Canada. These design features, in turn, have an effect 
on the potential impact of FINTRAC. This resulted in a variety of public criticisms 
of the institution. I provided a brief discussion on Phase II of FINTRAC’s legislative 
mandate, which is a response to the various criticisms and a general deepening of 
the AML controls in Canada.
Finally, I explored how AML controls may potentially detect or affect the 
phenomenon of home invasion robbery. This included discussion of how HIR, as 
a serious and/or organised crime, can generate sufficient proceeds to trigger
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investigative interest and/or AML detection. This is especially the case with 
respect to the more organised examples discussed above, and, in particular, with 
respect to the multi-billion dollar marijuana grow operation (MGO) industry.
I know turn to the conclusion to this thesis.
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CHAPTER EIGHT:
CONCLUSION
This study aimed to provide an empirical account of the nature and scope of home 
invasion robbery, an emerging form of serious and organised crime in Canada. It 
situated these activities within the prevention and control apparatus with a 
particular focus on financial intelligence. The principal data source was case law 
as well as participant observation in selected areas of the Canadian law 
enforcement and intelligence community. Direct use of the latter experiences was 
constrained by secrecy and legal issues. Therefore, they were used to inform my 
use of a range of secondary research materials.
In chapter two, I provided a review of the literature on serious and organised crime 
alongside efforts to define this phenomenon. It began by exploring the distinction 
between two models, disorganised crime versus the mafia-octopus 
(disaggregated crime versus the Godfather), which underlie many interpretations 
of this topic area. I then provided a selective overview of official definitions from 
the United States, Canada, the European Union and the United Nations. My 
attention then turned to assessing the importance of social context in 
understanding organised crime as a participant in illegal and legal activities. 
Issues of social context were used to highlight the underlying dimensions of the
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linear (mafia-octopus) and non-linear (disorganised crime and network) 
arguments.
In this chapter, I argued that the literature tends toward disorganised crime and 
interrelated markets as indicative of the bulk of organised crime activity. Official 
definitions of the phenomenon have a long history of linear arguments of a 
presumed concentration toward populist images of a mafia-octopus. 
Nevertheless, official definitions have more recently (post-United Nations 
Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime 2000) given way to 
recognising the non-linear arguments of disorganised crime and network 
structures. Unfortunately, whilst the definitions have expanded to include a broad 
range of serious crimes, the Godfather imagery has lost little of its cachet. A 
situation of denotative expansion and connotative intransigence continues to 
impede clearer understanding of what organised crime is and how it fits into 
contemporary society.
In chapter three, I addressed critical issues on the evidence base for the study of 
organised crime as well as articulating an appropriate methodology for a case 
study on the social organisation of a serious crime, home invasion robbery (HIR) 
discussed in chapter six. It is not at all clear that standard scientific positivist 
methods are appropriate in the field of organised crime study or the construction 
of a helpful evidence base in this area. It is difficult to answer basic questions 
about the state of the evaluation literature, or to assess the size and scope of this 
problem or the assessed level of threat. Few programme evaluations are
270
conducted, and those that exist tend to be basic pre-post designs using privileged 
operational data, often from enforcement agencies. Efforts to estimate the size of 
organised crime profits and the extent of money laundering typically involve little in 
the way of rigorous methodology and a distinct inflationary tendency.
The problems of studying organised crime are compounded by several key 
factors. Certain observers may exercise considerable influence over knowledge 
about the phenomenon and who can gain access to study the subject matter. The 
mass media provides the most accessible form of knowledge on this topic, though 
their coverage often tends to portray an explicit or implicit mafia-octopus. The 
executive branch of government, and law enforcement in particular, may limit 
funding, access and/or attempt to obscure evidence for certain topical areas or 
study.
Notwithstanding the acute and chronic difficulties of studying organised crime, 
academic researchers have employed a range of techniques to study various 
forms. These methods have included participant observation, observation, 
interviews with victims/offenders/enforcement/government, examination of police 
and court files, and other methods. Many of these efforts have required that the 
methods are tailored to the phenomenon of study. In developing my thesis, I 
employed a range of methods. This included participant observation in the fields 
of criminal and financial intelligence that, although I could not use directly for legal 
and ethical reasons, helped to inform my use of other sources of information. 
These included case law, the published and grey market literature, media reports
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and scholarly literature. In chapter four, I assessed the challenge of social 
regulation in general and with particular attention to organised crime. I discussed 
selected insights from anomie theory. These included Durkheim’s insight that 
anomie results from the absence of society in the failure to achieve social 
regulation. It also included Merton’s insight that anomie results from the presence 
of society in the failure to achieve a balance between goal achievement and the 
suitability (morality) of the available means, then turned to the claim that 
Durkheim and Merton may be control theorists, and I highlighted that in control 
theory individuals are freed to engage in deviance whereas in Durkheim and 
Merton individuals are pressured toward deviance.
I then shifted from issues of causation to responses with respect to particular 
approaches to social regulation. These approaches illustrate the limitations of 
applying standard control orientations in general and especially with respect to 
those involved in organised crime. The analysis addressed general deterrence 
(the wider population), specific deterrence (at-risk individuals), incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation. In the case of the first three responses, we find questionable 
capacity to reduce or prevent organised crime. Such groups have available 
numerous techniques and tactics to circumvent or displace risks. Further, 
rehabilitation has not been properly tried.
The chapter also included discussion of Durkheim’s legal evolution thesis. 
Therein, he argued that as society becomes more complex, moving from 
mechanical to organic solidarity, repressive (punitive) law is progressively
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replaced with restitutive (restorative) law. Although there are a number of critics of 
the legal evolution thesis, Durkheim posed a key problem of whether modern law 
can retain its own moral force and be something more than mere politics. The 
control of organised crime is an area that illustrates the continuing drift toward the 
narrow concerns of positive law.
In chapter five, I examined the sociological foundations of institutional anomie 
theory (IAT). These foundations involved the rise of the doux-commerce and self- 
destruction theses (Hirschman 1982) of market society. Respectively, the 
eighteenth century Enlightenment view that markets help to perfect human society 
and the nineteenth century Industrial revolution view that markets have a 
corrosive effect on human society. Building upon these ideas, IAT offers a macro- 
criminological model to examine structural causation. It posits that a market- 
oriented imbalance in social institutions may cause criminogenic tendencies in 
various parts of society and simultaneously undermine institutional and individual 
observance of social rules.
I then examined key issues relating to the ideas of globalisation and empire. In 
particular, the post-World War II view of globalisation as a system of economic 
means to improve the condition of humanity and social organisation. This was 
followed by the late-1980s shift toward a view of globalisation as a system of 
economic means apparently operating for its own abstract purposes. These 
issues are then linked to the concept of empire (over imperialism) in the 
contemporary period of United States dominance.
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My analysis then turned to how Canada experiences several anomic trends. 
Canadian sovereignty is not assaulted directly by an imperial aggressor but rather 
national participation in contemporary Empire compels a market-oriented focus in 
social institutions. This produces considerable inter-related problems and limits 
the ability of social institutions to regulate individuals and society. Despite the 
successes of the market-oriented society, those individuals and groups who find 
themselves marginalised represent a substantial problem to Canadian society.
In chapter six, I provided a case study of home invasion robbery as an example of 
serious and organised crime. I did not argue that all HIR cases are organised 
crime, either in the sense that they meet stereotypical notions or that they 
necessarily fit neatly into official definitions. This is central to the earlier debates 
and issues raised in the thesis about the evolving definitions of ‘organised crime’ 
(See Chapter Two).
Not the least of these issues is that the term itself and official definitions are 
problematic, and they are often unhelpful when examining the variable 
organisation of serious crimes. My aim was to examine how HIR exhibits, and 
may be linked to, a spectrum of criminal enterprise.
I began with a range of definitional issues relevant to the discussion of HIR. This 
included discussion of the two most proximate categories for HIR, residential 
break and enter (RB&E) and robbery, as defined by the Criminal Code of Canada.
I then turned to the definition of HIR, which is not a distinct crime category but
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rather a subdivision of the categories of RB&E and robbery. The narrow definition 
focuses on robbery that occurs in a private dwelling. The broad definition focuses 
on a robbery, or any RB&E involving a violent offence, that occurs within a private 
dwelling. Given the potential overlap in the broad definition, a given incident 
should only be counted once as the more serious offence. I also provided a brief 
discussion of definitional issues relating to serious and organised crime, and I 
discussed how HIR exhibits, and is linked to, a spectrum of criminal enterprise
I then turned to attempting to quantify the magnitude of the HIR problem. This 
was not a straightforward task given that HIR does not exist as a distinct official 
crime category. For this reason, Uniform Crime Reports (UCR 1) that contain a 
nationally representative picture of police-recorded crime cannot be used to 
identify HIR incidence. It is possible to gain some idea of incidence using the more 
detailed UCR 2 survey of police-recorded crime. However, UCR 2 represented 
less than 50% of the national volume of police-recorded crime and, therefore, it 
does not provide a representative picture of Canada as a whole or any of its 
regions. The General Social Survey (GSS), which includes a criminal 
victimisation component, provides some insights. However, the GSS does not 
have sufficient sensitivity to provide reliable statistics at a national, or census 
metropolitan area, level. The International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) is a 
comparative instrument and its typically small sample sizes (around 2,000) for 
each country produce sampling errors that make precise domestic estimates of 
existing crime categories problematic. Thus, the ICVS does not have sufficient
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sensitivity to be able to provide a reliable or precise estimate of the sub-category 
of home invasion robbery.
Then I provided an overview of 25 examples of HIR, 16 drawn from case law and 
9 from newspapers. These were assessed using the 5ls analytical framework 
(Ekblom 2003) and its eleven generic causes of crime to assess the social 
organisation of this phenomenon. My particular aim in using the framework is to 
examine how HIR exhibits, and may be linked to, a spectrum of criminal 
enterprise. I then turned to the Canadian policy response specific to the problem 
of home invasion robbery.
I have tried to highlight explicitly the profitability inherent in each of the examples 
(where the information is available), and there were a number of quite profitable 
examples that could be flagged by money laundering controls. Whilst money 
laundering legislation may have, to a greater or lesser extent in various countries, 
been created to deal with organised crime and drugs trafficking in particular, the 
pertinent legislation in Canada and elsewhere by no means limits itself to 
‘organised crime’ as that is commonly understood. Anti-money laundering 
controls can identify and be used to target a broad spectrum of serious crimes. 
This may result objectively from sums over $10,000 (objective reporting) and/or 
from sums that are incompatible with the individual’s income and profile with a 
financial institution (subjective suspicious transaction reports that can potentially 
be triggered at any monetary amount). There are limits to what money laundering 
controls can achieve, and I am critiquing the idea what such controls can achieve
when they are ostensibly directed at ‘organised crime’. Whereas, in reality, these 
controls are directed at the finances generated by (potentially) any serious 
predicate crime (i.e., monies or convertible assets).
In chapter seven, I discussed the rise of anti-money laundering (AML) controls 
and the national financial intelligence unit (FIU) in Canada. I addressed the 
common incorrect perception that AML relates primarily to organised crime, as it is 
commonly understood, and drug trafficking. Instead, these controls cover a broad 
range of
serious and organised crime. This diversity can cover virtually any proceeds of 
crime, including tax evasion. I explored financial intelligence as it portrays itself as 
being the vanguard of efforts to tackle serious and organised crime. This 
supposed centrality offered useful insights into several aspects of the prevention 
and control of serious and organised crime.
The chapter began with a brief discussion of getting inside a FIU, in particular the 
author’s involvement with the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre 
of Canada (FINTRAC). It discussed the difficulties of obtaining and using 
information about this very secretive area of public policy and operations. I then 
provided an overview of the policy and operational structure in Canada such as 
the jurisdictional division of governmental and investigative responsibilities.
I then focused on issues surrounding the creation of FINTRAC in 2000. These 
included the domestic and international pressures for its creation, the substantive
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components of the reporting regime, and key components of FINTRAC’s design. 
The discussion also looked at the operational potential of FINTRAC. This included 
its tactical mandate via the disclosure process, levels of analysis that are possible 
in context and the potential utility of external enforcement/intelligence and open 
source databases.
I also examined FINTRAC as representing an example of policy transfer from the 
United States but with a Canadian twist. Its design features are specific to the 
legal and cultural rules in Canada. These design features, in turn, have an effect 
on the potential impact of FINTRAC. This resulted in a variety of public criticisms 
of the institution. I provided a brief discussion on Phase II of FINTRAC’s legislative 
mandate, which is a response to the various criticisms and a general deepening of 
the AML controls in Canada.
Finally, I explored how AML controls may potentially detect or affect the 
phenomenon of home invasion robbery. This included discussion of how HIR, as 
a serious and/or organised crime, can generate sufficient proceeds to trigger 
investigative interest and/or AML detection. This is especially the case with 
respect to the more organised examples discussed above, and, in particular, with 
respect to the multi-billion dollar marijuana grow operation (MGO) industry.
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Bergman U 11 Female offender 
drug addicted 
with lengthy 
criminal record
Motivation to 
acquire money 
for drugs 
purchase
Telephone 
ripped from 
wall
Small 
television 
and a box 
of
silverware
1 Adult 
female
1 adult 
male
87-year-
old widow
(pushed
to the
floor,
pelvis
injured)
Entered
via
ground
floor
apartmen 
t window
Connection 
to drugs 
market
No
neighbour
s
intervene
d
Male was enabler, 
but he left once 
seeing the elderly 
woman was hurt
Bernier M 11 Criminal lifestyle Motivation to 
steal money, 
drugs
(marijuana),
stole
electronic
items
Handgun or 
rifle
Handcuffs
$300
Less than 
$5,000 in 
electronic 
items
No
marijuana
found
Via threats 
of violence 
Bernier 
received 
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from those 
who
misidentifi 
ed the 
target 
property
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1 Young 
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Possibly
two
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ed, struck 
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head with 
butt end 
of firearm)
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at time of 
incident
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down 
door of 
house
Connection
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Bernier
part of
common
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enterprise
to raid
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grow
houses
No
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nt of 
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s
Bernier requested 
from friends where 
to go to steal pot, 
female 
acquaintance 
misidentified the 
target
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Cooper M It Unspecified 
whether he had 
criminal record
Motivation to 
steal money
Ski mask,
gloves,
dark
clothing,
large
hunting
knife
(located in 
home on 
previous 
entry by 
offender)
No
ostensible 
reward, 
apart from 
inflicting 
violence 
and injury
1 Male 16-year- 
old girl 
(assaulted 
with knife)
Entry
through
unlocked
window
Young girl 
at home 
alone for 
the
incident
and
previous
occasions
when
offender
had
entered
No other parties 
involved
Curtis U » Criminal lifestyle Motivation to 
steal money to 
buy cocaine
Balaclava, 
butcher 
knife from 
victim’s 
kitchen
No
ostensible
reward,
although
fled in
victim’s
car and
was
arrested in 
possessio 
n of 
briefcase 
and watch 
owned by 
the couple
1 Male Couple
next door
known to
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male
victim
suffered
stab
wounds
Removed
the
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window 
to gain 
entry
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on, when
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d by the
male
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DaSilva 2 adults held 
extensive 
criminal records 
for violence
Motivation to 
steal money, 
including 
demands for 
bank cards 
and PIN 
passwords
Car, replica 
semi­
automatic 
handgun 
(pellet gun), 
mobile 
phones
Jewellery
and other
valuables
were
stolen
(unspecifi
ed value)
2 Adults
1 Young 
offender
Randomly 
selected 
car driving 
by
Rear- 
ended 
car, 
couple 
attacked 
and later 
taken to 
their
home to
continue
robbery
If there 
were 
passerby 
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road, 
none 
stopped 
to help
Harris tt n Unspecified
whether
offenders had 
criminal records
Obtain money Knife,
screwdriver 
rubber 
gloves and 
a ski mask.
Cut the 
exterior 
phone line 
and ripped 
phone from 
the wall
Rubbed 
down the 
house to 
remove 
fingerprint 
evidence
$1,000 
and an 
unspecifie 
d value in 
jewellery, 
electronics 
credit 
cards, etc.
2 Adults
(one
female)
1 Young 
offender
Elderly
couple
considere
d
potentially
wealthy.
Male
victim was
beaten
and
suffered 
brain 
damage, 
female 
victim was 
pushed 
and fell 
breaking 
her hip
Home 
visited 
twice, in 
part to 
cut
screen
on
kitchen 
window 
(that was 
often left 
open) 
and was 
used as 
the entry 
point
No
interventi 
on from 
neighbour 
until next 
day 
(victim 
dragged 
herself to 
front room 
window)
Male 
victim 
tried to 
defend 
using a 
small saw
Adult female acted 
as match-maker 
for the two males 
who committed the 
actual robbery
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H.(D.G.) i t  n Recent criminal 
lifestyle with one 
conviction each 
for assault and 
theft
Motivation of 
money to fund 
crack and 
marijuana 
habit
Offender
proceeded
on his own
despite
planning
with two
other
accomplice
s
Mask,
disconnecte 
d the phone 
line
$350, and 
un-cashed 
cheque for 
over 
$18,000
17-year- 
old male
Elderly 
woman 
(hurt her 
arm and 
knee 
when 
pushed to 
the floor)
Entered 
the home 
at night, 
not clear 
the point 
of entry
Neighbou
rs did not
intervene,
but a
police
check
stop
several
days later
result in
arrest
Victim had 
engaged the 
young man to do 
odd jobs which 
gave him 
knowledge of the 
home
Ivan Lengthy record 
for burglary, theft 
and robbery
Motivation of 
money to pay 
for gasoline 
(petrol) he 
owed for 
vehicle
Ripped 
phone from 
the wall
$20 and 
bank
cards plus 
the PIN, 
but did not 
get to use 
the latter 
before 
arrest
1 Adult Female 
occupant 
of mobile 
home, 
and 10- 
year-old 
boy was 
present 
but not 
victimised
Gained 
entry by 
asking to 
use the 
phone, 
and 
saying 
that his 
car had 
broken 
down
Neighbou 
rs did not 
intervene, 
but victim 
or a 
neighbour 
called 
police
Indirectly, the 
convenience store 
that provided 
offender with gas 
without payment
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J.C (( » It appear that the 
offender did not 
have a criminal 
record
Motivation to 
exact revenge 
for alleged 
abuse
Mask, two 
large knives
As the
motivation
was
revenge, it 
is not 
clear that 
there was 
any
tangible
reward
1 Young 
offender
Couple
(both
received
various
slashes
and were
bleeding)
Girlfriend 
of the 
offender 
let him 
into the 
house
Neighbou 
rs did not 
intervene, 
daughter 
did not 
intervene
The
daughter
and
parents 
gave a 
false
descriptio 
n to police
Daughter alleged 
couple were 
abusing her, she 
planned with her 
boyfriend for him 
to commit the 
offence
Jones Central
defendant had 
criminal record, 
and he and 
others suspected 
of many other 
offences
Motivation of 
stealing 
marijuana and 
drugs money
Jackets
with
POLICE 
lettering, 
firearms, 
gloves, 
toques, 
plastic flex- 
cuffs, duct 
tape, police 
scanner, 
phone 
ripped from 
the wall
Eight
marijuana
plants
(unspecifi
ed value),
$40
3 Males Couple
hog-tied,
blanket
thrown
over their
head
Female
sexually
assaulted,
male
struck on 
the face 
with
handgun
Front
door
forced
open
Believed to 
be raiders 
of
marijuana
grow
operations
Somewha 
t remote 
location, 
no
neighbour
interventi
on
Involvement of the 
couple in growing 
marijuana 
attracted negative 
attention
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K-(J.) t( II Unclear if the Motivation to Butcher’s Modest 2 Males Elderly Househol No Young offender
offenders had steal money knife (unspecifi male, d, neighbour knew
prior records, and other ed) 1 Male suffered unclear interventi grandchildren of
unclear if victim items amount of young stab whether on the victim, which
had locked doors money offender wound to offenders may have
and windows and some
costume
jewellery
his
stomach
broke in 
or door 
was 
open
contributed to 
targeting
Simmonds u » Two offenders Motivation to Firearm, $25,000 3 Males Victim a Hotel Victim a Apparentl Offenders drawn
most likely steal drugs duct tape cash known room, known y, no one toward victim due
involved in the and drug stolen 1 Female drug unclear drug dealer at the to his illicit
shooting and money from dealer the who hotel activities, and
murder had constructi manner laundered intervene $90,000 debt
previous records on office, in which proceeds d apparently owed to
for weapons, unclear if victim through his one of the
violence and both two kilos was constructio offenders
were convicted of cocaine kidnappe n company
for involvement in worth d
a previous home $80,000
invasion were 
stolen 
from the 
victim
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Taing U 11 Whether
offenders had 
previous records 
is unclear
Motivation to 
steal money, 
and valuables 
including 
jewellery
Imitation
handgun
$70,000 in
jewellery
removed
from the
family
store,
undisclose
d modest
money
and
valuables 
from the 
home
5 or 6 
Males
Couple 
with two 
daughters
i
offenders
appeared
to have
some
knowledg
e the
family
owned a
jewellery
store
Househol 
d entered 
at
gunpoint
(imitation
handgun)
Neighbou 
rs did not 
intervene
A member of the 
victims’ extended 
family may have 
released
information about 
the jewellery 
business
Varga Three of the 
offenders had 
criminal records, 
but one had no 
record
Motivation to 
steal
marijuana and 
drug money
Baseball 
bat, duct 
tape, steak 
knife from 
victim’s 
kitchen, 
phone 
disconnecte 
d
Unspecifie 
d quantity 
and value 
of
marijuana 
stolen, no 
drug 
money 
located by 
offenders
4 Males Man
running a 
marijuana 
grow 
operation, 
he was 
beaten 
head to 
toe with 
the
baseball
bat,
superficial 
wounds 
from the 
knife
Home,
unclear
the
specific 
manner 
of entry
Offenders
were
raiders of
marijuana
grow
operations
No
apparent
neighbour
interventi
on
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Confidenti
al-A
Criminal records 
of the group 
unclear
Motivation to 
recover debt 
for marijuana 
received
Masks, an 
axe
No
apparent
reward
was
retrieved 
in drugs or 
money, 
appears to 
have been 
about 
reputation 
of leading 
drug 
dealer
5 Adults
1 Young 
offender
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Couple 
who had 
received 
two
ounces of 
marijuana 
advanced 
from the 
group 
leader via 
the young 
offender. 
Male
victim was 
beaten 
and struck 
repeatedl 
y with the 
axe, 
female 
victim was 
threatene 
d with 
injury and 
sexual 
assault
Apartme
nt
Linked to
marijuana
market
No
apparent 
interventi 
on from 
neighbour
Victim had taken 
drugs and
appeared to be 
avoiding payment
Newspap
er
Examples
A u » Unclear whether 
offenders have 
criminal records, 
but quite likely
Motivation to 
intimidate rival 
aboriginal 
gang, and 
revenge
Samurai
sword,
butcher
knife
Intimidatio
n and
reputation
are the
reward
rather
than
monies or 
assets per 
se
2 Males 
1 Female
Rival
aboriginal
gang,
victims
received
cuts,
broken
arm, stab
wounds,
and a
nearly
severed
hand
Inner-city
home
entered
by
kicking 
down the 
back 
door
Gang
rivalry and 
intimidation 
, related to 
markets for 
drugs, 
prostitution 
, etc.
No
neighbour
interventi
on
Gang of the victim 
had committed 
previous home 
invasion against 
the gang involved 
in this incident
B « 11 Unclear whether 
offenders have 
criminal records
Motivation to 
steal money 
and valuables
Surgical 
gloves, 
police 
scanner, 
rolls of 
(duct) tape, 
and a list of 
potential 
victims
Undisclos 
ed value 
of money 
and
valuables
5 Males Individual 
s believed 
to have 
money 
and
valuables
at home,
victims
often
beaten
bound
and
gagged
Entry to 
homes 
gained 
by
dressing 
as postal 
delivery
No
neighbour
interventi
on
An unidentified 
person(s) was 
likely involved in 
listing potential 
victims
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c Unclear whether 
offenders have 
criminal records
Motivation to 
steal money, 
jewellery and 
other 
valuables
Replica
handgun
$200,000
in
jewellery, 
cash and 
gold from 
one
incident, 
unspecifie 
d money 
and
valuables 
in the 
other 
incident
Ring of 
12
suspects,
two
reported 
incidents 
with three 
involved 
in each 
incident
Elderly,
one
beaten to
death,
another
pistol-
whipped
Entry to 
homes 
achieved 
by
breaking
down
doors
No
neighbour
interventi
on
Middle-aged male 
in apparent Fagin­
like role
Jewellery store 
owner provided 
client lists to the 
ring
D « » Not indicated 
whether
offenders have 
criminal records, 
but likely given 
their gang 
lifestyle
Motivation to 
steal money 
and property
Stun guns, 
police 
scanner, 
and masks
Suspected 
of stealing 
tens of 
thousands 
of dollars 
over two 
year 
period
7 males
including
two
ringleade
rs
Method of 
targeting 
potential 
victims 
not clear
Method 
of entry 
to homes 
unclear
No
apparent
neighbour
interventi
on
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E Individuals linked 
to a gang
Motivation to 
steal weapons 
and other 
property
Unclear
what
resources 
were used
Unspecifie 
d value of 
weapons 
and other 
property
50
members
of a
street
gang,
including
the
leader
and
seven
lieutenant
s
Acting as 
prospectiv 
e
purchaser
s of
advertised
weapons,
other
unspecifie
d
targeting
methods
used
Entry 
acquired 
by acting 
as
prospecti 
ve buyer 
of
advertise 
d items
Links to 
markets in 
trafficking 
weapons 
and drugs
No
apparent
neighbour
interventi
on
Many victims had
advertised
products
(weapons)
valuable to the
gang and its
network(s)
F u n Offenders not 
identified
Motivation to 
steal weapons
No
additional
resources
apparent
Unspecifie 
d value of 
four
handguns
4 Males Elderly 
woman, 
when 
police 
responde 
d they 
found a 
cache of 
43 rifles 
and shot­
guns, one 
crossbow, 
and 3,000 
rounds of 
ammunitio 
n
Home
broken
into,
unspecifi
ed
manner
Likely links 
to weapons 
trafficking 
on the part 
of the 
offenders 
(the
weapons
appeared
to be
legally
owned but
improperly
stored)
No
apparent
neighbour
interventi
on
Offenders had 
somehow learned 
the elderly woman 
had weapons on 
the premises, or 
had learned that 
her relatives held 
weapons at her 
home
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G U 11 Unclear whether 
teenagers had 
existing criminal 
record, but 
unlikely
Motivation to 
steal
marijuana for 
a fee
None
apparent
Unspecifie 
d fee for 
stolen 
marijuana
2 groups 
of
teenager
s,
unspecifi
ed
numbers
Homes
containing
suspected
marijuana
grow
operation
s
Method 
of entry 
unclear
Links to 
marijuana 
grow 
operation
Teens service 
contracted by a 
broker, unclear if 
the broker linked to 
major crime 
groups (Asian, or 
biker gangs)
H Criminal records 
or background of 
offenders unclear
Motivation to 
steal
marijuana and 
drug money
Baseball
bats,
machetes,
and
handgun
50
marijuana 
plants 
(unspecifi 
ed value)
5 to 8 
Males
Marijuana
grow
operation,
victims
and all but
one of the
attackers
Vietname
se
Entry
acquired
by
breaking
down
back
door
Links to
marijuana
trade
No
apparent
neighbour
interventi
on
Home was 
identified by 
undisclosed 
party(ies),
1 Unclear whether 
offenders had 
criminal records, 
although one of 
the males was 
the subject of 
ongoing legal 
proceedings 
relating to his 
deportation order
Motivation to 
find guns, 
drugs and 
money
Firearm Not
specified
whether
monies or
assets
were
acquired,
intimidatio
n may
have been
stronger
motive
2 Males
and 3
Young
offenders
(all of
Chinese
descent)
Individual 
affiliated 
with a 
rival gang 
through 
brother, 
primary 
target 
shot in 
head, two 
other non- 
fatal 
victims
Entry
was
achieved
by
breaking 
glass of 
door or 
window
Links to 
gang
rivalry, and
competition
with a
major
Asian
criminal
network
No
apparent
neighbour
interventi
on
The victim’s direct 
or indirect 
involvement in 
gang activity 
attracted the 
attackers
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